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Summary
Self-access in goal selection refers to processes that make self-related knowledge available
while goals are being chosen. The ability to access the self is generally considered desirable
because it allows people to choose goals that are in line with their underlying needs and implicit
preferences. The present research addresses three main questions regarding self-access in goal
selection. Firstly, it clarifies the relationship between different self-access models. A common
feature of models of self-access in goal selection is that they conceptualize self-access in terms
of a communication between two systems, one implicit and one explicit. Whether such a
communication is possible depends on the availability of intuitive, affective, or experiential
processing. Secondly, different strategies for measuring self-access are discussed. The
measurement of self-access may be based on self-reports or on more objective criteria, where
the latter may be classified as fit versus process measures. Process measures are considered the
best measures of self-access in a narrow sense. Thirdly, several studies tested the prediction of
self-access based on PSI theory (Kuhl, 2000). Self-access was hypothesized to become
deficient in subjects with low action orientation who experienced negative affect. This
prediction could not be confirmed by the present studies, neither using the self-infiltration
paradigm (Kuhl & Kazén, 1994), nor using preference consistency as a measure of self-access.
These unexpected results are explained by interfering memory processes as well as
heterogeneity of self-access concepts. The main conclusion drawn from the present research is
that focusing on theoretical distinctions allows a more fine-grained theoretical and empirical
analysis of self-access phenomena.
Keywords: self-knowledge, self-access, goal selection, motivation, PSI theory,
self-infiltration
v

Introduction
Members of individualistic societies (cf. Triandis & Gelfand, 2012) are encouraged to
pursue their own goals based on a firm sense of identity. In other words, they are encouraged to
derive their goals from what they know about themselves. This notion of the human being as an
independent, self-reliant person is characteristic of humanistic psychology and has largely been
ignored in other branches of psychological theory.
Rogers (1961), for instance, held that the troubles that clients of psychotherapy face are
rooted in the underlying questions: “Who am I, really? How can I get in touch with my real
self, . . . ? How can I become myself?” (p. 108; emphasis in original). Thus, according to
Rogers, progress in psychotherapy is based on a process through which the patient moves away
from—among other things—façades, from “oughts”, from meeting expectations, from pleasing
others (p. 167 ff.), towards “being . . . the process which he inwardly and actually is” (p. 175;
emphasis in original). In other words, the patient learns to overcome obstacles and influences
that keep him from being himself.
Humanistic psychologists have traditionally been sceptical about the application of the
positivistic philosophy and the scientific method to the study of human behaviour and
experience (e.g. Maslow, 1956). Rogers (1961, Chapter 10), a humanistic psychologist himself,
however, opted for making use of science, in addition to the “experiential approach” (p. 210) he
followed when working as a therapist. More recently, empirical existential psychology (Koole,
Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2006) has emerged as an area of research that subjects ideas derived
from existentialist—and the closely related humanistic—philosophy (see Sartre, 1970) to
rigorous scientific testing. The present work is part of this tradition in that the question of how
people can become themselves (Rogers, 1961) is researched using empirical methods.
In personality psychology, the task of selecting goals based on one’s sense of self has
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recently gained interest in research on authenticity (Kernis & Goldman, 2006; Maltby, Wood,
Day, & Pinto, 2012). According to Wood, Linley, Maltby, Baliousis, and Joseph (2008),
authenticity consists of, firstly, a person’s awareness of his or her actual physiological, affective,
and cognitive states (i.e. absence of self-alienation), secondly, the unimpaired behavioural and
affective expression of a person’s self-perceptions (i.e. authentic living), and, thirdly, the extent
to which self-alienation and authentic living are free from undue social influences (i.e. not
accepting external influence; p. 386).
A considerable body of research shows that aspects of authenticity are positively
associated with measures of well-being. Subjects who report being authentic also report high
positive affect, self-esteem, and subjective well-being (Goldman & Kernis, 2002; Sheldon,
Ryan, Rawsthorne, & Ilardi, 1997; Wood et al., 2008). Individual differences in authenticity are
thought to be rooted in experiences in childhood and adolescence. According to Harter (2002),
the validation of the child’s own experiences by the parents is a central developmental precursor
of authenticity (p. 386).
The study of authenticity in personality psychology is limited in at least two ways. Firstly,
its measures are typically situated on a phenomenological level, i.e. not the actual but only the
perceived self-awareness or authentic living are measured. Secondly, while it considers distal
antecedents of authenticity, such as parenting styles, it disregards more proximal antecedents of
authenticity that may lie in aspects of the situation or in the person’s current state. For example,
social threat or pressure may lead to unauthentic behaviour, as compared to more relaxed
situations. The personality approach to authenticity remains mute about the question through
what processes a person selects and realizes goals that may be considered authentic, i.e. an
expression of the real self.
The present thesis concerns the self-awareness aspect of authenticity (see Wood et al.,
2008). However, as opposed to the personality approach to authenticity, the present research
focuses on self-awareness in the process of goal selection. Moreover, knowledge of the own
person is conceptualized in terms of objective, not merely subjective accuracy of
self-knowledge. Taken together, the present work investigates the processes that allow people to
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select goals that are objectively in line with their self. These processes are subsumed under the
term self-access.
In three papers, theoretical, methodological, and empirical questions about self-access are
tackled. More specifically, these questions concern the interrelations between different theories
of self-access, the measurement methods used in self-access research, and the empirical testing
of state and trait antecedents of self-access.
In the following, I, firstly, briefly review goal-selection research. Secondly, I define
self-access. Thirdly, I look at research on self-access in goal selection from three perspectives.
Finally, I give an overview of the three papers included in the present thesis.
How Goals Are Selected
Goal selection refers to the act of choosing one’s own goals from a larger number of
possible goals. To avoid confusion, I propose the term goal setting should be reserved to denote
the formulation of a given goal in terms of, for instance, wording and framing (Locke &
Latham, 2002). Thus, while goal selection refers to the question of what goals are chosen, goal
setting refers to the question of how these goals are cognitively and verbally represented. While
both aspects have implications for goal striving (Gollwitzer & Oettingen, 2012), the former is
more relevant to questions of the authenticity of goals.
A number of theories concern the antecedents and processes involved in the selection of
goals. In the following, I briefly discuss goal selection according to the model of action phases,
theories of decision-making, and theories on the self-regulation of decision-making.
According to the model of action phases (Gollwitzer, 1990), the goal-selection process is
initiated by wishes that are derived from motives (i.e. implicit needs; McClelland, 1985).
Because time and other resources are scarce, not all wishes may be put into action. Therefore,
some of the wishes need to be selected and made into intentions (i.e. into goals). According to
Gollwitzer (1990), this selection process is based on a contemplation of the feasibility and
desirability of wishes. Feasibility concerns the perceived likelihood that a certain outcome can
be achieved given the restrictions of one’s resources and of the situation, for instance, lack of
ability or time constraints. Desirability concerns the question to what extent the expected
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consequences of a certain path of action, as a whole, are thought to be pleasant or unpleasant
(Gollwitzer, 1990, p. 56). Thus, according to this model, goal selection is based on a
comparison between wishes with respect to the expected value of the anticipated consequences
of actions.
Gollwitzer’s account of goal selection is similar to normative theories of decision-making
in that it focuses on the cognitive processing of expectancy and value information. Normative
theories of decision-making hold that, when making a decision, a person should try to maximize
the expected utility (or value) of the consequences of choosing a certain option (see, e.g.,
Edwards, 1954). Simon (1955), however, criticized normative decision theories for ignoring the
psychological processes that underlie decision-making. More specifically, he argued that the
decision-maker typically has limited information as well as a limited capacity for processing the
available information. Based on this notion of bounded rationality (Simon, 1955), decision
theorists have argued that decisions are often based on relatively simple, sequential heuristics,
which, nevertheless, often lead to good decisions (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974).
The process of goal selection ends with the establishment of a commitment to the goal,
i.e. of a feeling that the selected course of action is personally important and will be pursued
even in the face of obstacles. Like goal selection, commitment to a goal is thought to depend on
the expected value of anticipated action outcomes (Klein, Wesson, Hollenbeck, & Alge, 1999).
Goal commitment may be regarded as a measure of how much a selected goal is wanted.
However, goal commitment does not solely depend on the goal-related subjective values
and expectancies but also on processes that integrate these two kinds of information. According
to the theory of fantasy realization (Oettingen, Pak, & Schnetter, 2001), the way in which value
and expectancy information are processed affects goal commitment. In a number of studies,
Oettingen et al. (2001) tested the hypothesis that mentally contrasting the positive future (i.e.
the value of achieving the goal) with the negative reality (i.e. on factors that speak for high task
difficulty) has an impact on goal commitment. Results indicated that goal commitment was
unrelated to expectations of success after subjects had focused on either the positive future or
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the negative reality. However, after subjects had contrasted the desired future with the present
reality, goal commitment was positively associated with expectations of success. Thus,
experiencing the discrepancy between present and future made subjects commit to goals that
were perceived as relatively easy to achieve and refrain from committing to goals that were
relatively hard to achieve (for a summary, see Gollwitzer & Oettingen, 2012).
In sum, according to different lines of research, choice of and commitment to goals
depend on the integration of expectancy and value information. Recent research from the
psychology of decision-making suggests that this integration of information is not exhaustive
but highly selective. In addition, mental contrasting of value- and expectancy-related cognitions
affects goal commitment, more specifically its association with expectations of success.
A number of criteria have been used to evaluate the selection of a given goal. Such
criteria include the adherence to mathematically derived axioms (e.g. Tversky & Kahneman,
1974), post-choice satisfaction (e.g. Wilson et al., 1993), or well-being (e.g. Sheldon, Ryan,
Deci, & Kasser, 2004). Another criterion for good goal choice is whether, in the process of goal
selection, the self is accessed to a larger or smaller extent. This concept of self-access is defined
in more detail in the following.
Defining Self-Access
Self-access is a relatively uncommon technical term which, however, is used here with
good reason. In the following, self-access is defined based on definitions of self and
self-knowledge. In short, self-knowledge is the accuracy of the self’s subjective representation.
Self-access refers to processes that enable self-knowledge.
Self
Unfortunately, some researchers have considered it unneccessary to define self, even
though this term is central to their theories. Kohut (1977), for example, in his book The
restoration of the self, explicitly refuses to furnish the concept of self with an exact definition
(p. 310 ff.). Similarly, Baumeister (1998), in his chapter entitled “The self”, does not attempt to
define the term but merely refers to the word’s colloquial usage everybody is assumed to be
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familiar with (p. 681).
Defining the self, however, is possible. The psychoanalyst Heinz Hartmann (1964)
defined the self in comparison to the ego. The self, he proposed, refers to the own person, as
opposed to the object (e.g. the other person), while the ego refers to the “a psychic system” that
is “opposed to other substructures of personality” (i.e. the super-ego or the id; p. 127). In a
similar vein, the philosopher John Perry (1996) considers it “a straightforward view . . . that the
self is just the person” (p. 524).
This view is contrary to the idea that the self is an entity within the mental system.
According to Sheldon and Elliot (1999), for instance, the self is not the whole person but part of
the person, namely the “center of agentic activity” (p. 483). In my opinion, however, the self in
terms of the center of agentic activity is not a clearly definable concept and therefore of little
use for empirical research. The self in terms of the person, by contrast, is a well-defined concept
that refers to a human being as viewed from his or her own perspective.
In the present research, the term self generally refers to the person. It may also refer to
any aspect of a person, be it cognitions, emotions, motivations, or bodily functions. It refers to a
specific entity within a person—an entity that is more true or central than other entities—,
however, when the term self is used in the context of a theory that suggests such a definition, for
instance, in the context of personality systems interaction theory (PSI theory; Kuhl, 2000) or the
self-concordance model (SCM; Sheldon & Elliot, 1999).
From Self-Knowledge to Self-Access
Before I define self-access, it is useful to introduce the closely related term
self-knowledge. Self-knowledge (for summaries, see Vazire & Carlson, 2010; Wicklund &
Eckert, 1992; Wilson, 2009; Wilson & Dunn, 2004) is knowledge of the own person, or of
certain aspects thereof. A person may know any aspect of the own person more or less
accurately. According to Wilson and Dunn (2004), these aspects may be perceptions, motor
abilities, personality, attitudes, or self-esteem. In personality psychology, for instance,
self-knowledge of one’s own traits has been measured by comparing self-report with
behavioural measures of traits, or by comparing self-perception with the perception by others
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(Vazire & Carlson, 2010).
Comparisons between subjective and (more) objective measures of self-aspects are,
strictly speaking, not measures of self-knowledge. According to philosophical theory (for a
summary, see Ayer, 1956), holding a true belief is not a sufficient condition for knowledge.
Rather, knowledge is defined as a true belief which, in addition, is in some way justified, for
example, by accurate perception or valid reasoning.1 Therefore, a belief about the own person
that is objectively true does not constitute self-knowledge. A reliable process or mechanism that
justifies the belief about oneself is an additional necessary condition. In the present research,
the term self-access refers to such processes and mechanisms.
Self-access was defined more narrowly in personality systems interaction theory (Kuhl,
2000), from which the term originated. Kuhl (2000) conceptualized the self as a memory
system, more precisely as “an extended network of representations of own states, including
personal preferences, needs, emotional states, options for action in particular situations, and
past experiences involving the self” (p. 131). Based on this definition, Baumann and Kuhl
(2003) introduced the term self-access to refer to access to the contents of the self. Thus,
self-access refers to the retrieval of self-related information from a specific memory system. In
the present research, by contrast, the term self-access is used in a broader sense. It refers to any
process that makes self-knowledge available, including accurate self-perception and successful
retrieval of self-related information from memory.
Taken together, self, self-knowledge, and self-access are different aspects of self-access
theories. Firstly, self-access theories need to define that which is accessed, here called the self.
Secondly, they need to provide a means to assess people’s knowledge of the self. Thirdly, they
should specify processes that make self-knowledge possible.
Self-knowledge and self-access are especially important during the selection of goals.
Choosing goals that are based on a false view of the own person may lead to futile efforts,
overexertion, and the frustration of needs. The present research focuses on self-access in goal
selection.
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Self-Access in Goal Selection: Three Perspectives
Self-access in the process of goal selection is thought to allow the alignment of one’s
goals with one’s self or personality (e.g. Job & Brandstätter, 2009). In other words, self-access
enables the selection of goals that fit the self. However, the question through which processes
this alignment is achieved is subject to debate. Self-access in goal selection may be studied
from at least three perspectives, namely from a theoretical, a methodological, and an empirical
perspective.
With respect to the theoretical perspective, the problem of defining self-access in goal
selection has been discussed above. Another theoretical problem concerns the question of what
mental structures and what processes underlie self-access. As mentioned above, some theories
hold that there is a mental entity—a part of the self as defined above—that contains the person’s
true preferences and evaluations. Is this assumption plausible? If so, how can this entity be
described? Furthermore, under what conditions can the contents of that entity be accessed? Are
there individual difference and/or situational variables that determine how easily aspects of the
self can be accessed? Such questions are addressed by a number of theories, for instance, by
motive disposition theory (Thrash, Cassidy, Maruskin, & Elliot, 2010), personality systems
interaction theory (Kuhl, 2000), the self-concordance model (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999), or by
certain decision-making paradigms (Lee, Amir, & Ariely, 2009). However, even though the
different theories are apparently referring to the same phenomenon, the question how they are
related to each other is yet unanswered. Clarifying the similarities and differences between
flavours of self-access theories may prove fruitful for the development of self-access theory as a
whole.
From a methodological perspective, a crucial question concerns the measurement of
self-access. Developing a measurement technique is not a trivial undertaking because an
objective measure of the “real self” is difficult to achieve. However, such a measure is a
prerequisite for assessing the accuracy of the subjective self relative to the “real self”. In
research on self-access in goal selection, a variety of strategies for assessing self-access have
been used, including projective tests (McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989) and
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self-reported autonomy of action-regulation (Sheldon, 2002). It is unclear, however, whether the
different measurement methods correspond to one common self-access construct. Moreover, an
objective measure of self-access that is straightforward, reliable, and economical needs yet to be
developed.
The empirical perspective is situated at the intersection of the two perspectives discussed
above: In empirical studies, methods for the measurement of self-access are used to test claims
made by self-access theories. The most prominent research questions concern the antecedents
and the consequences of self-access deficiencies. Both are relevant for applied settings.
Knowledge of the consequences of self-access deficiencies highlights the importance of intact
self-access for well-being and personal growth. Knowledge of the antecedents, in turn, is a
prerequisite for the development of intervention techniques that enhance self-access. While a
large body of research has been concerned with the consequences of self-access deficiencies
(see, e.g., Thrash et al., 2010, for a summary), fewer research exists on the antecedents of
self-access deficiencies (e.g. Kuhl & Kazén, 1994). Therefore, the present research focuses on
the antecedents of self-access.
In sum, the three big questions in research on self-access in goal selection are: What are
the similarities and differences between self-access theories? How can self-access be measured?
Does the evidence support the theoretical claims about the antecedents of self-access
deficiencies? The present work aims at increasing knowledge with respect to each of these
questions.
The Present Research
The present research goes beyond previous research in several ways. Firstly, as mentioned
above, the topic of self-access has been treated in a number of theories. However, a synoptic
view of these theories has not been attempted so far. In the present research, the topic will be
discussed from an overarching perspective. Secondly, in previous research, self-knowledge
(Wicklund & Eckert, 1992; Wilson, 2009) has been the phenomenon under investigation. The
present research goes beyond the question of how well people know themselves by adding the
question of through what processes people can make use of their—possibly
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latent—self-knowledge, in other words, the question of how people access their self. Thirdly,
because humanistic psychology has been traditionally intertwined with phenomenology
(Churchill & Wertz, 1985), some researchers of the humanistic school have focused on
subjective measures of self-access. As I, however, define self-access in terms of the justified
accuracy of a belief about the own person, objective measures of self-access are more
appropriate than subjective measures (see Wicklund & Eckert, 1992, Chapter 4). Thus, the
present research focuses on objective measures of self-access, i.e. on those measures that do not
rely solely on self-reports. Fourthly, while some research on self-access, notably from the
decision-making domain, has focused on situational factors, other research has been limited to
personality factors that affect self-access. The present research, in contrast, is based on the
assumption that situational as well as personality variables are needed to fully account for
differences in self-access.
In three papers, unresolved issues in self-access research, which have been discussed
above, are addressed. While the first paper focuses on theory and methodology from an
overarching perspective, the second and third paper focus on the validation of measurement
methods and the prediction of self-access.
Paper 1: Self-Access as Dual-System Communication
As mentioned above, self-access in goal selection has been explained by a variety of
models from motivation and decision-making research. In the first paper, the similarities and
differences of the various models are analysed. This results in a meta-theoretical framework of
self-access models, the dual-system communication framework.
According to the framework, the various models of self-access in goal selection agree that
self-access is based on a transfer of information between two systems. While one system
contains self-related information that is, in general, not consciously accessible, the other system
is responsible for conscious processes, such as verbal descriptions or volitional control.
Whether self-access takes place depends, according to the framework, on the availability of a
certain mode of processing. The framework includes a classification of models of self-access in
goal selection.
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Furthermore, decision-making theories of self-access, as well as their relationship to the
dual-system communication framework are discussed. Finally, the framework is used to
generate research questions on theoretical and methodological aspects of self-access in goal
selection.
Paper 2: Self-Infiltration as a Measure of Self-Access
This paper reports on a replication study that tested a theoretical assumption of
personality systems interaction theory (Kuhl, 2000). In science, replications are necessary to
ensure that false-positive research results are corrected in the long run (Pashler & Harris, 2012).
Personality systems interaction theory holds that subjects with a low
action-orientation—i.e. subjects who recover more slowly from stressful experiences—, have
reduced self-access capabilities (Kuhl & Kazén, 1994), especially when they are in a state of
negative affect (Baumann & Kuhl, 2003). In the context of personality systems interaction
theory, the confusion of self- with other-generated goals, the so called self-infiltration, serves as
a measure of self-access.
In a laboratory experiment, it was tested whether self-infiltration was predicted by the
combined effect of action-orientation and negative affect, as had been shown in previous
research (Baumann & Kuhl, 2003). In a further attempt to show that self-infiltration is indeed a
measure of self-access, individual difference variables associated with self-access were
included in the study.
Because self-infiltration is a memory paradigm, data analysis included calculations
according to the signal-detection approach. Based on this approach, a new method of analyzing
self-infiltration data is proposed.
Paper 3: Self-Access and Preference Consistency
The self-infiltration paradigm just mentioned, as well as other self-infiltration measures
(e.g. motive-goal congruence; Thrash et al., 2010) suffer from the disadvantage of being
time-consuming with respect to data collection and analysis. Working with the picture story
exercise (McClelland et al., 1989, PSE;) requires content analysis of verbal material. A
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measurement of self-infiltration requires sessions of one hour or more per subject. Therefore, a
more economical alternative to these self-access measures would be of use.
In the third paper, the consistency of preferences is proposed as an alternative measure of
self-access. More specifically, the internal consistency of preference judgements, on the one
hand, and the agreement of preference judgments with choices, on the other hand, were
hypothesized to be self-access measures. In three studies, self-access was expected to depend
on the combined effect of action-orientation and negative affect, as is the case in self-infiltration
research.
This series of studies was situated at the intersection of goal-selection and
decision-making research, which allows insights into the characteristics of both research
traditions. While in goal-selection research it is taken for granted that motivational trait
variables partly explain choice, the existence of such trait variables is disputed in the field of
decision-making.
Notes
1 For instance, imagine that you believe that your train will depart on Platform 1. However, your belief is
based on a memory error because, according to the timetable, your train should depart from Platform 3. If your
train departs, nevertheless,—due to construction work or technical fault—on Platform 1 your true belief does not
constitute knowledge because it was not justified by a valid process of knowledge generation.
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Abstract
A number of models used in the psychology of motivation include assumptions about
self-access in goal selection, i.e. about a person’s ability to choose goals according to his or
her needs and preferences. Examples of such models include the information-processing
model of implicit and explicit motives, the self-concordance model, and PSI theory. In the
current paper, the literature on self-access is reviewed and a meta-theoretical framework for
self-access models is developed. According to the resulting dual-system communication
framework, self-access is explained by communication between one system, in which implicit
evaluative dispositions are stored, and a second system that mediates the conscious control of
action. Whether communication is successful depends on whether the mode of processing is
appropriate to the mode of representation of the memory contents to be processed. Based on
this dual-system communication framework, models of self-access in goal selection are
compared, classified, and related to models of self-access from the decision-making domain.
The framework is then used to derive ideas for future research.
Keywords: self-knowledge, self-access, motivation, decision-making, dual processing
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Self-Access in Goal Selection Explained by Communication between Dual Systems
A goal is ”a cognitive representation of a future object that the organism is committed to
approach or avoid” (Elliot & Fryer, 2008, p. 244), where the term object typically refers to an
entity, event, experience, or characteristic. According to Locke and Latham (2002), goals
exert their influence through four mechanisms. They direct attention and effort toward
goal-relevant activities; they energize behaviour; they lead to persistence in a task; and they
lead to the “arousal, discovery, and/or use of task-relevant knowledge and strategies”
(p. 706 f.). While these mechanisms may apply to the effects of goals in general, Locke and
Latham held that goals are particularly effective when they are both specific (as opposed to
do-your-best goals) and challenging. Thus, the formation of well-designed goals enhances
performance, e.g. in work and school contexts.
The goal-selection1 process and the function it serves have been described in the model
of action phases (Gollwitzer, 1990). According to Achtziger and Gollwitzer (2008), a person’s
motives, i.e. his or her dispositional needs, produce certain wishes, a large number of which
are present at any point in time. As the available resources, e.g. the total available time, is
limited, only a small portion of a person’s wishes may be translated into action. Goal selection
is described as a weighing up of pros and cons, in the course of which the desirability and
feasibility of action outcomes is considered (cf. Gollwitzer & Oettingen, 2012). Thus, the
available resources are distributed among a small portion of wishes by turning a limited
number of wishes into binding goals.
In the course of the translation process from motives to wishes to goals, a person needs
to retrieve valid, self-related information from memory in order to achieve a fit between goals
and underlying dispositions. Baumann and Kuhl (2003) called this retrieval process
self-access (cf. Quirin & Kuhl, 2008). The current work is based on the assumption that
self-access in goal selection differs between individuals, and that these differences have
consequences for action regulation and well-being.
Choosing goals in accordance with underlying dispositions may be beneficial for two
reasons. Firstly, goals which are, in some way, out-of-tune with underlying dispositions may
be more difficult to pursue because the discordance within the organism may interfere with
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optimal motivation. Whether a goal is supported by underlying dispositions may be
particularly relevant when the action taken is not running smoothly and the continuation of
goal pursuit is called into question. Secondly, successfully achieving a goal that is discordant
with underlying dispositions may not be as rewarding as a goal that is rooted in higher-level
dispositions, needs, or values. Therefore, choosing inappropriate goals may reduce effort and
persistence, as well as positive affect following success.
The choice process has been an issue in two theoretical traditions: While motivation
psychology has focused on the dispositional and affective antecedents of goal selection, the
psychology of decision-making has focused on situational and cognitive antecedents of
choice. Both traditions, however, have contributed to self-access research. Therefore, in
addition to goal-selection models that are rooted in motivation psychology, we also consider
decision-making models. In the current paper, we review contemporary models of self-access
in goal selection and their respective paradigms, and connect them with related models from
the psychology of decision-making. Ideas for future research are then derived from the
resulting meta-theoretical framework.
In particular, three points are made. Firstly, we argue that current models of self-access
in goal selection fit a meta-theoretical framework which explains self-access by means of the
communication between dual systems. Secondly, we classify the paradigms used in
self-access research according to two criteria: (a) the extent to which theoretical reasoning and
empirical methods tap into self-access processes as such; and (b) consideration of
interpersonal processes, i.e. of coping with social influence. Thirdly, we review self-access
models and paradigms from decision-making research and show how they are related to
models of self-access in goal selection.
Models of Self-Access in Goal Selection
In the following, we present four prominent models that are closely related to
self-access in goal selection: motive disposition theory (MDT; McClelland, 1985), the
information processing model of dual motivation (IPM2; Schultheiss & Strasser, 2012), the
self-concordance model (SCM; Sheldon & Elliot, 1999), and personality systems interaction
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theory (PSI theory Kuhl, 2000). This review serves as a basis for comparing and classifying
models of self-access in goal selection.
Congruence between Systems: Motive Disposition Theory
MDT, as advocated by McClelland (1985), was not originally considered a self-access
model. Nevertheless, the model needs to be included in the literature review as, firstly, it is an
important ancestor of current models of self-access in goal selection and, secondly, it has been
reinterpreted as such a model in recent times.
According to Weinberger and McClelland (1990; cf. McClelland, 1985), a motive is an
anticipatory goal state which consists of the expectation that a natural incentive—i.e. a
stimulus that innately and automatically elicits positive affect—might become available if a
certain behaviour is executed. For instance, doing something better—in other words,
surpassing a standard of excellence—is the natural incentive for the achievement motive
(McClelland, 1985, p. 228). Thus, the achievement motive consists of the expectation that a
“consummatory affective experience” (McClelland, 1985, p. 136) related to doing something
better may be reached through appropriate behaviour.
In addition, motives have been defined as personality traits. These motive dispositions
are characterized by a heightened sensitivity and attention to a specific natural incentive,
which leads to a higher probability that the corresponding motive will be aroused. This, in
turn, leads to behaviour aiming at experiencing the consummatory affect (Weinberger &
McClelland, 1990).
The number of natural incentives is assumed to be limited (Weinberger & McClelland,
1990). Consequently only a limited number of motives exist, each of them aimed at the
consummatory affective experience related to a specific natural incentive. In MDT, three
motives have received the most attention: the achievement, affiliation, and power motives
(McClelland, 1985). Subjects scoring high on dispositional measures of these motives are
thought to be particularly sensitive to the incentives of (a) surpassing a standard of excellence
(achievement), (b) engaging in positive social relationships (affiliation), or (c) exerting
influence on other people (power), respectively.
SELF-ACCESS IN GOAL SELECTION 22
The measurement of motives and the dual-systems model of motivation. From the
beginnings of motive research (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953), motives were
assumed to be inaccessible through direct introspection, which is why they are also called
implicit motives. Therefore, self-report measures were not thought to be suitable for the
measurement of motive dispositions. Instead, an adaptation of the Thematic Apperception
Test (TAT3; Murray, 1943) was used. In this test, subjects are required to generate stories
based on photographic stimuli. Inferences about the subject’s personality characteristics are
made by counting the occurrences of certain content categories. Content coding systems were
developed for the three motives mentioned above, allowing content analysis to be standardized
across different coders (Winter, 1991).
The TAT measure has been criticized as having unsatisfactory retest reliability as well as
low internal consistency (Entwisle, 1972). However, in recent years, Schultheiss and
colleagues have collected empirical and meta-analytical evidence showing that retest stability
is higher than previously thought (e.g. r = .52 for a 1-month interval; Schultheiss, Liening, &
Schad, 2008; Schultheiss & Pang, 2007). Moreover, they argued that internal consistency
measures are not suitable for the TAT measure, as the construct to be measured—because of
its motivational nature—is unlikely to remain constant during the measurement period
(Schultheiss & Pang, 2007). Therefore, reliability of TAT-based motive measures may be
considered “sufficient for research purposes” (Schultheiss, 2008, p. 610).
Correlations between TAT motive measures and self-report measures of the same
motives are typically close to zero (see Schultheiss, 2008). While critics have interpreted this
fact as a lack of convergent validity, possibly based on poor reliability (Entwisle, 1972),
supporters have argued that the constructs measured by TAT versus self-report instruments
are—even though they are aimed at measuring motives of the same content
classes—fundamentally distinct (McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989; Weinberger &
McClelland, 1990). Two motive constructs have been proposed: the TAT-based implicit
motives and the self-report-based explicit or self-attributed motives.
Subsequent research revealed that the two types of motives predict different classes of
behaviour, and interact with different classes of cues or incentives (McClelland et al., 1989;
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Brunstein & Hoyer, 2002; for a meta-analysis in the achievement domain, see Spangler,
1992). Schultheiss (2008) concluded that performance measures are better predicted by
implicit than explicit motives, while choices and judgements are better predicted by explicit
than implicit motives. With respect to the type of cue interacting with each of the two motive
types, Schultheiss (2002) proposed that symbolically represented incentives are more likely to
interact with explicit motives, while experientially represented incentives are more likely to
interact with implicit motives. The IPM (Schultheiss & Strasser, 2012), which is based on this
thinking, is discussed below.
Given the dissociation between explicit and implicit motives, McClelland et al. (1989)
concluded, that, in “evoluationary terms, a conscious motivational system has been built on top
. . . of a more primitive motivational system” (p. 699). Stanton, Hall, and Schultheiss (2010)
labelled this view the dual-systems theory of motivation (cf. Schultheiss & Brunstein, 1999).
Congruence between motivational systems predicts well-being and health. Based
on cases of observed statistical orthogonality, the two motivational systems were thought to be
functionally independent (McClelland et al., 1989; Weinberger & McClelland, 1990). At the
same time, McClelland et al. (1989) speculated that discordance between the two systems, in
terms of implicit and explicit motives, “can certainly lead to trouble” (p. 700). Thus, while the
two systems were not thought to interact or to have common antecedents, their misalignment
was judged to be disadvantageous. Subsequently, researchers have attempted to show that
congruence between implicit and explicit motives positively predicts subjective well-being,
self-reported symptoms, or life satisfaction.
Several studies have found a main effect of congruence between motives on well-being
and health-related variables. In three studies, Baumann, Kaschel, and Kuhl (2005) showed
that subjects whose implicit achievement motive matched their explicit achievement motive
reported higher subjective well-being and fewer emotional and somatic symptoms. In other
studies, congruence between motives was related to unhealthy eating behaviour, as well as
negative affect (Job, Oertig, Brandstätter, & Allemand, 2010), and volitional depletion (Kehr,
2004).
In addition, research by Kazén and Kuhl (2011) revealed that the direction of
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incongruence—i.e. whether the implicit motive is higher than the explicit motive, or vice
versa—matters. Managers whose implicit power motive was lower than their explicit power
motive reported lower subjective well-being and higher life-stress. At the same time
motive-incongruence as such, irrespective of direction, did not predict well-being or stress.
These results indicate that striving for goals that are not supported by a strong implicit
motive—and therefore may be experienced as less pleasurable—is particularly detrimental to
well-being.
The studies discussed so far were concerned with congruence between implicit and
explicit motives—i.e. between two individual difference variables. In recent years, however,
research on motivational congruence has increasingly focused on congruence between implicit
motives and goals. In this line of research, the hypothesis was tested that subjects who select
their (explicit) goals in concordance with their implicit motives should experience better
health and well-being (for a review, see Brunstein, 2010).
In an early study by Brunstein, Lautenschlager, Nawroth, Pöhlmann, and Schultheiss
(1995), subjects reported their personal strivings and classified them as either agentic or
communal (see, e.g. Abele & Wojciszke, 2007). Agentic and communal strivings were
thought to be congruent with power and intimacy motivation, respectively. As predicted, the
well-being of subjects whose strivings thematically matched their implicit motives was higher
than the well-being of subjects whose strivings were discordant with implicit motives.
Hofer and colleagues (Hofer, Busch, Bond, Li, & Law, 2010; Hofer & Chasiotis, 2003)
replicated this effect in a number of studies using cross-cultural designs. Congruence between
implicit achievement and affiliation (but not power) motives and explicit life goals predicted
life satisfaction in Zambian adolescents (Hofer & Chasiotis, 2003). Congruence between the
implicit power motive and explicit power goals predicted positive (but not negative) affect in a
mixed German and Chinese sample (Hofer et al., 2010).4 In a study by Gröpel (2008), by
contrast, motive-goal congruence was not related to subjective well-being in a sample of
managers.
Further research has shown that, in some cases, congruence only predicts well-being
and health under certain conditions. Schüler, Job, Fröhlich, and Brandstätter (2008) found that
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congruence between implicit and explicit affiliation motives was beneficial only in subjects
who, in addition, showed affiliation-related behaviour. Similarly, in a study by (Püschel,
Schulte, & Michalak, 2011), motive-goal congruence in a sample of outpatients only reduced
depressive symptoms when goal progress was high. These two studies may indicate that
well-being need not benefit from motive-goal congruence if motive-congruent behaviour is
either not shown, or not successful.
In sum, even though the evidence is not abundant, it generally supports the hypothesis
that congruence between implicit and explicit motives, or congruence between implicit
motives and goals, are positively related to well-being and health variables.
Methodological factors and personality traits predict implicit-explicit congruence.
While Weinberger and McClelland (1990) believed the implicit and explicit motive systems to
be functionally independent, this view has been called into question by research showing that
implicit-explicit congruence depends on methodological factors as well as personality traits
(for a review, see Thrash, Cassidy, Maruskin, & Elliot, 2010). Thrash, Elliot, and Schultheiss
(2007) measured the explicit achievement motive using several different instruments, where
the implicit achievement motive was coded according to Heckhausen (1963). The implicit
motive was only significantly correlated with the explicit measure designed to match
Heckhausen’s coding system in content (r = .17, p < .05) but not with other explicit motive
measures. Thrash et al. (2010) concluded that the implicit-explicit correlations may have been
underestimated in previous research.5
In a number of studies, trait measures related to volitional competences have been
shown to predict implicit-explicit congruence. Subjects high in self-reported volitional
strength, as measured by the Volitional Components Inventory (VCI; Kuhl & Fuhrmann,
1998), were more congruent than subjects low in volitional strength. Similarly, Baumann et al.
(2005) found that subjects high in action orientation, as measured by the Action Control Scale
(ACS-90; Kuhl, 1994) were more congruent than state-oriented subjects (cf. Brunstein, 2001).
Furthermore, subjects who described themselves as more self-determined, i.e. as autonomous,
on the Self-Determination Scale (SDS; Sheldon & Deci, 1996) were more congruent than less
self-determined subjects (Hofer et al., 2010; Thrash & Elliot, 2002). These studies support the
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hypothesis that subjects with higher volitional competences and higher subjective autonomy
display higher congruence between implicit and explicit measures of motivation.
Thrash et al. (2007) identified additional trait predictors of congruence. Implicit-explicit
congruence was higher in subjects with a high level of private body consciousness (Miller,
Murphy, & Buss, 1981), a low level of self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974), and a high preference
for consistency (Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995). These findings suggest that subjects who
are more aware of their own body processes (private body consciousness) and who are more
concerned with the social appropriateness of their behaviour (self-monitoring), as well as with
appearing consistent (preference for consistency), are more congruent.
In sum, a number of methodological as well as trait predictors of implicit-explicit
congruence have been found. Consequently, the two motivational systems cannot be entirely
independent. Furthermore, it may be assumed that there are processes that promote or hinder
motivational congruence. To date, these processes have not been exhaustively researched.
Thrash et al. (2010) pointed out that such processes may comprise (a) influences of an implicit
on an explicit motive, (b) influences of an explicit on an implicit motive, or (c) common
antecedents of the two motive types. However, the prominent process theories of
implicit-explicit congruence are of type (a). They assume that the contents of the implicit
system may find their way, however indirectly, to the explicit system, a process we have called
self-access above. Processes that promote motivational congruence lie at the core of the
self-access model to be discussed next, the IPM.
An Information-Processing Model of Dual Motivation
The dual-system model of motivation, as depicted by McClelland (1985), relies on
concepts taken from behaviourist and psychodynamic traditions. For example, the model
explains behaviour—in a behaviouristic fashion—primarily through classical and operant
conditioning processes, while cognitive contents—like goals—are not considered to be
predictors of behaviour. Furthermore, the assumption of strictly independent conscious and
unconscious processes seems to be borrowed from Freudian theory. Schultheiss (2002;
Schultheiss, 2007; Schultheiss & Strasser, 2012), in his IPM, revised McClelland’s theory,
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focusing on cognitive processes to describe the duality of motivation and individual
differences in self-access.
Weinberger and McClelland (1990) proposed that implicit motives are acquired prior to
language acquisition, while explicit motives are generally learnt within the medium of
language. Drawing on this distinction, Schultheiss and Strasser (2012) postulated, that
dissociations between implicit and explicit motives are primarily based on the implicit
system’s affinity for processing non-verbal—or experientially represented—information and
the explicit system’s affinity for processing verbal—i.e. symbolically
represented—information. In this vein, the IPM explains why (1) the implicit and the explicit
motive interact with different kinds of cues or incentives, (2) predict different kinds of
outcome variables, and (3) are preferably measured using different kinds of instruments
(Schultheiss & Strasser, 2012; cf. Schultheiss, 2002).
Thus, the implicit and the explicit systems seem to process information separately and
in different modalities. However, communication between the implicit and the explicit
motivation system is possible, namely through referential processing, a process originally
proposed by Paivio (1986) in his dual-coding theory.
Referential processing and competence. Referential processing refers to the
translation of non-verbally represented information into a verbal format (naming) and the
translation of verbally represented information into a non-verbal format (imagining;
Schultheiss & Strasser, 2012). According to the model, subjects engaging in referential
processing should have motivation systems that are better aligned than those of subjects not
engaging in such activity. Evidence from two types of studies supports this hypothesis. Firstly,
the impact of goal imagery on the alignment of explicit goals and implicit motives was
determined. Here, goal imagery may be interpreted as an induction of referential processing.
Secondly, the subjects’ ability to engage in referential processing—an individual difference
variable called referential competence (RC; Schultheiss, Patalakh, Rawolle, Liening, &
MacInnes, 2011)—predicted motivational congruence.
Experimental induction of goal imagery. Schultheiss and Brunstein (1999) tested the
hypothesis that goal imagery enhances the congruence between implicit motives and goal
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commitment. Their subjects were expecting the task of counselling another participant. The
task was framed so as to include both affiliation and power incentives. Subjects in the
experimental group were led by pre-recorded instructions to imagine the successful course of
the counselling task. The instructions used concrete language that was rich in sensory detail.
No imagery task was included in the control group. Goal commitment and affective arousal
were measured. Following goal imagery, subjects who were high in both their implicit power
and affiliation motives reported higher commitment to the counselling goal and displayed a
bigger change in affective arousal through the imagery task than subjects who were low on at
least one motive (Schultheiss & Brunstein, 1999, Study 1). Without goal imagery, no such
differences emerged.
In three studies, Job and Brandstätter (2009) set out to conceptually replicate the result
of Schultheiss and Brunstein (1999). In their first study, subjects were asked to put themselves
in the place of a person about to start a new job. Subsequently, subjects were asked to choose
some goals from a list of 15 goals related to the current scenario. Subjects in the affect focus
(i.e. affective goal imagery) condition imagined what it would feel like to strive for each goal.
Subjects in the self-focus (i.e. cognitive goal imagery) control condition asked themselves, for
each goal, whether or not it suited them. Subjects in a second control condition did not
perform an imagery task. Results indicated that only subjects in the affect focus condition and
with a high implicit affiliation motive chose more affiliation-related goals, relative to goals
related to power or achievement (Job & Brandstätter, 2009, Study 1). An attempt to replicate
the effect in the achievement domain yielded the expected, but only marginally significant,
pattern of results (Job & Brandstätter, 2009, Study 2). In Study 3, the effect was replicated
using a wider range of personal goals: Subjects high in agentic motives (i.e. power and
achievement) reported higher commitment to agency-related goals in the affect focus
condition, but not in the control condition.
The goal imagery task used in the studies by Schultheiss and Brunstein (1999) and Job
and Brandstätter (2009) can be regarded as an induction of referential processing. Firstly,
imagining processes were induced by instructing the subjects to vividly imagine striving for
the goal (Job & Brandstätter, 2009, Studies 1 and 2), or striving for the goal and reaching it
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(Schultheiss & Brunstein, 1999, Study 1; Job & Brandstätter, 2009, Study 3). In this way, the
goal which may have been represented in a predominantly verbal format, was furnished with
non-verbal ancillary information. Non-verbal representation was further extended by asking
subjects about their feelings while striving for or on reaching the goal. Secondly, naming
processes may also have been induced. While subjects imagined their goals, they were asked
the question: “How do you feel?” (Job & Brandstätter, 2009; cf. Schultheiss & Brunstein,
1999). This question may have induced naming in that it encouraged subjects to verbalize the
otherwise non-verbal affective processes.
According to the IPM (Schultheiss & Strasser, 2012), the verbal and non-verbal systems
are separated by a communication problem similar to the one of two people speaking different
languages. Translation in both directions—e.g. by an interpreter—is necessary to make
successful communication possible. Thus, to allow self-access through the communication
between a verbal and a non-verbal system, bidirectional translation is necessary. Firstly, the
verbally represented goal needs to be translated into a non-verbal format in order to be
evaluated by the non-verbal system. Secondly, the result of the evaluation—e.g. affective
reactions—needs to be translated back into a verbal format to make it usable for conscious
action control.6
Referential competence: Individual differences in referential processing. Apart from
affective imagery studies, the relevance of referential processing for self-access can also be
corroborated by conceptualizing referential processing as an individual difference variable, i.e.
referential competence (Schultheiss et al., 2011; for a summary, see Schultheiss & Strasser,
2012). This variable was originally proposed by the clinical psychologists Bucci and
Freedman (1978), who were interested in the relationship between therapeutic progress and
the patients’ narrative style. They developed a measurement method based on reaction times
for the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935). As the naming of colour bars includes a translation from
the non-verbal to the verbal modality, Bucci and Freedman proposed that colour-naming
reaction times, relative to word-reading reaction times, constitute a measure of referential
competence. To demonstrate the relevance of the construct for complex human behaviour,
they measured it and analysed narrative data from their subjects. They came to the conclusion
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that subjects with a high level of referential competence produced more specific, detailed
descriptions of events than subjects with a low level of referential competence, while the latter
produced more general descriptions of their own feelings than the former.
Schultheiss et al. (2011) tested the hypothesis that referential competence, measured
using a computer-based version of the Bucci and Freedman (1978) procedure, is related to
motivational congruence. In three studies, Schultheiss et al. (2011) showed that referential
competence is positively related to the congruence between implicit motives on the one hand,
and goal commitment (Studies 2 and 3) or goal preference (Study 4) on the other hand.
However, in most cases referential competence did not predict congruence between implicit
and explicit motives.7
Dual-system theories in the McClelland tradition as self-access theories. While
McClelland et al. (1989) conceptualized the two motivational systems as being functionally
independent, more recent research has shown that the implicit and the explicit motivational
systems are able to communicate under certain circumstances. This assumption was necessary
to explain the moderating effect of methodological factors, personality traits, and goal
imagery induction on motivational congruence. It has been expressed in terms of a self-access
assumption (e.g. Schultheiss & Strasser, 2012; Thrash et al., 2010). The underlying question
is: How can human beings align their conscious planning and execution of actions with their
subconscious wishes and needs?
The self-access models addressed so far have chiefly dealt with the various antecedents
of motivational congruence. The model presented in the following, the SCM (Sheldon &
Elliot, 1999), on the other hand, focuses on the consequences of motivational congruence.
The Self-Concordance Model
Sheldon and Elliot (1999) defined self-concordance as the “degree to which stated goals
express enduring interests and values” (p. 482). According to the SCM (Sheldon, 2002, 2008;
Sheldon & Elliot, 1999), whether a person’s goals are self-concordant has implications for
self-regulatory processes. Firstly, subjects are expected to exert more effort on self-concordant
than on self-discordant goals, which should foster the attainment of self-concordant goals.
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Secondly, attaining a self-concordant goal should satisfy needs to a larger extent and thus be
more beneficial to one’s subjective well-being than attaining a self-discordant goal.
Self-determination theory and the measurement of self-concordance. The SCM is
based on self-determination theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2000, 2008),
which was originally developed to explain decreases in motivation through the introduction of
external rewards (for a meta-analysis, see Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999). To explain such
effects, SDT distinguishes two types of motivation: intrinsic and extrinsic. Behaviour is
intrinsically motivated if the actor finds “the activity itself interesting and personally
satisfying”; in contrast to this, behaviour is extrinsically motivated if it is executed “because it
leads to some separable consequence, such as the attainment of a reward . . . [or] the avoidance
of a punishment . . . ” (Ryan & Deci, 2008, p. 660; for a critical discussion of the
intrinsic-extrinsic distinction, see Rheinberg, 2008).
According to SDT, intrinsic motivation is diminished when a person experiences an
extrinsic motivating factor—e.g., the expectation of a reward—as controlling, because feeling
controlled thwarts the satisfaction of people’s innate need for autonomy (Ryan & Deci, 2008).
However, extrinsically motivated behaviour does not necessarily feel controlled. People are
able to “transform socially sanctioned mores or requests into personally endorsed values or
self-regulations” (Deci & Ryan, 2000, p. 235 f.) through a process called organismic
integration (Ryan & Deci, 2008). A behaviour’s organismic integration status may range from
external, through introjected, and identified, to integrated regulation (Ryan & Deci, 2008).
In SDT research, a behaviour’s organismic integration status is measured by asking
subjects to state the reasons for their behaviour, more precisely, to indicate the perceived locus
of causality (PLOC; deCharms, 1968) with respect to their behaviour. If, for example, the
reported reason for a particular form of behaviour is to avoid feelings of guilt, the behaviour’s
regulation is classified as introjected. If, on the other hand, a subject indicates that he or she
endorses the value of the behaviour, the behaviour’s regulation is classified as identified (see
Deci & Ryan, 2000).8 In the SCM (Sheldon, 2002), the PLOC is used as an indicator of a
behaviour’s—or goal’s—self-concordance. The more internal the PLOC regarding a goal, the
more self-concordant the goal is assumed to be (e.g., Sheldon & Elliot, 1999).
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Empirical support for the SCM. As mentioned above, the SCM (Sheldon & Elliot,
1999) predicts that goal self-concordance facilitates goal-attainment and thus well-being, and
that attainment of self-concordant goals enhances well-being to a larger extent than attainment
of self-discordant goals. In the following, we review empirical studies that test these
hypotheses.
In two early studies, Sheldon and Kasser (1995) measured the PLOC of personal goals,
together with other measures of personality integration, and determined the relationship
between the PLOC and various indicators of well-being. The PLOC—more precisely, the
number of goals with an internal PLOC minus the number of goals with an external
PLOC—correlated positively and significantly with well-being variables such as vitality,
positive affect, self-esteem, and life satisfaction (.20 <= r <= .30).
In a longitudinal design, Sheldon and Elliot (1998, Studies 2 and 3) extended this finding
by showing that subjects striving for goals with a high—as compared to a low—internal
PLOC, exerted more effort and were subsequently more likely to attain their goals. Data from
Sheldon and Elliot (1999) further support the view that self-concordance affects changes in
well-being via effort and goal-attainment. In addition, their data are in line with the hypothesis
that changes in well-being are mediated by need-satisfying experiences, i.e. by the experience
of autonomy, competence, and relatedness. These experiences, in turn, are fostered
particularly by the attainment of self-concordant, as opposed to self-discordant, goals.9
The basic assumptions of the SCM have been tested in applied settings such as the work
context (Greguras & Diefendorff, 2010; Judge, Bono, Erez, & Locke, 2005), sports (Smith,
Ntoumanis, Duda, & Vansteenkiste, 2011; Smith, Ntoumanis, & Duda, 2007), and school
engagement and burnout (Vasalampi, Salmelo-Aro, & Nurmi, 2009), with results that in most
cases support the model10. Sheldon and Houser-Marko (2001) extended the model by showing
that goal-attainment and adjustment due to self-concordance may lead to more self-concordant
goal selection in the future and, again, to increased goal-attainment and adjustment, which
supports the notion of an “upward spiral” (p. 152) of positive outcomes. Finally, Sheldon et al.
(2004) contributed evidence for the universality of the relationship between self-concordance
and well-being. Such relationships were found in samples of US American, South Korean,
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Taiwanese, as well as Chinese subjects.
In sum, the evidence included in published articles testing self-concordance hypotheses
is almost unanimous. Studies are correlational—i.e. self-concordance in terms of PLOC is
never manipulated—, but many of them feature a longitudinal design. The SCM may be
considered a model with good empirical support.
Locating self-concordance in a model of personality. Based on a model by
McAdams (1995), Sheldon (2008) placed the self-concordance construct into an overarching
personality model. McAdams held that persons “should be described on at least three separate
and, at best, loosely related levels of functioning” (p. 371, emphasis in original). According to
McAdams, on Level 1, persons can be described regarding personality traits, which are
relatively non-conditional, decontextualized, as well as comparative (p. 371). An example of
personality traits are the Big Five personality factors (for a summary, see De Raad, 1998). On
Level 2, persons can be described regarding personal concerns, which comprise a wide range
of phenomena, such as motives, values, defence mechanisms, coping styles, and personal
strivings, to name a few. What Level 2 phenomena have in common is that they are
contextualized in “time, place, and/or role” (p. 376). On Level 3, persons may be described
regarding the story they construct of their selves, in order to find unity and purpose in their
lives. This level may be called the “level of identity as a life story” (p. 382). To fully describe
a person, information must be provided about all three levels. Although McAdams does not
exclude linkages between different levels a priori, he rejects theoretical assumptions of such
linkages without a empirical foundation (p. 380). Furthermore, he is opposed to the idea of
one level (e.g. Level 2: personal concerns) being a derivative of another level (e.g. Level 1:
personality traits; p. 386).
Sheldon (2008) used McAdams’s 1995 model to specify what entities are involved in
self-concordance. In his own interpretation of McAdams’s model, Sheldon (2004) added a
fourth level, organismic nature (Sheldon, 2004, p. 46), which includes “basic personality
processes, needs, and characteristics built into the psychology of all people, which are
inherent to the human organism”, in other words, innate and universal features common to all
human beings.11
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Based on the model of McAdams (1995), Sheldon (2008) defined self-concordance as
“the degree of consistency or fit between the goal level of personality [Level 2; authors’ note],
and the organismic and trait levels of personality [Levels 4 and 1, respectively; authors’ note]”
(p. 468). The question of consistency between Levels 2 and 4 would seem to go beyond the
scope of the self-access topic currently being discussed. It concerns the question of whether
people’s goals fit certain aspects of human nature as such, irrespective of individual
differences. Self-access, as discussed here, by contrast, is concerned with the question of
whether a person’s goals fit his or her individual underlying dispositions. Defining self-access
as a fit between Levels 1 and 2 proves fruitful, however. Self-concordance—or self-access in
general—may be conceptualized as a fit between the relatively decontextualized personality
traits on Level 1, and the contextualized personal concerns on Level 2. In this vein, self-access
may be defined as the ability to adapt to the current life situation (Level 2) in a way that is
consistent with the trait level of personality (Level 1).
The SCM as a self-access model. As a self-access model, the SCM differs from
MDT and IPM in that the self-access measure in SCM research—i.e. the PLOC—is purely
phenomenological. Thus, while motive disposition theories use the fit between self-report and
non-self-report (i.e. projective) measures as an indicator of self-access, SCM research is based
on the assumption that subjects are able to reliably report a proxy variable of self-access, i.e.
the PLOC.
Sheldon (2008) admits that this method of measurement “does not directly assess the fit
of goals . . . with the person’s traits and his or her organismic needs . . . ” but instead measures
self-concordance on a phenomenological level. In fact, it is not clear in what way a goal’s
internalization status is a valid indicator of self-concordance. While it is plausible that a goal
originating from one’s needs is more likely to be internally than externally regulated, the
possibility that a person strives for a self-chosen, internally regulated goal that does not fit his
or her personality traits or needs cannot be ruled out. In other words, as people are thought to
sometimes select goals that do not fit their personality—a hypothesis that the SCM puts
forward—, it is questionable whether the PLOC is a valid indicator of the self-concordance of
goals.
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The next theory to be discussed, PSI theory (Kuhl, 2000), has similarities with
self-determination research in that it takes into account the integration of goals that originate
externally. It also has similarities with MDT in that it employs a non-self-report measure of
the accuracy of self-related knowledge. However, it goes beyond MDT in that it defines
self-access without recourse to motivational content.
Beyond Motives: Self-Access According to PSI Theory
PSI theory (Kuhl, 2000, 2001; for a summary, see Kuhl, 2008) seeks to explain
individual differences in self-regulation, which includes the ability to form intentions
according to implicit needs and preferences, to maintain intentions and translate them into
actions, as well as the capacity for self-development, i.e. for personal growth based on the
integration of novel and unpleasant experiences. The theory explains differences in these
abilities through the interaction of four cognitive systems, the exchange between which is
influenced by situational and personality factors.
Of the four systems, two are responsible for handling input, i.e. the processing of
experiences, while the other two systems are responsible for behavioural output, i.e. the
planning and execution of actions. On the input side, the object recognition system (OR)
identifies and distinguishes objects, while the extension memory system (EM) integrates and
stores a large number of the person’s experiences, which is why it is also called the self-system
(Kuhl, 2008). On the output side, intention memory (IM) maintains difficult intentions, while
the intuitive behaviour control system (IBC) provides the behavioural routines needed to
translate intentions into actions (Kuhl, 2000, 2008).
According to PSI theory, each of the four cognitive systems processes information in a
specific way (Kuhl, 2000). Intention memory—which is involved in conscious
planning—processes information in a slow, sequential, and analytical way. Similarly, the
object recognition system—which specializes in the detection of errors and novel stimuli—is
characterized by analytical processing. In contrast to intention memory, however, it analyses
incoming stimuli with respect to their features in the different modalities. Extension
memory—which functions as a storage for integrated self-representations—processes
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information in a fast, parallel, and holistic way. Similarly, the intuitive behaviour control
system processes information holistically. However, it specializes in processing behavioural
routines, which are contextualized in time and space (cf. Kuhl, 2001).
Differences in the self-regulatory functions mentioned above—like the selection and
execution of self-congruent goals—are explained by changes in the relative activation of
specific cognitive systems, which, in turn, determine the exchange of information between
systems. The two input systems, object recognition and extension memory, as well as the two
output systems, intuitive behaviour control and intention memory, are antagonistically related,
i.e. they inhibit each other’s activity. Therefore, at any given point in time, one of the systems
is usually highly activated while the other system is deactivated (Kuhl, 2000, 2001).
According to the theory, self-regulatory functions become available when the
unbalanced state of activation of the two systems becomes temporarily balanced (Kuhl, 2001).
For instance, the mental system as a whole is either in a state of planning and inaction (high
intention memory activity, low intuitive behavioural control activity), or in a state of acting
(low intention memory activity, high intuitive behavioural control activity). The
self-regulatory function of action initiation, for example, becomes available when the
dominance of intention memory ceases in favour of a dominance of intuitive behaviour
control. In the course of this transitional process, the two systems are, for a moment, in a
similar state of activation, which, according to the theory, allows the transfer of the intention
from intention memory to intuitive behaviour control, and thus action initiation (Kuhl, 2001).
Changes in the relative activation of systems depend on specific changes in affect (Kuhl,
2000, 2008). For instance, for an intention to be translated into action, inhibited positive affect
must be released in order to transfer the intention from intention memory to intuitive
behaviour control. To allow a novel or painful experience to be integrated into extension
memory, high negative affect—if present—must decrease in order to transfer an experience
from the object recognition system to extension memory, and enable its integration into the
current network of self-representations (Kuhl, 2008).
In PSI theory, self-access is defined as the ability to retrieve integrated
self-representations from extension memory. These self-representations include “needs,
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feelings, body sensations, preferences, [and] values” (Kuhl, 2001, p. 151; own translation),
based on which the self-congruence of a goal may be determined.
Measuring self-access according to PSI theory. PSI theory makes extensive use of
memory-related concepts. Therefore it is not surprising that the theory measures self-access
using a memory paradigm. The ability to distinguish goals set by oneself—i.e. originating in
extension memory—from goals assigned by another person is used as an indicator of
self-access.
Based on this idea, Kuhl and Kazén (1994) developed the so-called self-infiltration
paradigm. Their subjects were asked to put themselves in the position of an office clerk and to
plan their working day. They were given a list of 27 work-related activities12 and asked to
choose 9 of the activities for later execution. In addition, the experimenter assigned 9
activities to the subject. Following a distractor task, subjects were given an unexpected
memory test. For each activity, they were asked to indicate whether they had previously
chosen it, or whether it had been assigned by the experimenter, or both. Classifying a
previously assigned activity as chosen was considered an indicator of self-access failure.
Baumann and Kuhl (2003; Kazén, Baumann, & Kuhl, 2003) enhanced the paradigm by
introducing computer-based assessment and by completely balancing item attractiveness,
choice, and assignment.
From the perspective of memory psychology, self-infiltration is a measure of self-other
distinction in an unexpected source memory test (cf. Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993).
Here, only items that have been assigned exclusively are taken into account and only
false-alarms regarding these items are counted. Thus, the self-infiltration measure is not a
measure of general memory performance, nor of self-other distinction as such, but of a
specific kind of self-other confusion.
Predicting self-infiltration. According to PSI theory, subjects under high negative
affect suffer from self-access deficiencies. However, subjects scoring high on action
orientation after failure (AOF; Kuhl, 1994), compared with low-AOF subjects, should be able
to efficiently reduce negative affect (e.g., Koole & Jostmann, 2004). In other words, AOF
should buffer the detrimental effects of negative affect on self-access. Data from correlational
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(Baumann & Kuhl, 2003, Study 1) as well as experimental (Baumann & Kuhl, 2003, Study 2;
Kazén et al., 2003, Studies 2 and 3) studies are in line with these predictions.13 In a further
study by Quirin, Koole, Baumann, Kazén, and Kuhl (2009), cortisol level, as well as change in
cortisol level due to stress induction, predicted false self-ascription of assigned activities.14
Self-compatibility checking: A reaction-time measure of self-access. Computer-
based self-access measurement (Baumann & Kuhl, 2003; Kazén et al., 2003) allowed reaction
time data to be recorded and thus a reaction-time measure of self-access to be developed.
Kazén et al. (2003) argued that self-access, in terms of testing whether a given goal is
congruent with one’s integrated self-representations, takes time. According to Kazén et al.,
this self-compatibility checking process comprises two steps: (1) accessing one’s emotional
preferences, and (2) accessing episodic memory about the activity’s commitment status, i.e.
about whether or not the activity has been selected as a goal. In the course of
self-compatibility checking, a person may detect that he or she is committed to a subjectively
unattractive activity, or that he or she is not committed to a subjectively attractive activity. In
these cases, the person experiences a conflict between the two steps, i.e. a conflict between an
activity’s attractiveness and its commitment status. In the other cases—when an attractive
activity has been chosen or an unattractive activity has not been chosen—no such conflict
results.
When subjects decide whether or not they have chosen an activity, a conflict between
the two above-mentioned steps leads to an increase in decision latencies. However, subjects
with deficient self-access, i.e. state-oriented subjects under negative affect, should experience
less conflict between preference and commitment status and therefore display a smaller
increase in decision latencies due to incongruence of the two steps, compared with subjects
with intact self-access.
Kazén et al. (2003) tested this hypothesis in three studies using the self-infiltration
paradigm. In one study, self-other distinction regarding a number of mini-actions (e.g.,
clapping your hands, snapping your fingers) was measured. As expected, in action-oriented
subjects, reaction times were prolonged in trials in which an unattractive activity was
classified as chosen or an attractive activity was classified as not chosen. In state-oriented
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subjects, no such pattern emerged. These results were confirmed in two additional studies.
The role of the affective state remains unclear, however, as self-reported mood did not
moderate the self-compatibility checking effect (Kazén et al., 2003, Study 3).
PSI theory’s contribution to self-access research. Self-infiltration is one of the most
widely used paradigms in PSI theory research. The paradigm and the aim of predicting
self-access are central to the theory. The self-infiltration paradigm is unique in that it proposes
non-self-report measures of self-access without falling back upon comparisons of goal versus
motive content. Moreover, PSI theory has strongly contributed to self-access theory by
coining self-access as a technical term. With respect to empirical support of self-infiltration
effects, further replication of the central effects is clearly desirable.
A Dual-System Communication Framework
Four prominent models that are closely related to self-access in goal selection have been
presented above: MDT, the IPM, the SCM, and PSI theory. In the following, we present a
meta-theoretical framework, the dual-system communication framework, which encompasses
the main ideas of the four self-access models. The framework serves as a means of comparing
the different approaches with respect to hypotheses and methodology, and to derive ideas for
future research.
The framework is introduced in two steps. In a first step, self-access is conceptualized as
the communication between two memory systems, each of which serves a specific function
and—in accordance with its function—is characterized by a specific mode of representing
information. In a second step it is shown that the success of self-access depends on how
appropriate the means of information processing is to the mode of information representation.
In the following, we discuss how each of the self-access accounts discussed above relates to
the assumptions of the dual-system communication framework.
Self-Access as Dual-System Communication
In this first step, we evaluate whether each of the four self-access accounts is compatible
with the view that self-access is based on communication between two systems. Because
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MDT and IPM are closely related, they are treated as variants of the same overarching theory
in the following.
In recent accounts of motive congruence (Thrash et al., 2010), including the IPM
(Schultheiss & Strasser, 2012), congruence between implicit motives and goals is thought to
depend, at least partially, on self-access processes. According to these accounts, self-access is
based on the interplay of two systems: an implicit motivational system, in which dispositional
implicit motives are stored, and an explicit motivational system, in which self-attributed
motives, as well as goals, are stored. In the context of this family of theories, congruence
between the implicit and explicit motivation systems is taken to be an indicator of
self-knowledge. Self-access processes, on which that self-knowledge is based, are thought to
be processes of inter-system communication.
In motive congruence research, the most detailed account of self-access processes can
be found in the IPM. According to this model, bi-directional translation between the two
motivational systems is the main prerequisite for successful self-access. Self-access is
possible if the dispositional knowledge stored in the implicit motivational system is made
available to the explicit motivational system, i.e. to processes mediating the generation of
self-attributed motives and the selection of goals.
Motive congruence theory has been translated into the vocabulary of PSI theory.
Baumann et al. (2005) held that
congruence between explicit and implicit motive measures is expected to occur
when information can be exchanged between the two processing systems. More
specifically, intention memory needs to “communicate” with extension memory in
order to form valid representations of implicit needs in terms of self-congruence
goals. (p. 782)
This self-access account is based on the assumption that goals are stored in intention
memory, while implicit motives are stored in extension memory (Baumann et al., 2005,
p. 782). It must be noted, though, that extension memory and intention memory of PSI theory
are by no means synonymous with the implicit and explicit motivational systems, respectively,
of MDT and IPM. For instance, extension memory serves to integrate novel experiences and
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intention memory is thought to mediate planning processes (see Kuhl, 2001). These, however,
are not assumed to be functions of the implicit and explicit motivational systems, according to
the IPM.
While the self-access account of Baumann et al. (2005) echoes the conceptualization of
self-access in MDT and IPM, a different account can be found in the self-infiltration literature
(e.g. Baumann & Kuhl, 2003). In this alternative account, intention memory is not mentioned.
Rather, self-access is explained entirely through extension memory processes: If a person has
access to extension memory, then he or she “can choose goals that satisfy multiple constraints
and easily feel priorities” (Baumann & Kuhl, 2003, p. 488). In other words, if extension
memory can be accessed, a large number of aspects related to goal selection can
simultaneously be taken into account. Thus, goal selection can be based on a larger amount of
self-related information.
The self-infiltration account of PSI theory specifies the system containing evaluative
dispositions (i.e. extension memory), but not the system responsible for conscious action
regulation. Similarly, accounts of the SCM (e.g. Sheldon & Elliot, 1999) do not specify two
interacting systems on which self-access is based. However, a more explicit specification of
such systems—or levels—has recently been added to the model (Sheldon, 2004, 2008).
According to the SCM (Sheldon, 2002), self-access—i.e. self-concordance—concerns
the question of “whether chosen goals are congruent or concordant with the person’s deeper or
true condition” (p. 68). Sheldon (2008) located self-concordance in a theory of multiple levels
of personality. He defined self-concordance as the fit between the goal level—which is
contextualized in time, place, and/or role—, and the—decontextualized—“organismic and
trait levels” of personality (p. 468). The process of aligning the contextualized with the
decontextualized levels of personality is described as self-perception, i.e. the perception of the
trait levels during goal selection. While self-perception may be assumed to include
communication between mental systems—i.e. between a system that perceives, and another
system that is being perceived—, dual-system communication is not made explicit in the
self-concordance model.
In sum, in each of the self-access theories discussed so far, the distinction of two
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systems, or levels, plays a major role in the conceptualization of self-access. One exception is
explanations of self-infiltration, which do not explicitly rely on a dual-system model.
According to theories of motive congruence—be they rooted in motive disposition theory or
PSI theory—communication between an implicit and an explicit system mediates self-access.
In SCM, such a communication is not explicitly mentioned but may implicitly be assumed.
As we have just shown, in most models of self-access in goal selection, communication
between dual systems is assumed to underlie self-access. Next, the theories are compared with
respect to the question of the conditions under which inter-system communication—and thus
self-access—is enhanced or impaired.
Conditions for Inter-System Communication
Of the self-access models discussed above, PSI theory and the IPM specify the
conditions under which communication between systems is facilitated or hindered, while the
SCM does not15. Therefore, only PSI theory and the IPM are considered in the following.
According to Baumann et al. (2005), “chronic inhibition of positive affect (frustration)
and/or chronic activation of negative affect (anxiety)” (p. 782) disturb the communication
process between intention memory and extension memory. This double hypothesis is based on
four assumptions. Firstly, intention memory and extension memory are antagonistically
related (Kuhl, 2000), i.e., extension memory suppresses intention memory activity, and vice
versa. Secondly, an inhibition of positive affect activates intention memory, and consequently
inhibits extension memory and thus access to implicit needs. Thirdly, high negative affect
directly inhibits extension memory. From the fourth assumption, that extension memory needs
to be activated in order to communicate with intention memory, it follows that low positive
affect or high negative affect are detrimental to self-access. In other words, the
communication between explicit intentions and implicit self-representations is hindered when
a person is chronically frustrated—i.e. when he or she focuses on previous failures—, or when
a person is anxious—i.e. when he or she is preoccupied with possible future failures.
According to PSI theory, both conditions make it less likely that a person can successfully
access his or her implicit self-representations, including needs, preferences, and values.
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In contrast to PSI theory, the IPM does not assume that inter-system communication
depends on the (relative) activation of the implicit and the explicit system. Rather, as
mentioned above, Schultheiss and Strasser (2012) propose that referential processing converts
information from the implicit—i.e. nonverbal—system into an explicit—i.e. verbal—format,
and vice versa. According to the IPM, these conversion processes are a prerequisite for
self-access.
At first glance, PSI theory and the IPM disagree about the processes thought to underlie
such communication. However, they may not be as contradictory as it seems. The personality
systems in PSI theory differ in their information processing modes: Intention memory
processes information in a sequential and analytical fashion, while extension memory
processes information in a parallel and holistic fashion (Kuhl, 2000, 2001). These processing
modes correspond to the way in which information is stored in each of the two systems: In
extension memory, self-aspects are stored in parallel distributed networks (Kuhl, 2001,
p. 152), while in intention memory, planned actions are stored in an abstract symbolic
representation format (p. 147), which is closely related to language (p. 158). Thus, the
processing characteristics of intention memory and extension memory correspond to the
representation format of memory content in each system: Parallel distributed networks require
parallel processing, symbolically represented goals require sequential processing. Self-access
is possible when parallel, holistic, and intuitive processing is available in the cognitive system
as a whole, which allows access to a person’s implicit needs and preferences stored in the
distributed networks of extension memory. Besides self-representations being accessible in
extension memory, they need to be transferred to intention memory so that a goal can be
selected that is well-aligned to implicit self-representations.
If the relationship between intention memory and extension memory is interpreted in
this fashion, the IPM agrees with PSI theory regarding two aspects. Firstly, the explicit system
(or intention memory) represents information verbally and symbolically to a larger extent than
the implicit system (or extension memory). Secondly, for a system to be accessed, a cognitive
mode must be available that is appropriate to the implicit system’s mode of information
representation.
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IPM goes beyond PSI theory in that a bi-directional flow of information is assumed. Not
only must implicit motives be translated into explicit goals or motives, but also vice versa.
Therefore, according to the IMP—the implicit system may be ignorant of the person’s current,
explicitly held goals and motives, which may result in a failure to align the explicit
motivational system with the implicit motivational system.
Summary of the Dual-System Communication Framework
In sum, models of self-access in goal selection are compatible with the view that
self-access depends on successful communication between two systems. While MDT
(McClelland, 1985) and the IPM (Schultheiss & Strasser, 2012) are explicit dual-system
models, the SCM (Sheldon, 2002) and PSI theory (Kuhl, 2000) include duality assumptions in
more implicit ways. The self-access account of SDT (Sheldon, 2002) may be interpreted in
terms of a duality of the goal level on the one hand, and underlying personality and organismic
levels on the other hand. In PSI theory (Kuhl, 2000), a duality assumption is made with
respect to the antagonism of intention and extension memory.
Dual-system communication may be regarded as the lowest common denominator of
models of self-access in goal selection. Exemplars of this category of models are in line with
three assumptions. Firstly, evaluations of future actions—or classes of future actions—may be
represented by an implicit, as well as an explicit system, where the implicit system holds
evaluative dispositions, while the explicit system is responsible for the conscious control of
action. Secondly, implicit evaluations of future actions may be transferred from the implicit to
the explicit system under certain conditions, so that they may influence conscious reports and
conscious action control. Thirdly, inter-system communication—and thus self-access—is
possible if a certain mode of cognitive processing is available in the mental system.
According to PSI theory (Kuhl, 2000) and the IPM (Schultheiss & Strasser, 2012),
inter-system communication—and thus self-access—succeeds when a mode of processing is
available that fits the representation format of the stored information, i.e. when distributed,
non-verbal information in the implicit system can be processed holistically and in parallel, and
when verbal information in the explicit system can be processed analytically and sequentially.
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According to the IPM, the appropriateness of the processing mode is not sufficient for
self-access. Rather, self-access depends on a bi-directional translation of memory contents.
Figure 1 depicts the dual-system communication framework. The bold arrows represent the,
more commonly hypothesized, transfer from the implicit to the explicit system. The dashed
arrows represent the transfer of information in the opposite direction, which is an assumption
unique to the IPM (Schultheiss & Strasser, 2012).
Insert Figure 1 about here
Theories and Measures of Self-Access in Goal Selection Classified
After discussing the common features of models of self-access in goal selection in the
previous sections, the following section serves the purpose of determining the criteria
according to which the models, and the respective self-access measures, may be classified. We
propose two such criteria: level of analysis and consideration of interpersonal processes.
Level of Analysis
The concept of self-access is based on the idea of one mental entity gaining access to
contents stored inside a second mental entity. The self-access models presented above differ
with respect to how closely their theoretical assumptions and measurement techniques match
the concept of self-access in its full form. We label these differences level of analysis.
A high level of analysis exists when the processes involved in decoding self-relevant
information stored in memory are postulated theoretically, and such processes are either
measured or manipulated. On a medium level of analysis, only the results of the self-access
processes are considered, but not the self-access processes themselves. These results may be
considered instances of self-knowledge16, often conceptualized as a fit between explicit
motivation (e.g. goals) and some objective, or dispositional reference value. A low level of
analysis is purely phenomenological and includes exclusively subjective self-access
constructs, e.g. identity diffusion or perceived lack of self-access.
Most self-access models discussed above—namely the IPM, the SCM, and PSI
theory—include a hypothesis of individual differences in self-access, i.e. in the ability to select
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goals in accordance with some kind of subconscious or implicit disposition. Thus models of
self-access in goal selection are, from a theoretical perspective, situated on a high level of
analysis. According to these models, differences in self-access are attributed to differences in
the availability of evaluative dispositions that are generally not consciously accessible.
While self-access processes are almost unanimously postulated theoretically, the ways
of measuring the critical construct vary greatly between the different approaches. Self-access
measurement according to the SCM (Sheldon, 2002) using the PLOC is characterized by a
low level of analysis. Whether the perceived locus of causality is perceived as more internal or
external, is an exclusively subjective measure from which no inferences may be drawn about
the accuracy of the subject’s beliefs.
Fit measures, situated on a medium level of analysis, are put forward by MDT
(Brunstein, 2010) and PSI theory (e.g. Baumann & Kuhl, 2003). Both motive-goal
congruence and self-infiltration are measures of the fit between a subjective report about a
goal, and an objective—i.e. non-self-report—measure that serves as a touchstone for the
inference of congruence. In the case of motive-goal congruence, the evaluation of a goal is
compared with the projectively measured evaluation of a corresponding class of incentives,
e.g. achievement incentives. In the case of self-infiltration, the subjective belief about an
activity’s intention status is compared with its objective intention status, namely whether or
not it has been previously chosen by the subject.
In the goal-imagery as well as the self-infiltration paradigms, self-access processes are
directly manipulated or measured: in the goal imagery studies, in which referential processing
is manipulated (e.g. Schultheiss & Brunstein, 2002), and in the self-compatibility checking
measure within the self-infiltration paradigm (Kazén et al., 2003). In the former,
self-access—in terms of inter-system communication—is facilitated by stimulating the
cross-modal translation of goal-related information. In the latter, conflict between activated
preferences—presumably a result of successful self-access—and an activity’s intention status,
resulting in prolonged decision latencies, is measured. These two paradigms are the most
direct ways of operationalizing self-access that are currently available.
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Consideration of Interpersonal Processes
A goal may either be self-set, or assigned by others (e.g. employers or parents;
Oettingen & Gollwitzer, 2004, p. 167), which has implications for the research questions
typically asked. In the case of self-selected goals, the prominent question is how goals are
selected on the basis of a person’s needs, which interact with the incentives present in the
situation (Gollwitzer, Kappes, & Oettingen, 2012). In the case of assigned goals, by contrast,
the prominent question is how the goals interact with the person’s current goals, and how well
they are accepted as personal goals (Oettingen & Gollwitzer, 2004). Models for self-set goals
focus on intrapersonal processes that occur when a difficult decision needs to be taken. In
contrast to this, models for goals that are assigned by others focus on interpersonal processes
that are the result of social influence, with which the actor may cope in different ways.
Self-access models differ with respect to the question of whether self-access is thought to be
primarily based on intrapersonal or interpersonal (i.e. social) processes.
From a theoretical perspective, motive congruence research in MDT (McClelland et al.,
1989) and PSI theory (Baumann et al., 2005) focuses on intrapersonal determinants of
self-access. According to these models, whether self-access succeeds depends on a person’s
ability to base the selection of goals in a given situation on his or her own dispositions.
A second class of goal-selection models, by contrast, focuses on interpersonal
processes, in that they address the dichotomy—or conflict—between a subject’s internal
dispositions, on the one hand, and external assignments, expectations, or norms, on the other
hand. One such model is self-determination theory (Ryan & Deci, 2000), which includes the
assumption that goals originating externally—e.g. a teacher’s assigment, or social
norms—may be internalized and integrated into the self. While the SCM (Sheldon, 2002,
2008), in theory, explains self-access pre-eminently through self-perception processes, the
self-access measure used in this area of research is based on the notion of a conflict between
self- and other-generated motivation, namely on the PLOC. Thus, from a methodological
point-of-view, the SCM suggests that self-access is related to interindividual processes.
Similarly, PSI theory (Kuhl, 2000) as such does not model interindividual processes,
because social influences on goal selection are not represented by any of the four cognitive
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systems. However, interindividual processes are included in the self-access measure derived
from PSI theory, namely self-infiltration (Kuhl & Kazén, 1994). In this paradigm, goals are
distinguished according to their internal versus external origin. Specific mistakes in the
memory representation of this dichotomy—i.e. false self-ascription of assigned activities, or
false internalization—indicate self-access deficiencies.
On closer examination, the self-access paradigms of SCM and PSI theory have more in
common than the inclusion of an external source of goals and corresponding interpersonal
processes. They are based on theories of internalization (see Schafer, 1968), i.e. on theories
about the incorporation of external regulations into the person. For example, the emotion of
shame may be regarded as a result of the internalization of external punishments upon making
a mistake. In what way does internalization relate to self-access? SCM and PSI theory have
different views about this question. The PLOC measurement used by the SCM suggests that
reporting a high internalization—i.e. integration—of goals indicates good self-access;
self-infiltration research, by contrast, uses internalization as an indicator of self-access
deficiencies. Thus, a non-internalized goal representation indicates good self-access according
to PSI theory, but bad self-access according to the SCM.17
A 3×2 classification scheme. In the preceding sections, it was proposed that
self-access paradigms can be classified according to two criteria: level of analysis and
consideration of interpersonal processes. Paradigms can, firstly, be distinguished according to
the level of analysis on which the corresponding self-access measures are situated. Of the
three levels, the first is phenomenological, the second includes a concept of fit, and the third
addresses self-access processes directly by measuring or manipulating them. Secondly,
paradigms of self-access in goal selection may be classified according to the question of
whether interpersonal processes are included in the theory and/or measurements. As it turned
out, paradigms that involve interpersonal processes are, more precisely, paradigms that include
a concept of internalization of externally originating goals. In sum, measures of self-access in
goal selection may be classified according to a 3×2 scheme (Table 1).
Insert Table 1 about here
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Self-Access in Decision-Making: Convergence with Self-Access in Goal Selection?
As shown above, a variety of self-access models exist in the domain of goal selection.
These models are linked to motivational concepts like needs and the energization of
behaviour, and to social-psychological concepts like the internalization of external demands.
However, processes of choice have not only been researched in social psychology and the
psychology of motivation, but also in the field of decision-making. Like motivation and social
psychologists, decision theorists have been interested in the question how well choices fit a
person, and on what processes such a fit is based. Thus, the phenomenon of self-access has
been discussed in decision-making research, albeit less explicitly and less extensively than in
other subdisciplines of psychology.
The following section discusses models and paradigms of self-access in
decision-making. The current research may profit in two respects from the inclusion of
decision-making models. Firstly, whether models of self-access in decision-making converge
with models of self-access in goal selection may prove fruitful for an overarching model of
self-access. Secondly, self-access measures from the decision-making domain may be
transferred to goal-selection research and expand the methodological possibilities in
self-access research.
In the following, we consider the similarities and differences between the related
concepts of goal selection and decision-making. Subsequently, we give an overview of two
prominent concepts in models of decision-making: the concepts of rationality and duality.
Finally, we present selected models of self-access in decision-making, along with their
respective paradigms, in order to discuss the relationship between these paradigms and the
dual-system communication framework.
Goal Selection and Decision-Making
As mentioned above, goal selection refers to the act of transforming some, but not other,
wishes into binding goals, which is the result of “deliberating the positive and negative
potential consequences of . . . action alternatives” (Achtziger & Gollwitzer, 2008, p. 273).
Similarly, making decisions may be defined as “choices among acts that cause desirable or
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undesirable consequences when performed in various states of the world” (Joyce, 2005,
p. 655). At first glance, the two definitions seem interchangeable, as both denote the choice of
an action from a larger set of possible actions. A closer look, however, reveals important
differences.
Firstly, the two concepts stem from different theoretical traditions. Goal selection
originates in the psychology of motivation, which is characterized by the assumption of
prominent affect-based antecedents of goal selection, which are conceptualized as personality
variables, e.g. implicit motives. Decision-making, by contrast, is generally concerned with
cognitive information processing, i.e. with the way in which action preferences are derived
from the utility of expected action outcomes (Joyce, 2005). Affective (e.g. Slovic, Finucane,
Peters, & MacGregor, 2007) or personality-oriented (e.g. Appelt, Milch, Handgraaf, & Weber,
2011) views of decision-making have not been of major importance to this field of research
and have only recently begun to attract attention. Secondly, the research questions regarding
choice are different in the two traditions. While decision-making research is mostly limited to
antecedent processes of choice, goal selection research concerns, in addition, the
consequences of making certain choices for action initiation, performance, and well-being.
Thirdly, in the typical decision problem, the set of options from which one is to be chosen is
given and known to the subject, while in goal selection research, a theoretically unlimited
number of possible goals is assumed.
In sum, decision-making theory is a theory of cognitive information processing and
focuses on the antecedent processes of choice from a, typically, limited set of options.
Goal-selection theory, by contrast, is rooted in a theory of individual differences in affectively
based traits, and focuses on the consequences of choices from a theoretically unlimited set of
options.
Rationality and Duality: Two Prominent Concepts in Theories of Decision-Making
Theories of decision-making deal with outcomes, i.e. criteria about whether a decision’s
consequences are good or bad for the decision-maker, and processes, i.e. the mental activities
leading to a decision. Rationality, on the one hand, has been used as an outcome criterion of
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decisions in various lines of research (e.g. Evans, Over, & Manktelow, 1993). The processing
antecedent to a decision, by contrast, has often been conceptualized in terms of duality, i.e. a
broad distinction between two modes of processing (e.g. Smith & DeCoster, 2000).
Duality models may either be formulated as dual-processing or dual-system models.
Both alternatives assume distinctive differences in processing. Dual-system models make the
additional assumption of two distinct entities on which dual-processing is based. Thus,
dual-system models are dual-processing models, but not vice versa. In the following, when we
refer to a duality model, this means a dual-processing model that may or may not include a
dual-system assumption.
Rationality in Decision-Making. Authors from the field of game theory have
proposed that decision-makers should maximize the subjective expected utility (SEU) by
adhering to certain axioms (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944, as cited in Hayashi, 2008; cf.
Savage, 1972). For instance, the axiom of independence says that, if a decision-maker prefers
option p to option q, then adding the same value (weighted with the same expectancy) r to
both options should leave the preference intact, because it does not affect the utility
relationship between p and q (Hayashi, 2008). The postulate that people conform to axioms
like the independence axiom has been met with early criticism in economic theory (Allais,
1953; Ellsberg, 1961). Allais (1953), for example, held that people systematically violate the
axiom of independence, a phenomenon known as the Allais paradox.
Simon (1955) criticized the approach of game theory to decision-making on a more
fundamental level. He argued that classical theories of rationality assume that the economic
man has a knowledge of the outcomes (pay-offs) of all relevant options, has a knowledge of
the probability of each outcome and is able to make complex calculations to find the optimal
option. According to Simon (1955), this view is neither suitable for a normative nor a
descriptive account of decision-making, as psychological research shows that the human mind
is limited with respect to knowledge and information processing capabilities. In other words,
rationality is bounded (Simon, 1972), which is why decision-makers often do not choose the
normatively optimal option but the first satisfying option they consider (so-called satisficing).
Using computer simulations, Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) showed that judgements under
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the constraints of bounded rationality may be as effective as judgements based on exhaustive
information processing. So-called one-reason decision-making—e.g. the Take The Best
heuristic—leads to the same proportion of correct inferences as complex algorithms like
multiple regression. This conclusion is in line with conclusions drawn by Tversky and
Kahneman (1974) who, despite focusing on biases resulting from using heuristics, hold that
such simplified decision algorithms “are highly economical and usually effective” (p. 1131).
In sum, researchers interested in a psychologically plausible (Gigerenzer, 2001) description of
judgement and decision-making refrain from assuming an exhaustive processing of
information in the derivation of judgements or decisions.
According to a contemporary view of rationality, a behaviour—or the mental states and
processes on which it is based—is rational if it leads to the achievement of given goals (Over,
2004; Simon, 1972). Thus, in contemporary theories of rationality—in contrast to classical
decision theory—maximizing subjective expected utility is not assumed to be the goal people
strive for exclusively. Rather, the achievement of ideographic goals is the rationality criterion.
Duality models in decision-making. Duality models are common in psychology (for
reviews, see Deutsch & Strack, 2006; Evans, 2008; Gawronski & Creighton, in press; Smith &
DeCoster, 2000). They are based on the assumption that there are two fundamentally distinct
modes of cognitive processing, the choice between which has an impact on the way in which
objects are evaluated and decisions are made. Evans (2008), who reviewed dual-system
accounts in cognitive and social psychology, stated that different labels for the two systems
abound and proposed using the terms System 1 and System 2 processes (e.g. Kahneman,
2003). According to Evans (2008), most duality theorists agree that System 1 processes are
“unconscious, rapid, automatic, and high capacity”, and System 2 processes are “conscious,
slow, and deliberative” (p. 256). Furthermore, some theorists assume that System 1 processes
are older in evolutionary terms, less language-based, more contextualized, and more universal
than System 2 processes, to name a few examples (Evans, 2008).
With respect to judgement and decision-making, the question arises, whether System 1
or System 2 processing leads to better decisions—e.g. in terms of compliance with axioms of
rational choice. According to some theorists, System 1 processing is a source of errors and
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biases (e.g. Petty & Wegener, 1999; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Other theorists, by
contrast, held that System 1 processing leads to better decisions. Dijksterhuis and Nordgren
(2006), for example, took the position that unconscious thought leads to better decisions than
conscious thought. Similarly, intuitive processing is often thought to be more effective than
more conscious and deliberative processing (for a summary, see Betsch & Glöckner, 2010).
Paradigms for Measuring Self-Access in Decision-Making
As in the goal-selection models discussed above, self-access is also an issue in models
of decision-making. In decision-making, self-access is defined as processes that enhance the
fit between choices and underlying preferences. Whether these preferences are to be
conceptualized as relatively stable dispositions is more controversial in decision-making than
in goal-selection research.
Two paradigms of self-access in decision-making are discussed in the following: the
paradigm linking dual-processing to preference consistency (e.g. Lee, Amir, & Ariely, 2009)
and the paradigm linking the processing of somatic markers to performance in the Iowa
Gambling Task (Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1990). These paradigms have been chosen,
firstly, because they make explicit self-access assumptions and, secondly, because they appear
to be consistent with a dual-processing account. The preference consistency account discussed
next differs most markedly from goal-selection accounts in that measures of self-access are
explicitly derived from axioms of rational choice.
Duality and preference consistency. An axiom of classical decision theory says that
a decision-maker, when making repeated judgements or decisions about the same objects,
should show the same absolute and relative preference for each judgement or decision. In
other words, judgements or decisions should not contradict earlier judgements or decisions.
This requirement has been formalized in theories of rational choice as the transitivity of
preferences (e.g. Tversky, 1969). According to the transitivity axiom, if object A is preferred
to object B and, furthermore, object B is preferred to object C, then object A should be
preferred to object C. If, however, the decision-maker prefers object C to object A, this
preference is regarded as a violation of the transitivity axiom.
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In their review of preference transitivity research, Regenwetter, Dana, and Davis-Stober
(2011) noted that most researchers had concluded from empirical data that humans and other
animals violate the transitivity axiom. The authors showed, however, that it cannot be readily
concluded from transitivity violations in overt choice behaviour that the latent preferences are
intransitive as well. Thus, when behaviour is stochastically modelled, Regenwetter et al. held
that no evidence for intransitivity can be found in empirical data. Studies by Birnbaum and
Schmidt (2008, 2010) have confirmed this view.18
Only a small number of studies have treated preference consistency as an individual
difference variable and tested whether preference consistency depends on people’s states or
traits (Lee et al., 2009; Nordgren & Dijksterhuis, 2009; Riechard, 1991). The studies by Lee
et al. (2009) and Nordgren and Dijksterhuis (2009) are of particular interest to the current
research, as they explain preference consistency using duality accounts.
Lee et al. (2009) used transitivity as a measure of preference consistency. Based on a
dual-system account, the authors expected participants to be more consistent when
information processing was more emotion-based, compared with more cognition-based
processing. In four experimental studies, participants made pairwise preference comparisons
between products (e.g. a voice recording pen, or an LED clip light). Stimulus features
(pictures versus words; colour versus black-and-white pictures) and processing features (trust
in feelings; cognitive capacity) were manipulated. As expected, subjects were more consistent
when emotional processing was facilitated, i.e. when judging pictures (versus words), colour
(versus black-and-white) pictures, when trust in feelings was high, or when cognitive capacity
was limited by a secondary task. According to Lee et al., these results may be due to the
emotional system being “better attuned to consistently and reliably provide individuals with a
reading of their preferences” (p. 175) and “one’s emotional responses” being “very valuable in
understanding one’s inherent preferences” (p. 185; cf. Simonson, 2008). Thus, their data are in
line with a self-access account.
Using a related paradigm, Nordgren and Dijksterhuis (2009) examined whether the
consistency of preferences depended on processing style. In five experiments, their
participants rated the attractiveness of various objects—e.g. Chinese ideograms, paintings,
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jelly beans—both at the beginning and the end of a 50-minute period. The stability of
preference ratings served as an indicator of preference consistency. Nordgren and Dijksterhuis
hypothesized that the more deliberatively information is processed when making judgements,
the less consistent the judgements should be. Subjects’ processing mode was manipulated by
instructing them to make judgements either in a deliberative manner, i.e. by thinking “very
hard”, or in a nondeliberative manner, i.e. “based on a gut feeling” (p. 40). As expected,
subjects who made judgements more deliberatively were less consistent in their judgements
than subjects making nondeliberative judgements. This was especially true when stimuli were
complex, i.e. described by many features. Results indicate that deliberation hinders preference
consistency, while nondeliberation does not increase consistency compared with a control
condition. Nordgren and Dijksterhuis argued that deliberation “introduces decisional noise by
poor and unsystematic weighting” (p. 40) of object attributes.
Compared with Lee et al. (2009), these authors employed a merely implicit duality
model: They assumed two distinct processes but did not specify the (System 1) process that is
disrupted by the deliberative (i.e. System 2) process. However, the results of Nordgren and
Dijksterhuis do not contradict the view that System 1 processing supports access to implicit
preference dispositions, which leads to more reliable preference judgements, and that System
2 processing is disruptive to this System 1-based self-access.
In sum, the results of Lee et al. (2009) and Nordgren and Dijksterhuis (2009) are in line
with the idea that self-access in judgement and decision-making is supported by System 1, and
hindered by System 2 processes. It must be admitted, though, that this research did not tap
into self-access processes themselves, but only into their assumed results. The somatic
markers and the Iowa Gambling Task discussed in the following, by contrast, claim to
represent more direct measures of self-access processes.
Somatic markers and the Iowa Gambling Task. In 1985, Eslinger and Damasio
described a neurological patient, EVR, with specific behavioural anomalies following a brain
tumour and corresponding surgery in the frontal lobes. The patient scored on or above average
on a number of cognitive tests, including intelligence scales and tests of frontal lobe function
(e.g., the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, WCST). EVR’s real-life behaviour, by contrast, was
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characterized by bankruptcy, an inability to keep a stable job, and broken marriages. Eslinger
and Damasio (1985) classified EVR’s behaviour as “sociopathic” (p. 1734). The dissociation
between cognitive and social functioning laid the foundations for a new neuroscientific theory
of decision-making.
Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, and Anderson (1994) developed a laboratory task on
which EVR, and similar patients, behaved markedly differently from other neurological
patients or normal controls. This so-called Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is a serial
decision-making task, in which subjects pursue the goal of maximizing their monetary assets.
Initially, subjects are provided with $ 2000 in facsimile banknotes. They are then asked to
choose repeatedly from one of four decks of cards, A, B, C, or D. Each choice results either in
a reward, or in a combination of reward and punishment. The four decks differ with respect to
reward and punishment schedules. Each choice from decks A or B results in a $ 100 gain,
while a choice from decks C or D results in a gain of only $ 50. Through occasional
punishments, subjects lose $ 1200 per 10 cards from decks A or B, but they lose only $ 250
per 10 cards from decks C or D. A preference for decks A or B results in a net loss, while a
preference for decks C and D results in a net gain. Therefore, decks A and B are
disadvantageous, while decks C and D are advantageous. The task ends after 100 draws.
Subjects are not informed about the reward and punishment schedules or the number of cards
they are required to draw to complete the task.
Patients like EVR, who have lesions in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC),
perform markedly worse on the Iowa Gambling Task than normal subjects (Bechara et al.,
1994). While normal subjects develop a preference for the advantageous decks after a short
exploratory phase, vmPFC patients never stop drawing from the disadvantageous decks. Thus,
unlike control subjects, vmPFC patients do not learn from experience that the relatively high
rewards in decks A and B do not outweigh the infrequent, but relatively high punishments in
the same decks.
According to Bechara et al. (1994), these results may indicate that, in vmPFC patients,
cognitive scenarios (e.g. the act of drawing from a particular deck) are not “marked with a
. . . value” (p. 14, emphasis in original). Moreover, the somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) says
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that this marking of a cognitive scenario is mediated through the “overt or covert processing of
somatic states” (Bechara et al., 1994, p. 14). In other words, somatic changes19—be they
conscious or unconscious—indicate to the normal subject that a certain option is good or bad
overall. According to this hypothesis, such a process does not take place in vmPFC patients.
A study by Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, and Damasio (1996), which used the skin
conductance response (SCR) as an indicator of somatic changes, is in line with the SMH. In
this study, the SCR was measured over a period preceding, as well as a period following the
drawing of each card. Both vmPFC patients and healthy controls generated SCRs after being
rewarded or punished. In addition, control subjects developed SCRs before drawing certain
cards. These SCRs, which are interpreted as anticipatory SCRs, were stronger before drawing
from decks A and B, compared with decks C and D. Such anticipatory SCRs, however, were
entirely absent in vmPFC patients. Bechara et al. (1996) concluded that somatic changes may
help normal subjects to make advantageous decisions, and that vmPFC patients choose
disadvantageously because they lack such somatic changes.
Die SMH assumes that somatic markers may be processed outside the individual’s
awareness. To corroborate this assumption, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, and Damasio (1997)
collected self-report data during the Iowa Gambling Task by asking subjects to tell the
experimenter “all you know about what is going on in this game” and how they felt about the
game (Bechara et al., 1997, p. 1293). Based on oral responses, as well as SCR data from
vmPFC subjects and normal controls, four task periods were distinguished. The period before
punishments20 were made and in which no anticipatory SCRs were observed was called the
pre-punishment period. When a number of punishments had been experienced, normal
subjects developed anticipatory SCRs, while the same subjects were entirely unable to specify
any rules or regularities in the task. Therefore, this second period was called the pre-hunch
period. In the third, the hunch period, all normal subjects expressed a hunch about decks A
and B being less advantageous, and all normal subjects showed anticipatory SCRs before
drawing from these same decks. None of the patients, by contrast, had a hunch or anticipatory
SCRs. In time, subjects gained explicit knowledge about the nature of the task. The period, in
which subjects were able to tell why decks A and B were disadvantageous, was called the
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conceptual period. Both some of the patients and some of the normal controls reached the this
fourth period. Interestingly, even those vmPFC patients who were able to indicate which decks
were disadvantageous did not develop a preference for choosing from the advantageous decks.
Based on these results, Bechara et al. (1997) proposed a model of decision-making
which features two classes of processes that are antecedents to a decision: Firstly,
“nondeclarative dispositional knowledge related to the individual’s previous emotional
experience with similar situations” (p. 1294) are evoked. Secondly, facts about action-outcome
contingencies are consciously processed and subjected to reasoning strategies. Bechara et al.
(1997) concluded from their data that, in normal subjects, nondeclarative processing precedes
declarative processing of facts and biases the reasoning process on which a decision is based.
This biasing, Bechara et al. (1997) believe, makes the decision-maker avoid dangerous
options. Furthermore, SCRs are assumed to reflect “access to records of previous individual
experience” (Bechara et al., 1997, p. 1294). In sum, the SMH may be considered a duality
account of self-access as it features the distinction between two types of knowledge, one
nondeclarative, one declarative. The relative contribution of these types of knowledge
determines the extent to which previous experience is taken into account when the decision is
made.
The empirical status of the SMH is controversial (for a review of critical accounts, see
Dunn, Dalgleish, & Lawrence, 2006). For instance, it has been shown that subjects who
choose advantageously have a conscious knowledge of which decks are advantageous (Maia
& McClelland, 2004). This calls into question the assumption that unconscious biases help
decision-making in normal subjects. Furthermore, subjects with impaired feedback from the
body—i.e. patients with pure autonomic failure (PAF) or spinal cord injuries—did not perform
worse on the Iowa Gambling Task than normal subjects in most studies (e.g. Heims, Critchley,
Dolan, Mathias, & Cipolotti, 2004). Dunn et al. (2006) concluded that the main aspects of the
SMH are most likely false: Data do not support the notion that the Iowa Gambling Task
measures learning of contingencies based on anticipatory, peripheral marker signals.
Duality, rationality, and self-access in decision-making. The preference consistency
paradigm, as well as research on somatic markers share the idea that the quality of decisions is
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enhanced by processes described as emotional, non-deliberative, or somatic. This class of
processes can be identified with System 1 processes, as defined in dual-processing models. In
this vein, the models of self-access in decision-making discussed above may be considered
duality models.
The criterion for judging decision quality differs between preference consistency and
somatic marker research. In the preference consistency studies discussed above, compliance
with axioms of rational choice theory is taken to indicate higher decision quality: Decisions
that are more transitive or more temporally stable are thought to be better realizations of the
decision-maker’s disposition. Here, compliance with axioms of rational choice is considered
an indicator of self-access.
In somatic marker research, by contrast, subjects choosing from disadvantageous decks
in the Iowa Gambling Task do not violate axioms of rational choice. Even though their
experience may suggest an advantage of some, compared with other decks, they cannot
reasonably make any prediction about the value of future cards. Nevertheless, subjects who
persistently draw from disadvantageous decks are thought to suffer from decision-making
deficiencies. Here a different variant of rationality is the touchstone for decision quality:
Choosing from advantageous decks is rational in that it serves the subject’s current goal of
making a profit. Thus, in the context of the SMH, rationality is not defined in terms of
compliance with axioms, but with the achievement of personal, or idiographic, goals (see the
rationality concepts of Simon, 1972, and Over, 2004, discussed above).
Self-Access in Decision-Making and the Dual-System Communication Framework
According to the dual-system communication framework, evaluative dispositions which
are stored in an implicit system may become available for conscious report or action control
through a transfer of information from the implicit to an explicit mental system. In the
following, two questions regarding the relationship between self-access in decision-making
and the dual-system communication framework are discussed: firstly, the question of whether
models of self-access in decision-making fit into the dual-system communication framework;
secondly, what consequences the consideration of decision-making models has for the
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framework.
Models of self-access in decision-making as dual-system communication models.
Do the two decision-making accounts discussed above fit into a dual-system communication
framework? Both accounts include the idea of process-dependent access to self-related
information: According to both Lee et al. (2009) and Bechara et al. (1997), System 1
processing—emotional or somatic, respectively—fosters access to dispositional evaluative
knowledge. This kind of access, in turn, helps to make decisions more rational or
advantageous.
However, these accounts differ from dual-system communication models in the domain
of self-access in goal selection in that, even though they mention one system in which
dispositional evaluative knowledge is stored, they do not explicitly mention a second system
which might access this stored knowledge. Thus, theories of self-access in decision-making
may be considered incompletely specified dual-system communication models, which do not,
however, contradict the dual-system communication framework.
Models of self-access in decision-making differ with respect to their level of analysis.
The preference consistency approach is merely concerned with the assumed outcomes of
self-access processes and therefore situated on a medium level of analysis. SMH research, by
contrast, explicitly tests a proposed mechanism of self-access—i.e. somatic markers—and is
therefore situated on a high level of analysis. Models on a low level of analysis are uncommon
in research on self-access in decision-making, because models usually include an objective
measure of self-access outcomes or processes.
The models of self-access in decision-making discussed above do not differ with respect
to the consideration of interpersonal processes. None of the models consider coping with
external demands or other-assigned goals.21 In this respect, they are similar to MDT and IPM,
but dissimilar to the SCM and PSI theory.
Considering decision-making: Consequences for the dual-system communication
framework. As shown above, self-access models for goal selection and decision-making are
similar in several respects. This leads to the question whether the dual-system communication
framework could be generalized to more seamlessly include self-access models of
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decision-making.
In the decision-making domain, duality of processes or systems is a characteristic
feature of self-access models. As discussed above, these duality models feature a distinction
between two systems, System 1 and 2, and their respective processes. The implicit and the
explicit system in the dual-system communication framework may be considered instances of
System 1 and 2, respectively, as defined in duality models. Like System 1, the implicit system
is thought to process information unconsciously and automatically, while, like System 2, the
explicit system is thought to process information consciously and deliberatively. Thus, the
dual-system communication framework is a duality model.
However, duality is a general notion, of which dual-system communication is a specific
instance. Therefore, some features apply to dual-system communication that do not apply to
duality in general. Firstly, while duality may denote duality of processing, or systems, or both,
the dual-system communication framework features two systems that are, in addition, defined
as long-term memory systems. Memory contents in the two systems differ in their mode of
representation. Moreover, retrieval of memory contents succeeds if a type of cognitive
processing is available that fits the memory contents. For instance, retrieval of non-verbally
encoded implicit self-representation stored in distributed networks succeeds if holistic,
intuitive processing is available, but fails if processing is restricted to de-contextualized,
sequential, limited-capacity processing.
Thus, duality in the dual-system communication framework is present on two levels: on
the level of the representation mode and on the level of the processing mode. Systems and
processes in the dual-system communication framework may therefore be renamed using the
Type 1 versus Type 2 distinction known from duality models. This results in a distinction
between Type 1 and Type 2 processes which operate on the contents of Type 1 and Type 2
systems, i.e. System 1 and System 2. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the
dual-system communication framework—in which the processes and systems have been
renamed—and theories of self-access in decision-making (which, as mentioned above,
generally lack a specification of System 2).
Insert Figure 2 about here
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Dual-System Communication: A Framework for Future Research
In the current article, we have proposed a meta-theoretical framework to summarize the
prominent models of self-access in goal selection. According to the resulting dual-system
communication model, self-access is based on a transfer of information from an implicit
system, or System 1, to an explicit system, or System 2. Evaluative dispositions are stored as
long-term memory contents in System 1. Such a disposition can be successfully retrieved and
made available to conscious action control if a cognitive processing mode is available that fits
the disposition’s representation mode. The self-access models discussed are compatible with
the dual-system communication framework, even though dual-system communication is
specified more explicitly in some models than in others.
Models of self-access in goal selection may be classified according to two dimensions:
level of analysis and consideration of interpersonal processes. Level of analysis concerns the
question of how closely hypotheses and measurement methods correspond to the self-access
concept, i.e. the question of whether merely self-report, or self-access outcome, or self-access
process variables are considered. Consideration of interpersonal processes concerns the
question of whether primarily intrapersonal processes—like self-perception—, or also
interpersonal processes—like the internalization of externally originating goals—are thought
to be relevant to self-access. Future research may profit from this synoptic review of
self-access research in a number of ways, as becomes apparent from the following discussion.
A Need for Convergence
We have shown that the self-access models presented above share a number of
characteristics, especially the idea of a transfer of information from an implicit to an explicit
system, given that information is processed in a certain way. Nevertheless, the models differ
with respect to the description of system characteristics, as well as processing prerequisites.
The distinctive features of the two systems have been described as affective versus cognitive
(Weinberger & McClelland, 1990), non-verbal versus verbal (Schultheiss & Strasser, 2012),
or by a wide range of System 1 versus System 2 features (e.g. intuitive versus reflective; Kuhl,
2000). Moreover, in the different models, different processes underlying self-access have been
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proposed: While, according to PSI theory, self-access rests on intuitive processing, the IPM
proposes a translation process, which, presumably, encompasses encoding, translation, and
decoding steps.
Duality models of self-access are diverse because the concept of duality is vague.
Duality does not refer to a specific distinction between process or system characteristics, but
to a class of models featuring two systems or types of processing, the exact nature of which is
not precisely defined. In other words, even though the system characteristics mentioned above
may be subsumed under System 1 versus System 2 processes, affective, symbolic, or intuitive
processes, for example, need not be substantially intercorrelated. Because the duality
distinction is realized in various distinct ways, there is diversity in the system and process
descriptions of self-access models.
Given the similarity in the scope and general architecture of the models, is this diversity
justified? If it were, it would need to be shown that the different models affect distinct
self-access phenomena or distinct aspects of the self-access phenomenon. The diversity of
models for a relatively universal subject constitutes a challenge for self-access research.
Further studies should be undertaken to decide which of the assumptions—e.g. system and
processing features—are most feasible from a theoretical and empirical point of view. In other
words, researchers should strive for a convergence of the models, and—as far as possible—for
a unifying model of self-access.
A Need to Discriminate
While the overall diversity of models is puzzling, there is nevertheless a need to
distinguish between classes of self-access models. Notably, we have identified two different
views of self-access that may require separate theoretical approaches: While some models
assume that goals are internally generated, other models include some sort of conflict between
internal and external sources of goals. These two classes of self-access models are
fundamentally different: While the former primarily involve processes of self-perception, the
latter involve—in addition to self-perception processes—processes of self-other distinction,
internalization, and resistance to persuasion.
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The question whether intrapersonal and interpersonal processes should be analysed
within the same model or in separate models is a practical one. Can other-related processes be
easily researched in paradigms used to tackle self-perception processes? Whatever the case
may be, in future research, self-perception processes and outcomes should be clearly
distinguished from other-related processes and outcomes, in theory as well as in methodology.
Measuring Self-Access: The Criterion Problem
Measuring self-access is difficult because it requires a quantification of how well an
implicit system, or System 1, and an explicit system, or System 2, are aligned. The self-access
criterion used in the different models corresponds to the level-of-analysis distinction
introduced above, more precisely to its methodological aspect. The criterion may be (a) purely
phenomenological, i.e. subjective, (low level of analysis), (b) based on a comparison between
a subjective and an objective measure (medium level of analysis), or (c) include the
measurement or manipulation of self-access processes (high level of analysis).
A well-established paradigm with a high level of analysis of type (c) is the induction of
referential processing through affective imagination (see Schultheiss & Strasser, 2012). In this
paradigm, processes are induced which are assumed to underlie self-access. Similarly, in
preference consistency research (Lee et al., 2009; Nordgren & Dijksterhuis, 2009), process
manipulations had an impact on measures related to self-access. Also research on the SMH
(cf. Damasio et al., 1990) tested whether blocking the processes assumed to underlie
self-access did indeed reduce self-access. However, the evidence generally speaks against
self-access being mediated by peripheral, somatic processes (for a summary, see Dunn et al.,
2006). The only known direct measure of self-access processes is the self-compatibility
checking method (Kazén et al., 2003), which has not, however, been extensively tested. Thus,
the manipulation of self-access processes is more common on this level of analysis than the
measurement of such processes. Furthermore, process manipulation is used more extensively
in the decision-making than in the goal-selection domain.
In many paradigms, self-access outcomes—which are situated on a medium level of
analysis—rest on a comparison between a self-reported goal (or object) attribute and its
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objective—i.e. non-self-report—counterpart. Typical exemplars of this category are
motive-goal congruence (Brunstein, 2010) and self-infiltration (Kuhl & Kazén, 1994).
Preference consistency measures are related to this kind of measures: They include a
comparison of preference judgements with other preference judgements, in other words, a
measurement of homogeneity of judgements on the same or similar objects. Thus, in the vast
majority of models, self-access is thought to be related to the accuracy, or homogeneity, of
conscious reports about goals or objects.
When the accuracy of people’s reports is to be measured, pure self-reports of self-access
(e.g. Sheldon, 2002) are of little use. However, it is probable that differences in self-access
capabilities find expression in certain subjectively measurable states. For instance, two items
from the Volitional Components Inventory (VCQ; Kuhl & Fuhrmann, 1998) aim to measure
perceived self-congruence of actions. However, more comprehensive self-report instruments
for the phenomenological concomitants of self-access—or lack thereof—are presently not
available.
In sum, the three levels of analysis constitute a hierarchy of self-access criteria: purely
subjective, comparison/outcome, and process criteria. Future research should attempt to
encompass all three levels more fully. For instance, knowledge about the mechanisms
underlying self-access may greatly profit from the inclusion of process manipulations or
measurements. Subjective measures, on the other hand, might provide a convenient way of
measuring self-access proxies.
Internalization and Self-Access: An Ambiguous Relationship
Situated on a medium level of analysis, the PLOC (SCM) and the self-infiltration (PSI
theory) paradigm agree that self-access outcomes are related to a goal’s state of
internalization. Both approaches are based on the assumption that other-assigned goals may
be gradually integrated into a person. Furthermore, they agree that the first step in the process
of internalizing an externally originating goal is introjection of the goal. An introjected goal is
considered a part of the self, even though it exerts its influence through a representation of
some external object, e.g. an figure of authority or a social norm. According to the SCM, the
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more internalized a goal is, the more intact self-access is thought to be. According to PSI
theory, by contrast, lack of internalization is thought to indicate intact self-access. Put
differently, the two models differ with respect to the question of whether internalization is
functional or not.
A case can be made both for the functionality and the disfunctionality of internalization.
For instance, an internalized regulation may use up less energy, or willpower, than an external
regulation. Therefore, internalization may be regarded as an instance of efficient
self-regulation. On the other hand, internalization may have detrimental consequences
because of its disintegrative aspect. An internalized goal may exert an influence on a person,
even though it is not in line with that person’s needs or preferences. Thus, self-access affects
internalization in different directions in PSI theory and the SCM, because they make different
a priori assumptions about the goal’s self-concordance and implement it differently in
methodological terms. While the self-infiltration paradigm considers the internalization of
unattractive items, the SCM’s self-access measure features goals that are thought to be in line
with the person’s deeper needs. In sum, internalization of self-incongruent goals—as in PSI
theory—is considered harmful, while internalization of self-congruent goals—as in SCM—is
considered helpful.
The relationship between internalization and self-access is ambiguous, because different
a priori assumptions are made about the self-congruence of goals. Do the SCM and PSI theory
make such divergent assumptions because those assumptions are arbitrary? They are at least
questionable. With respect to the self-infiltration paradigm, unattractive activities may serve
higher-order values and goals and therefore be self-congruent. Consequently, it may be
functional to internalize unattractive activities. With respect to the SCM—as discussed
above—, the assumption that internally regulated goals must be self-congruent seems
premature, because a person with deficient self-access might internalize even severely
self-incongruent goals. In sum, the relationship between internalization and self-access is
ambiguous because the underlying assumptions are not well-founded. Thus, the question of
what goals may be considered self-congruent, emerges as a central theoretical question.
Paradigms in which an implicit and an explicit measure of the same constructs are
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compared—like motive-goal congruence—are not based on a priori assumptions about certain
goals being self-congruent. From this point-of-view, paradigms featuring implicit-explicit
comparisons are to be preferred. However, one limitation of such comparison paradigms lies
in their recourse to traits as the primary determinants of goal selection, and in the
corresponding neglect of situational determinants.
Are Preferences Situationally Determined?
In most models of self-access in goal selection, self-access refers to the ability to
retrieve evaluative dispositions, or stable preferences, from memory. In decision-making
research, by contrast, the question of whether preferences for objects or actions may be
dispositional is subject to debate. On the one hand, a large body of research shows that
preferences are influenced by situational factors, e.g. available options, features of the task, or
context (for a review, see Shafir & LeBoeuf, 2004), which suggests that constructive processes
play a major role in preference judgements or decisions. On the other hand, it has been argued
that contextual influences on preferences do not rule out inherent, i.e. dispositional
preferences. Simonson (2008) holds that both inherent and constructed preferences play a role
when decisions are made, and that inherent preferences are most influential when the object or
action has been actually experienced.
This discussion is relevant for self-access research in two ways. Firstly, it is reminiscent
of the notion of experiential versus verbal-symbolic processing that distinguishes the implicit
and explicit motivational systems according to an early version of the IPM (Schultheiss,
2002). Imagery exercises, known to enhance self-access, may provide the subject with a
simulation of actual experience, therefore making his or her inherent action preferences
accessible. Thus, the view of Simonson (2008) converges with the IPM. Secondly, the
question of whether dispositional or constructive processes prevail in a given situation, has
largely been neglected by self-access research. This question is, however, of great importance,
as the relative role of the two processes may moderate the influence of implicit motives, and
other kinds of evaluative dispositions, on behaviour.
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Summary and Conclusions
All models of self-access in goal selection and decision-making agree in assuming that
some judgement- or decision-relevant memory contents may be retrieved more or less
successfully, depending on situational and personality factors. The dual-system
communication framework, which is based on the common features of self-access models,
further specifies the mental systems and processes that are thought to underlie self-access
processes. However, whether the dual-system communication framework is valid depends on
the validity of the models it is based on.
Irrespective of its validity, the framework proves useful in several ways. Firstly, finding
a common comparison of models allows knowledge to be applied across model boundaries.
Secondly, identifying distinctive features of models helps to differentiate the self-access
concept into several facets. Thirdly, the dual-system communication framework suggests that
decisions between several possible explanations of the same phenomenon need to be
attempted.
Self-access is researched in several subdisciplines of psychology and economics. Basic
assumptions and methodological procedures vary. Therefore, self-access research appears
fragmented with respect to theory and methodology. The dual-system communication
framework may help to reduce fragmentation and turn diversity into unity.
Notes
1The term goal-setting is sometimes used to describe the goal-selection concept as defined here (e.g. Goll-
witzer, 1990). However, goal-setting, as most prominently used, does not refer to the selection of goals from a
large number of possible goals, but to the way in which a given goal is represented. In the theory of Latham
and Locke (1991), for example, goal-setting refers to the level of specificity and difficulty of the intended action
outcomes. Therefore, to avoid confusion, we use the—less common—term goal selection in the current paper.
2This model has been called an information processing account of implicit motive arousal (Schultheiss, 2002),
or an information processing model of implicit and explicit motives (Schultheiss, 2008). For the sake of brevity,
the model is referred to in the following as the information processing model of dual motivation (IPM).
3In more recent publications (e.g., McClelland et al., 1989), the TAT has been relabelled as the “picture story
exercise” (PSE). However, as the measurement instrument has not significantly changed since it was first adapted
to motive measurement (McClelland et al., 1953), the necessity for relabelling is not apparent.
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4Hofer et al. (2010) attributed the divergent results for the power motive to cultural differences.
5In another study with content-matched instruments (Schultheiss, Yankova, Dirlikov, & Schad, 2009), signifi-
cant implicit-explicit correlations were only found for the power motive but not for the achievement and affiliation
motives.
6Note that, even though the IPM assumes the translation process to be bi-directional, it nevertheless serves the
purpose of bringing the explicit motivational system—e.g. goals—into alignment with the implicit motivational
system—e.g. implicit motives, and not vice versa. In short, bi-directional translation is a prerequisite for the
uni-directional alignment of systems.
7The only exception was the significant effect of referential competence on congruence between achievement
motives in Study 3.
8PLOC measures typically include questions about external, introjected, identified, and intrinsic—but not
integrated—reasons for executing the behaviour (e.g., Sheldon & Elliot, 1999), the agreement to which the subject
indicates on a Likert scale.
9But see Smith et al. (2007) for a contradictory result.
10For instance, Greguras and Diefendorff (2010) did not find an effect of self-concordance on goal-attainment.
However, this finding appears to be a rare exception.
11It is doubtful, however, whether this fourth level fits McAdams’s model. The three-level model is explic-
itly concerned with the description of individual differences on each of the levels. Thus, adding a level largely
unrelated to individual differences makes little sense.
12Except in Study 1, where 24 items were used. Of these 8 were chosen and 8 suggested by the experimenter.
In addition, Study 1 included activities related to the preparation of a birthday party, in addition to office activities.
13Note that, in Kazén et al. (2003, Study 2), affect was not directly manipulated but an induction of external
pressure was used as a proxy variable of affect .
14Negative affect, which was not manipulated in this study, did not have an effect on false self-ascription.
15 Sheldon (2004) has proposed the organismic valuing process (OVP; Rogers, 1961, as cited in Sheldon, 2004,
p. 104), which allows people to revise their goal choices in a way that enhances their well-being and growth
(Sheldon, 2004, p. 198). A small number of empirical studies have shown that subjects shift from extrinsic
goals (e.g. material possessions) towards intrinsic goals (e.g. personal growth) over time (e.g., Sheldon, Arndt,
& Houser-Marko, 2003; cf. Sheldon, Kasser, Smith, & Share, 2002). The organismic valuing process differs
from the self-access processes discussed here in at least two respects. Firstly, research on the organismic valuing
process has not been concerned with the concordance between people’s goals and their individual, underlying
dispositions. Instead it is based on an a priori evaluation of certain classes of goals, intrinsic versus extrinsic, as
being desirable or undesirable, respectively. Secondly, individual differences in the organismic valuing process
have not been taken into consideration by empirical research. For these reasons, the organismic valuing process
does not concern self-access as defined in the current research and is therefore not discussed further.
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16 In epistemology, a correspondence between a fact and a belief—i.e. true belief—does not, in itself, constitute
knowledge (for a summary, see Klein, 1998). For example, the true belief that the last name of the president of
the United States of America in 1996 begins with a “C” is not knowledge if it is based on the false belief that the
president was called Winston Churchill. Traditionally, it has been held that a false belief has to be based on suffi-
ciently good reasons in order to be knowledge (Klein, 1998). Thus, strictly speaking, a correspondence between
an implicit characteristic of a person and the conscious belief about that characteristic is only self-knowledge if the
belief is held for sufficiently good reasons. It is difficult to ensure empirically that this condition is met. Therefore,
concepts of fit should be preferred to concepts of self-knowledge wherever applicable.
17PSI theory and the SCM agree, however, in their assumption that an intermediate state of internalization,
called introjection, signifies that a subject’s goal does not entirely conform to his or her self.
18The conclusion that latent preferences are transitive does not rule out the possibility that preference consis-
tency may constitute a valid measure of self-access, for two reasons. Firstly, researchers in economically oriented
transitivity research did not consider individual differences in transitivity. It is possible that meaningful indi-
vidual differences in consistency exist but have not been detected by previous research. Secondly, even though
people—on average—are consistent in their latent preferences, individual differences in manifest preferences may,
nevertheless, constitute a valid measure of self-access. For instance, the consistency of overt preferences may point
to a subject’s personality integration status. Therefore, it does not follow from the general consistency of latent
preferences that consistency, taken as an individual difference variable, is unrelated to self-access.
19According to Bechara et al. (1996), the “term ‘somatic’ is used here in its broadest sense to include both
musculoskeletal and visceral structures of the soma, as well as their neural representations in the central nervous
system” (p. 215).
20Note that punishments are the salient incentives in the Iowa Gambling Task because they are relatively infre-
quent but high, whereas moderate rewards are given at each trial. Tomb, Hauser, Deldin, and Caramazza (2002)
changed the reward and punishment schedule, so that the average magnitude of rewards and punishments was
higher for good decks than for bad decks. Under these conditions, healthy subjects still preferred the good decks,
but also developed SCRs for the good decks. Thus, SCRs do not seem to be related to high punishments but to the
magnitude of the consequences of the decision, be they positive or negative.
21In social psychology, a large body of research addresses coping with attitudes and opinions held by others,
namely in the field of persuasion (see Crano & Prislin, 2006, for a recent review). Interestingly, some influential
persuasion models are duality models (e.g. the elaboration likelihood model; Petty & Wegener, 1999). Persuasion
models, however, do not include self-access assumptions. They are concerned with external sources of attitude
change, but not with internal or external sources of attitudes per se.
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Figure 1. A dual-system communication framework: Whether evaluative dispositions towards
certain future actions become available to conscious report or conscious action control
depends on the transfer of information from an implicit system to an explicit system (bold
arrows) and, according to Schultheiss and Strasser (2012), vice versa (dashed arrows). Such a
transfer of information succeeds when the predominant processing mode corresponds to the
way in which the information to be processed is represented.
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(a) Theories of self-access in goal selection: Dual-system communication framework
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Type of
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(1 versus 2)
(b) Theories of self-access in decision-making
Figure 2. Models of self-access in the goal-selection and decision-making domains are similar
in that they assume that access to evaluative dispositions depends on which of two types of
processing—System 1 versus System 2 processing—dominates in the mental system as a
whole. They differ, however, in that models of self-access in decision-making—at least those
included in the current paper—do not specify the system (of System 2 type) which mediates
the self-access process, i.e. which makes evaluative dispositions available to conscious report
or action control.
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Data from the present study are also reported in Study 1 of the third paper of the present
thesis, entitled “The consistency of preferences as a measure of self-access”. In the two
studies, hypotheses regarding different outcome measures are tested. Because the data stem
from the same data collection, the descriptions of some measurement instruments (ACS-90,
PANAS), and the first three paragraphs of the procedure are identical in the two studies.
SELF-INFILTRATION AND SELF-ACCESS 90
Abstract
False self-ascription of assigned activities, i.e. self-infiltration, has been proposed as a
measure of access to one’s own needs and preferences. The current research attempted to
closely replicate research by Baumann and Kuhl (2003), who showed that subjects with a low
action orientation who experience negative affect are particularly prone to self-infiltration. In
an experimental setting, N = 76 subjects, mostly students, chose a number of office activities
and were assigned additional activities. In a subsequent unexpected memory task, they had to
indicate whether or not they had chosen the activities beforehand. Current affect, action
orientation, and other personality variables were measured. Contrary to expectations, subjects
with a high action orientation (OR = 1.54) were more prone to make self-infiltration errors
than subjects with a low action orientation (OR = 1.00). Current affect did not predict
self-infiltration. To explain the results, processes other than self-access processes need to be
taken into account. It is argued that future self-infiltration research should consider general
memory performance in more detail.
Keywords: self-infiltration, PANTER, PSI theory
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Self-Infiltration as a Measure of Self-Access: A Replication Study
Learning has often been metaphorically referred to as the acquisition of something
(Sfard, 1998). In Perls’s (1969) view, for example, learning is like eating. Both activities
involve the incorporation of new material into the organism. To be effective, both require
material to be destroyed so as to be assimilated by the organism. An introjection is an instance
of mental material that has not been successfully treated in this way. As Perls puts it,
“introjection means preserving the structure of things taken in, whilst the organism requires
their destruction” (p. 129; original in italics). According to Perls (1969), Gestalt therapy helps
the patient to re-chew the introjected material in order to make assimilation possible.
Kuhl and Kazén (1994) developed an experimental method for measuring individual
differences in the tendency towards introjection, the so-called self-infiltration measure. This
measure was used to test hypotheses regarding situational and personality conditions that
make introjection more probable. For a number of reasons, which are discussed below, a
replication of the self-infiltration paradigm is necessary. Such a replication study is reported in
the current paper, following a review of the existing self-infiltration literature.
Introjection as Internalization
The term introjection, originally coined by the psychoanalyst Ferenczi (1910), belongs
to a broader class of internalization processes. After reviewing the psychoanalytical literature,
Schafer (1968) defined internalization and its main types, introjection and identification.
Internalization refers to processes by which external regulations are transformed into inner
regulations (Schafer, 1968). As a result, the influence of an outside object (e.g., a person) on
the subject continues when the object is absent. In the case of introjection, the representation
of a person (or other person-like object) resides within the subject. This “inner person” may
exert an influence on the subject and, in some cases, even be influenced by the subject
(Schafer, 1968, p. 72). Identification, by contrast, refers to changes in “motives”, behaviour
patterns, and self-representations “in such a way as to experience being like, the same as, and
merged” with an object (p. 140). So whereas, in the case of introjection, the object is displaced
from the outer to the inner world relatively unchanged, identification changes the subject itself
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(p. 153 f.).
In recent times, internalization processes have sparked interest in various fields of
experimental psychology. In social psychology, Deci and Ryan (2000) have set out to
empirically study internalization processes—especially with regard to the motivation for
learning—, using vocabulary taken from the psychoanalytic and Gestalt therapy traditions.
Their organismic integration theory (OIT; see Ryan & Deci, 2008)—a theory within
self-determination theory (SDT)—postulates that externally regulated behaviour, i.e.
behaviour motivated by external contingencies, such as reward or punishment, may be
gradually internalized, resulting in a more self-determined regulation of behaviour. When
regulation is internalized, it passes through the stages of introjection, identification, and
integration. A behaviour’s internalization status is measured using a self-report instrument, in
which subjects indicate whether the perceived locus of causality (PLOC) is more internal or
external. Empirical studies have shown that a more internal PLOC is beneficial to well-being
(e.g. Black & Deci, 2000; Neyrinck, Vansteenkiste, Lens, Duriez, & Hutsebaut, 2006),
performance (e.g. Turban, Tan, Brown, & Sheldon, 2007; Vansteenkiste, Simons, Lens,
Sheldon, & Deci, 2004), and persistence (e.g. Pelletier, Fortier, Vallerand, & Brière, 2001;
Vallerand, Fortier, & Guay, 1997; for reviews, see Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2008).
While SDT research has particularly considered the consequences of the internalization
of goals that originate externally, personality systems interaction theory (PSI theory Kuhl,
2000, 2001) has focused on the situational and dispositional antecedents of internalization
processes. According to PSI theory, the integrated self is modelled as an extended network of
“implicit self-representations; that is, integrated representations of internal states such as
needs, emotions, somatic feelings (e.g. muscle tensions), and values” (Kuhl, 2000, p. 130,
emphasis in original). This network of self-representations is conceptualized as a memory
system called extension memory. It is thought to process information in a parallel, holistic
manner, thus taking a large number of self-aspects into account. In addition, the ability to
integrate novel or painful experiences depends on the activity of extension memory.
Introjection, in contrast, signifies that the integrative function of extension memory is
deficient. According to this theory, introjection indicates that a person’s self-access
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capabilities, i.e. his or her ability to retrieve integrated self-representations, are impaired
(Quirin & Kuhl, 2008).
Negative Affect and Action Orientation Predict Introjection
According to PSI theory, persistent negative affect reduces extension memory activity,
which results in reduced access to integrated self-representations (Kuhl, 2001). To what extent
negative affect has a detrimental impact on self-access depends on the personality disposition
of failure-related action orientation (AOF; Kuhl, 1994). Subjects with a high AOF recover
faster from failure or otherwise stressful experiences, than subjects with a low AOF, i.e. they
are better at overcoming ruminative thoughts and negative affect (Jostmann, Koole,
Van Der Wulp, & Fockenberg, 2005; Koole & Jostmann, 2004). Thus, while negative affect
reduces self-access, AOF buffers this reduction and helps the subject recover from stressful
experiences and thus regain self-access capabilities sooner.
Empirical testing of the hypothesized antecedents of self-access was made possible by
Kuhl and Kazén (1994), who developed a paradigm to measure impaired self-access in terms
of a tendency towards introjection. In contrast to the self-report measure used in SDT
research, this paradigm features an objective—i.e. not self-reported—measure of self-access.
In the paradigm, subjects are asked to simulate a working day in an office, in the course of
which they are asked to choose a number of activities (e.g. “sort the post”, “sharpen the
pencils”) for later execution. Likewise, they are assigned a number of activities by the “boss”
(or the experimenter). In a subsequent, unexpected memory task, subjects must decide for
each activity whether it originated with the subject him- or herself, or with the boss. Activities
assigned by the boss and—erroneously—classified as self-selected by the subject indicate
impaired self-access. Because subjects who score high on this measure allow—metaphorically
speaking—an alien force (i.e., the boss) to secretly populate their “self”, this measure is also
called self-infiltration. In a number of studies, self-infiltration has been shown to depend on
AOF in association with state variables, notably negative affect (Baumann & Kuhl, 2003;
Kazén, Baumann, & Kuhl, 2003; Kuhl & Kazén, 1994).
Thus, the self-infiltration paradigm has been successfully used to explore antecedents of
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self-access. Nevertheless, we argue that a close replication of the paradigm is necessary,
particularly to test its robustness with respect to small variations in procedure. The current
research attempted to replicate the self-infiltration paradigm by means of an independent, but
largely equivalent implementation. Self-infiltration was expected to depend on the combined
influence of negative affect and AOF. This hypothesis is prominent in self-infiltration research,
as can be seen from the following review of the literature.
Reviewing the Self-Infiltration Literature
To date, 13 studies using self-infiltration as a dependent variable have been published in
five journal articles (Baumann & Kuhl, 2003; Baumann, Kuhl, & Kazén, 2005; Baumann &
Scheffer, 2011; Fuhrmann & Kuhl, 1998; Kazén et al., 2003; Kuhl & Kazén, 1994; Quirin,
Koole, Baumann, Kazén, & Kuhl, 2009, see Table 1). Early studies included AOF as the focal
predictor, but did not consider negative affect as a potential predictor of self-access. Kuhl and
Kazén (1994) developed a paper-and-pencil procedure for measuring self-infiltration. In these
studies, between 24 and 27, mostly office-related, activities were shown to subjects. Subjects
chose one third of items and were then assigned another third of the items they had not
previously chosen. In a subsequent, unexpected memory task, subjects had to decide for each
activity whether it had been chosen, assigned, or neither chosen nor assigned (i.e. a remaining
activity). Activities not previously chosen but classified by the subject as having been chosen
were counted as false self-ascriptions (FSA). The extent to which the number of false
self-ascriptions (FSA) of assigned activities exceeded the number of FSAs of remaining
activities served as a measure of self-infiltration. The results of two experiments showed that
subjects low in AOF made more FSA errors with assigned, compared with remaining items,
OR = odds(assigned)/odds(remaining) = 3.96, while no such difference emerged in subjects
with a high AOF, OR = 1.02. In Experiment 2, AOF predicted self-infiltration
(ORhigh AOF = 0.75; ORlow AOF = 2.88) only if an uncompleted intention had been induced.
This moderating effect of an uncompleted intention was explained by excessive working
memory load due to intention maintenance in low-AOF subjects (cf. Goschke & Kuhl, 1993).
The paper-and-pencil procedure suffers from one major shortcoming: Its memory
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measurement does not reflect a pure distinction between self and other, but is confounded by
the subject’s liking of activities. When subjects decide whether they chose an activity
themselves, the decision may rely on at least two different cues (cf. Johnson, Hashtroudi, &
Lindsay, 1993): firstly, the episodic memory of the choice situation and, secondly, the
subject’s liking of the activity. The activities chosen by the subject are the activities that the
subject likes best. Thus, liking is a good cue for deciding whether or not the activity was
chosen, irrespective of any memory effect.
The computer-based version of the self-infiltration procedure, which is implemented in
a software package by the name of PANTER1 (Baumann & Kuhl, 2003), allows liking effects
to be separated from memory effects by varying item attractiveness independently of
memory-relevant manipulations. In this procedure, subjects first rate the attractiveness of all
the activities. In the subsequent choice task, subjects are presented lists of six activities and
required to choose half of the activities from each list. In order to control for item
attractiveness, items from the same attractiveness quartile are presented in each list of six.
Thus, subjects are forced to choose attractive and unattractive items in equal proportions. This
procedure ensures that liking is no longer a valid cue for deciding whether or not an activity
was actually chosen. Thus, the self-infiltration measure reveals self-other confusion
independently of memory for attractiveness.
Kazén et al. (2003) conceptually replicated Study 1 by Kuhl and Kazén (1994) using the
computer-based PANTER procedure. Office activities were replaced by mini-actions (“clap
your hands”, “touch your left elbow”). Subjects were told that the attractiveness of a number
of mini-actions needed to be known so as to develop a program for emotion perception in
preschool children. As in Kuhl and Kazén (1994), AOF affected self-infiltration. However,
this was only true for unattractive2 mini-actions. When mini-actions had a low level of
attractiveness, the number of FSAs for assigned mini-actions exceeded the number of FSAs
for remaining mini-actions in low-AOF subjects (OR = 2.61) but not in high-AOF subjects
(OR = 0.92). No such interaction resulted for attractive items (ORlow AOF = 1.18;
ORhigh AOF = 1.04). The authors explained that the moderating effect of attractiveness was
due to different internalization processes for pleasant versus unpleasant ideas, norms, or goals
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(Kazén et al., 2003). While pleasant ideas etc. are internalized through identification,
unpleasant ideas are introjected (definitions: see above). PSI theory makes predictions for
introjection but not for identification, which is why predictions are only made for unattractive
items (Baumann & Kuhl, 2003). This limiting condition has been taken into account in most
published PANTER studies.
While the studies discussed so far did not include a measure or manipulation of current
affect, three published studies have tested whether self-infiltration can be predicted by current
negative affect interacting with AOF (Kazén et al., 2003, Experiment 3; Baumann & Kuhl,
2003, Experiments 1 and 2; see also Baumann & Scheffer, 2011). This test is crucial, because
a central claim of PSI theory is that negative affect leads to impaired self-access and therefore
to increased self-infiltration, while AOF buffers the detrimental effects of negative affect
(Kuhl, 2000, 2001). In two studies (Kazén et al., 2003, Experiment 3; Baumann & Kuhl,
2003, Experiment 1), AOF and current affect were measured. In both cases, low-AOF subjects
experiencing high negative affect displayed higher FSA rates for assigned as opposed to
remaining unattractive items (see Table 1 for details).
Quirin et al. (2009) contributed the only replication study using the classic
paper-and-pencil self-infiltration procedure (Kuhl & Kazén, 1994). They induced moderate
stress in all subjects using unpredictable auditory startles and measured the biological stress
response using saliva cortisol levels. In this study, contrary to expectations, neither negative
affect nor AOF predicted self-infiltration. However, self-infiltration was related to cortisol
levels as measured both at Time 1 (baseline) and Time 2 (25 minutes after the stress task).3
In one study (Baumann & Kuhl, 2003, Experiment 2), affect was manipulated to
corroborate a causal influence of negative affect or stress on self-infiltration. The PANTER
software was used. Affect was manipulated between subjects using a funny versus a sad film.
Low-AOF subjects in a sad—but not in a happy—mood displayed a self-infiltration effect for
unattractive items (OR = 2.29). High-AOF subjects did not show a self-infiltration effect
under the same conditions (OR = 0.67) or under any other conditions.
In sum, while early studies found an effect of AOF alone, or in combination with the
induction of an uncompleted intention, later research focused on the prediction of
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self-infiltration through the AOF × Negative Affect interaction. The latter hypothesis is
supported by three PANTER studies, but not supported by one paper-and-pencil study. Thus,
successful replications exist for the PANTER method but not for the paper-and-pencil method
(see Table 1).
The self-infiltration effect is not due to a general memory effect but to the specific error
of classifying assigned activities as having been chosen. In the PANTER studies, several
measures were taken to exclude the alternative explanation of a general memory effect.
Firstly, they controlled for the FSA of items that were neither chosen nor assigned. Secondly,
in some studies (Baumann & Kuhl, 2003; Baumann et al., 2005), false other-ascription
(FOA)—the error of classifying chosen activities as assigned—was analyzed in addition to
FSA. In most cases, FOA was not predicted by the variables predicting FSA (for an exception,
see Baumann et al., 2005, Study 2). Thirdly, in some studies (Baumann et al., 2005), it was
shown that, from a signal detection perspective, performance in the choice memory task—i.e.
discrimination between items that were chosen or not chosen—did not depend on predictors
of self-infiltration. In sum, it can be concluded from the literature that the self-infiltration
effect cannot be attributed to general memory deficits.
Insert Table 1 about here
The Current Research
Self-infiltration. In science, any new effect must be replicated by independent studies
(Popper, 1959/2002). However, according to van Ijzendoorn (1994), exact replication is only
one of a number of possible replication strategies. Varied replications, van Ijzendoorn argues,
allow knowledge about an effect’s boundary conditions to be accumulated (but see Pashler &
Harris, 2012, for an opposite opinion). The current study aimed to perform a close—but not
exact—replication of the self-infiltration effect found in Baumann and Kuhl (2003,
Experiment 1). Even though the influence of affect and AOF on self-infiltration has been
demonstrated in three studies (Baumann & Kuhl, 2003; Kazén et al., 2003, Study 3), a
replication is nevertheless necessary, for two reasons.
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Firstly, all recent self-infiltration studies—with one exception—have been conducted
using the same PANTER software. There is therefore little variation in the procedure used in
these studies. Although the instructions and items differ between them, the general design, the
response options and the general procedure remain the same. It cannot therefore be shown,
using the original PANTER, that self-infiltration effects are invariant to small changes in
procedure.
Secondly, as the PANTER dates back to an earlier period of personal computing, i.e. the
early nineties, and runs in an MS-DOS window, the usability of the software is severely
limited from today’s point of view. Choices are made in a two-colour console window using
arrow, space, and other keys. A mouse is not supported. These limitations may have an impact
on self-infiltration effects. Working on arduous tasks may lead to a general increase in
negative affect and therefore heighten the general tendency towards self-infiltration. Moreover,
the complexity of the original PANTER implementation necessitates frequent interventions by
the experimenter, which may make the experimenter’s presence more salient to the subject. As
the experimenter represents authority—and is sometimes explicitly named as the source of
activity assignments—a highly salient experimenter may increase or decrease self-infiltration
tendencies, depending on whether reactance processes (Miron & Brehm, 2006) take place.
For these reasons, it is necessary to replicate self-infiltration effects. In the current study,
the effect of naturally occurring affect and AOF on self-infiltration was tested using an
independent implementation of the PANTER procedure. Low-AOF subjects high in negative
affect were expected to display self-infiltration for unattractive items, while high-AOF
subjects and subjects low in negative affect were expected not to display self-infiltration. In
addition, the prediction of a self-other distinction was tested from a signal detection
perspective, to check whether self-infiltration effects were due to a general memory deficit.
Self-compatibility checking. Kazén et al. (2003) reported a second measure of
self-access, known as self-compatibility checking. When the subject decides whether an
activity was self-chosen, two features of the activity may be cognitively activated. On the one
hand, the subject may judge the attractiveness of the activity; on the other hand, the subject
may remember whether he or she chose the activity earlier in the study. A conflict between
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these two features should result in prolonged reaction times in the choice memory task. More
specifically, in the case of incongruence between attractiveness and choice, i.e. if the subject
classifies an unattractive activity as having been chosen or an attractive activity as not having
been chosen, reaction times should be longer than in the case of congruency between
attractiveness and choice.
Subjects with intact self-access—having a clear, stable representation of both the
attractiveness and the choice feature—should experience more conflict and therefore show a
larger increase in reaction times than subjects with impaired self-access. Kazén et al. (2003)
found longer reaction times for conflicting trials in high-AOF but not in low-AOF subjects. In
accordance with these results, we expected longer reaction times for conflicting trials and,
more importantly, a more pronounced increase in reaction times in high-AOF as compared
with low-AOF subjects.
Additional trait predictors of self-infiltration. In the existing literature, AOF has
predominantly been considered as a trait predictor of self-infiltration (e.g., Kazén et al., 2003;
Kuhl & Kazén, 1994). However, if self-infiltration does indeed indicate self-access, it should
be related to other trait variables that, theoretically, predict self-access or self-knowledge.
Therefore, additional trait variables were included in the current study.
Neuroticism. According to PSI theory, persistent negative affect hinders self-access
(Kuhl, 2001). As subjects with a high level of neuroticism experience negative affect more
frequently and for longer periods of time (Verduyn & Brans, 2012), they should be more likely
to be in a state of reduced self-access than low-neuroticism subjects. We therefore expected
subjects with a high level of neuroticism to be more prone to self-infiltration than subjects
with a low level of neuroticism.
Faith in intuition and need for cognition. Cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST;
Epstein, 1994) distinguishes a rational from an experiential mental system. While the rational
system processes information in a controlled, analytic fashion, the experiential system
processes information automatically and holistically. The two types of processing are
conceptualized as being independent of one another, i.e., both types of processing may be
active in a given task, and each independently to a small or large extent.
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When developing hypotheses about cognitive characteristics of memory systems in PSI
theory, Kuhl (2001) relied on the experiential-rational distinction. The proposed information
processing characteristics of extension memory are very similar to the processing
characteristics of the experiential system in CEST.
Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, and Heier (1996) proposed two personality traits, faith in
intuition (FI) and need for cognition (NFC; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), to measure the activity
of the experiential and rational system, respectively. As, according to PSI theory, experiential
processing should foster self-access, we expected subjects with a high FI to display reduced
levels of self-infiltration. Given that highly intuitive processing was present, rational
processing was not expected to hamper self-infiltration. Therefore, we expected only FI but
not NFC to be related to self-infiltration.
Attention to and clarity of feelings. In recent years, a large number of theories have
stressed the functional role of affect in decision-making (for a review, see Loewenstein &
Lerner, 2003). Affective processes have been proposed to mediate consumer decision-making
(affect heuristic; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2007), risky decision-making
(Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1990), behaviour selection (“feeling is for doing”; Zeelenberg,
Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Pieters, 2008), and social communication (affective orientation;
Booth-Butterfield & Booth-Butterfield, 1994). These theories share the assumption that
affective processing helps to make decisions that provide an optimal fit between incentives
and one’s own preferences. Thus affective processing should facilitate self-access in terms of
perceiving one’s own needs, wishes, or values.
Emotional intelligence is defined as a class of emotion-related abilities, including
accurate perception of emotions, accessing one’s emotions to assist thought, understanding,
and regulating emotions (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2004). Such abilities may help one to
use affective processes that facilitate self-access. In the current study, attention to feelings,
clarity of feelings, and mood repair were measured using a self-report instrument (Trait
Meta-Mood Scale; Salovey, Mayer, Lee Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995). Subjects with
high levels of attention to and clarity of feelings were expected to display less pronounced
levels of self-infiltration than subjects scoring low on these variables.
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Method
Participants
Data were collected from N = 76 subjects (61 women, 15 men) recruited at the
University of Zurich through an internet-based participant recruitment system. Subjects were
M = 23.5 (SD = 6.8) years of age. Seventy subjects (92%) were students. Subjects could
choose between monetary (CHF 15.–, approximately e 12.50; 24 subjects) and course credit
compensation (52 subjects).
Materials4
Instructions and office activities. The wording of the instructions was based on
instructions used in Baumann and Kuhl (2003) and modified where necessary, e.g. to match
the mouse-based method of input. Forty-eight office activities were taken from a recent item
set used in PANTER research (C. Lüdecke, personal communication, June 28, 2010) and
adapted slightly to Swiss language usage. Sample items are “stamping a letter”, “hanging up a
calendar” (all two-word expressions in German).
Action orientation. A 24-item Action Control Scale (ACS-90; Kuhl, 1994) was used
to measure demand-related (AOD) and failure-related (AOF) action orientation. For each
item, subjects are required to choose either alternative A or alternative B. An example of an
item for AOD is “When I know I must finish something soon: A. I have to push myself to get
started. B. I find it easy to get it done and over [sic; authors’ note] with.” An example of an
item for AOF is “When I have lost something that is very valuable to me and I can’t find it
anywhere: A. I have a hard time concentrating on something else. B. I put it out of my mind
after a little while.” (translations from Kuhl, 1994). In both examples, alternative B indicates
action orientation. Internal consistency was adequate for both AOD (Cronbach’s α = .73) and
AOF (Cronbach’s α = .72).
Affective state. Affect was measured using the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
(PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; German translation by Krohne, Egloff, Kohlmann,
& Tausch, 1996). Subjects are shown 10 negatively and 10 positively valenced adjectives (e.g.
“interested”, “distressed”, “excited”) and are asked to choose one of the five verbal anchors
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for each item, ranging from very slightly or not at all to extremely. In the present study,
subjects were asked to indicate how they “feel right now”. Internal consistency for positive
affect (Cronbach’s α = .87) and negative affect (Cronbach’s α = .86) was good.
Big Five personality factors. Big Five personality factors were measured using the
Personality Adjective Scales (PASK5; Brandstätter, 2010). This questionnaire consists of 32
pairs of short self-descriptions, e.g. “careless” versus “conscientious”, “assertive” versus
“shy”. Subjects indicate whether and to what extent the left-hand or the right-hand expression
describes them better on a scale ranging from 1 to 9. Each of the five personality factors is
computed using weighted sums of all items (Brandstätter, 2010). The factors estimated are
self-control, anxiety, independence, intransigence, and extraversion.
Faith in intuition and need for cognition. Experiential versus rational thinking styles
were measured using the Rational-Experiental Inventory (Epstein et al., 1996; German
translation by Keller, Bohner, & Erb, 2000). Two subscales, faith in intuition and need for
cognition, are included in the questionnaire. All answers are given on 7-point Likert scales
ranging from 1 (“does not apply at all”) to 7 (“fully applies”). Faith in intuition is measured
using 15 items, e.g. “I am a very intuitive person”, or “I believe in trusting my hunches”.
Need for cognition is measured using 14 items based on the scale of the same name by
Cacioppo and Petty (1982), e.g. “I would prefer complex to simple problems”, “Thinking is
not my idea of fun”. Reliability was good for both faith in intuition (Cronbach’s α = .83) and
need for cognition (Cronbach’s α = .85).
Attention to and clarity of feelings. Attention to and clarity of feelings were
measured using the Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS; Salovey et al., 1995; German translation
by Otto, Döring-Seipel, Grebe, & Landermann, 2001). This instrument consists of 30
statements about the person. Answers are given on 5-point Likert scales ranging from 1
(strong contradiction) to 5 (strong agreement). The attention to feelings subscale consists of
13 items, e.g. “It is usually a waste of time to think about your emotions”. The clarity of
feelings subscale consists of 11 items, e.g. “I am rarely confused about how I feel” (wording
from Salovey et al., 1995). Reliability was acceptable for attention (Cronbach’s α = .77) and
good for clarity of feelings (Cronbach’s α = .87).
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Procedure
Subjects were tested individually in a room without daylight. The experimenter was
present throughout data collection, separated from the subject by a divider. Data were
collected using an IBM-compatible personal computer running a Psychtoolbox (Version 3;
Brainard, 1997) script. All instructions were presented on the computer screen. Subjects
responded using the computer mouse.
The purpose of the study—as presented to subjects—was “to find out how office clerks
organize their work, plan actions and how they feel while doing so”. Subjects were told to
imagine they were an office clerk about to perform a variety of activities. Their affective state
was measured using the PANAS. Next, the 48 office activities were presented sequentially in a
predefined random order. Subjects indicated how attractive they judged each activity to be on
a 19-point scale ranging from −9 (extremely unattractive) to +9 (extremely attractive).
In the two following tasks, subjects were assigned half of the activities and, in addition,
chose half of the activities. The order of assignment and choice tasks was balanced between
participants. In the choice task, subjects were presented with lists of six activities of which
they had to choose three. In each trial, subjects could select and deselect each activity
presented ad libitum, and then confirm their choice, given that exactly three activities were
selected.
In the assignment task, half of the items were assigned to the participant for later
execution. Items were presented successively on screen. Two rectangles were presented, in the
bottom left- and right-hand corners of the screen, labelled “assigned” and “not assigned”. For
half of the subjects, the “assigned” label was on the left-hand side, for the other half, it was on
the right-hand side. Activities that had been assigned were prefixed by an asterisk (*). Each
activity appeared in a top centre position. Subjects were required to drag the activity into the
respective rectangle, depending on whether it was assigned or not. In addition, subjects were
told to read every activity aloud. The assignment task was preceded by two ascending and
followed by two descending beep tones. Subjects who failed to read the activities aloud were
reminded to do so by the experimenter.
Following the choice and assignment tasks, subjects answered the ACS-90 and the
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PASK5 and rated their current affect again using the PANAS. After that, source memory for
choice and assignment was measured in two unexpected recognition memory tasks. In each
memory task, all the items were shown, one by one, in a random order. Subjects were told to
indicate whether they had chosen (choice memory task) or been assigned (assignment memory
task) each of the items presented. The order of the choice and assignment memory tasks was
the same as the order of choice and assignment earlier in the procedure (which had been
varied between participants).
Subjects were told to place their index and middle fingers on the two mouse buttons.
One mouse button indicated a positive (yes) answer, the other button a negative (no) answer.
The assignment of the mouse buttons was balanced between participants and constant across
the two memory tasks. The first of the two memory tasks was preceded by a training task
consisting of 6 items. In the training task, sample items were presented together with the
required response (e.g. “yes, chosen” or “no, not chosen”). Subjects were told to give the
respective response using the mouse buttons. They were instructed to react “spontaneously”.
Before the start of each actual memory task, subjects were reminded once again of the button
assignment.
Following the second memory task, subjects filled out the TMMS and the REI and
provided demographic data. When subjects had completed these questionnaires, they were
probed for suspicion, debriefed, thanked and received their compensation. None of the
subjects correctly guessed the research question.
Within and between subjects balancing. The attractiveness (1–4) of the items,
assignment, and choice were completely balanced for individual participants, resulting in four
categories of items: chosen (and not assigned), assigned (and not chosen), both (i.e., chosen
and assigned), and remaining (i.e. neither chosen nor assigned). In each of these categories of
size 12, three items corresponded to each of the four levels of attractiveness. The order of
assignment and choice (choice first, assignment first), order of “assigned” versus “not
assigned” rectangles (assign left, assign right), and assignment of the yes button (yes left, yes
right) were completely balanced between participants.
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Results
Preliminary Analyses
Negative affect ranged from 10 to 29 (M = 13.3, SD = 4.5) and was considerably
skewed (g1 = 2.1). For the subsequent analyses, the variable was split at the median.
Thirty-nine subjects were classified as having a high negative affect (M = 16.1, SD = 4.9),
and 37 subjects were classified as having a low negative affect (M = 10.5, SD = 0.5). For the
following analyses, AOF was centred on its mean. Item attractiveness, source and affect were
coded as −1,1, with the positive value indicating high attractiveness, low negative affect and
an assigned source. Descriptives and zero-order correlations of the hypothesised self-access
predictors are shown in Table 2.
As is customary in self-infiltration research, item attractiveness was recoded from a
four-level into a dichotomous variable (high, low). Items classified as unattractive (M = 6.9,
SD = 3.9) had been rated as being significantly less attractive than items classified as
attractive (M = 13.5, SD = 3.1), b = 3.30, SE = 0.068, t(1747) = 48.6, p < .001 (mixed
linear model). Thus, the PANTER script successfully classified the activities according to
each subject’s attractiveness ratings.
An alpha level of p < .05 was chosen for all tests. Hypotheses were tested using mixed
logit regressions with a penalized quasi-likelihood estimator (Venables & Ripley, 2002),
unless otherwise specified.
Insert Table 2 about here
Predicting Self-Access from Affect and Action Orientation
False self-ascription. In the following analyses, the terms false self-ascription (FSA)
and self-infiltration is used with slightly different denotations. While false self-ascription
denotes the erroneous classification of a non-chosen item as having been chosen,
self-infiltration denotes a higher self-ascription rate for assigned items, compared with items
that were neither assigned nor chosen (cf. Baumann & Kuhl, 2003).
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The hypotheses derived from theoretical considerations concerned self-infiltration, but
not false self-ascription as such. In line with Baumann and Kuhl (2003), self-infiltration was
predicted to be higher in low-AOF subjects reporting high negative affect than in high-AOF
subjects or subjects reporting low negative affect. This effect was only expected for
unattractive items. As self-infiltration is indicated by an interaction between a predictor and
item source, a significant Source × Attractiveness × Affect × AOF interaction was expected.
Only assigned and remaining items were included in the following analysis, which
corresponds to 1824 data points (24 per subject). Items that had not been chosen in the choice
task but were classified as chosen in the memory task were identified as false self-ascriptions.
Across all subjects, 631 false self-ascriptions were made (8.3 per subject; 35% of data points).
The effect of control variables on false self-ascription and self-infiltration was tested
using a mixed logit model. False self-ascription was regressed on attractiveness rating item
number, choice memory task item number, order of assignment and choice (choice first,
assignment first), order of “assigned” versus “not assigned” rectangles (assign left, assign
right), and assignment of yes button (left, right). The odds of making a false self-ascription
were higher for items that were rated later, b = 0.007, SE = 0.0037, t(1746) = 2.02, p = .043.
No other significant effects were seen (p > .45). Rating item number was included in the
following analysis.
The main hypothesis was tested using a second mixed logit model. False self-ascription
was regressed on rating item number, item attractiveness (low, high), source (assigned,
remaining), affect (low, high) and AOF. Moreover, all interactions were included up to the
fourth order for attractiveness, source, affect, and AOF. The effect of rating item number was
no longer significant, b = 0.00008, SE = 0.0039, t(1735) = 0.02, p = .984. Significant main
effects of item attractiveness, b = 0.57, SE = 0.055, t(1735) = 10.47, p < .001 and source,
b = 0.11, SE = 0.053, t(1735) = 2.02, p = .044, emerged. The odds of false self-ascription
were higher for attractive, compared with unattractive items (OR = 1.77) and higher for
assigned, compared with remaining items (OR = 1.11). AOF interacted with item
attractiveness, b =−.04, SE = 0.019, t(1735) =−2.01, p = .045, and with source, b = 0.04,
SE = 0.019, t(1735) = 2.04, p = .041, in the prediction of false self-ascription. In addition,
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the Attractiveness × Affect × AOF interaction was significant, b =−0.05, SE = 0.019,
t(1735) = 2.84, p = .005. No other main effects or interactions approached significance,
including the expected Source × Attractiveness × Affect × AOF interaction, b = 0.02,
SE = 0.019, t(1735) = 1.26, p = .209.
To further describe the interactions, the log(odds) of false self-ascription for the
different predictor levels were predicted from the model and transformed into odds. For AOF,
values for 1 SD below and above the mean were predicted. From the odds, the odds ratios
signifying self-infiltration—i.e. OR = odds(FSAassigned)/odds(FSAremaining)—were
computed. Accordingly, the AOF × Source interaction signifies more self-infiltration in
high-AOF (OR = 1.54), than in low-AOF subjects (OR = 1.00; Figure 1).
Insert Figure 1 about here
The AOF × Attractiveness and the Attractiveness × Affect × AOF interactions do not
include the source and therefore do not concern self-infiltration but only false self-ascription.
The following result is described in terms of odds ratios signifying higher odds of FSA in
high-AOF compared with low-AOF subjects, i.e.
OR = odds(FSAhigh AOF)/odds(FSAlow AOF). The AOF × Attractiveness interaction signifies
that, for unattractive items, the odds of making a false self-ascription were higher for
high-AOF than for low-AOF subjects (OR = 1.42), while the opposite was the case for
attractive items (OR = 0.91).
This interaction was further qualified by the Attractiveness × Affect × AOF interaction.
For unattractive items, the higher odds of false self-ascription of high-AOF compared with
low-AOF subjects were more pronounced in cases of low negative affect (OR = 1.57) than in
cases of high negative affect (OR = 1.29). For attractive items, in contrast, high-AOF subjects
were more likely than low-AOF subjects to make a false self-ascription when displaying high
negative affect (OR = 1.47), but less likely to do so when displaying low negative affect
(OR = 0.56).
According to PSI theory, self-infiltration is expected to depend on the AOF × Affect but
not on the AOD × Affect interaction. Therefore, the effect of AOD on self-infiltration was
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tested using a mixed logit model. In line with the predictions of PSI theory, AOD was
expected to interact—if at all—with positive affect (Kuhl, 2001). False self-ascription was
regressed on age, rating item number, item attractiveness, source, positive affect, AOD, and
the second, third, and fourth-order interactions between attractiveness, source, positive affect,
and AOD. False self-ascriptions were more likely in older subjects, b = 0.035, SE = 0.015,
t(70) = 2.29, p = .025, and for attractive items, b = 0.58, SE = 0.056, t(1712) = 10.42,
p < .001. No other main effects or interactions were significant, p > .05.
Exploring the specificity of self-infiltration effects. The self-infiltration measure
reported above represents a specific memory measure, since a difference between two item
categories, FSAassigned and FSAremaining, is used as the self-infiltration indicator. In the
literature, the specificity of self-infiltration effects has been demonstrated in two additional
ways: Firstly, it has been shown that only false self-ascription depends on the predictors—in
our case, affect and AOF—but not false other-ascription (FOA). Secondly, it has been shown
that memory performance, i.e. self-other distinction in signal detection terms, is not affected
by the same predictors. These two tests of effect specificity are conducted in the following.
False other-ascription. Mixed logit models equivalent to the self-infiltration models
above were calculated, using false other-ascription of self-chosen activities as the outcome
variable. Activities that were not assigned but were classified by the subject as having been
assigned were identified as false other-ascriptions. To determine the effect of control
variables, false other-ascription was first regressed on attractiveness rating item number,
choice memory task item number, order of assignment and choice (choice first, assignment
first), order of “assigned” versus “not assigned” rectangles (assign left, assign right), and
assignment of yes button (yes left, yes right). If the choice task preceded the assignment task,
more false other-ascriptions were made, compared with the opposite order, b = 0.043,
SE = 0.14, t(72) = 3.15, p = .002. No other effects were significant. The order of tasks was
included in the following analysis.
In the main hypothesis test, false other-ascription was regressed on order of choice and
assignment tasks, attractiveness (low, high), source (chosen, remaining), negative affect (low,
high), and AOF. The odds of false other-ascription were higher when the choice task preceded
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the assignment task, b = 0.56, SE = 0.17, t(71) = 3.23, p = .002, for attractive items,
b = 0.47, SE = 0.05, t(1736) = 8.78, p < .001, and for chosen source, b = 0.90, SE = 0.054,
t(1736) = 16.62, p < .001. Subjects displaying higher negative affect tended to make more
false other-ascriptions, b =−0.16, SE = 0.084, t(71) =−1.88, p = .065.
Furthermore, the Source × Affect interaction was significant, b = 0.15, SE = 0.054,
t(1736) = 2.70, p = .007. Subjects with a high negative affect made more false
other-ascriptions for chosen, compared with remaining items,
OR = odds(FOAchosen)/odds(FOAremaining) = 8.12. The same was true for subjects with low
negative affect, though to a smaller extent, OR = 4.53.
Finally, the significant Attractiveness × Negative Affect × AOF interaction, b =−0.05,
SE = 0.195, t(1736) =−2.41, p = .016, concerns the prediction of FOA, irrespective of
source. For unattractive items, the odds of FOA under conditions of high negative affect were
higher than the odds of FOA under conditions of low negative affect, both for high-AOF,
OR = odds(FOAhigh negative)/odds(FOAlow negative) = 1.24, and low-AOF, OR = 1.23,
subjects. For attractive items, in contrast, the odds of FOA were higher under conditions of
low negative affect, compared with high negative affect in low-AOF subjects, OR = 0.90,
while in high-AOF subjects FOAs were more probable for high as opposed to low negative
affect, OR = 2.58.
Self-other distinction in memory. In a second attempt to corroborate the specificity of
the self-infiltration effects, memory performance was tested in terms of signal detection.
Signal detection theory is the method of choice for analysing recognition data (Tanner &
Swets, 1954). From a signal detection perspective, the self-infiltration measure reported above
exclusively takes false alarms (i.e. activities falsely classified as chosen) into account and
ignores information about hits (i.e. activities correctly classified as chosen). Thus, the analysis
does not control for response tendencies. For example, subjects with a tendency to answer yes
in the choice recognition task have higher FSA rates even though they may not be worse at
distinguishing chosen from non-chosen items. The data were therefore analysed using signal
detection methods. The following analysis does not correspond closely to the self-infiltration
analysis reported above, as all items are included—not only the items that were not
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chosen—and correct self-ascriptions are taken into account in addition to false self-ascriptions.
DeCarlo (1998) recommends the analysis of recognition data using probit or logit
models, in which the subject’s response to the item (here: yes, no) is predicted by the actual
choice status (here: chosen, not chosen). Self-other distinction is present if an item’s choice
status has a significant effect on the subject’s response. The distance measure commonly
known as d′ corresponds to the model coefficient b of the main effect of item status.
We assume that reduced self-access is indicated by reduced self-other distinction, i.e. it
does not only result in higher odds of a false self-ascription but also in lower odds of a correct
self-ascription. If low-AOF subjects with a high negative affect tend to confuse assignment
status with choice status, then their choice recognition classifications should either depend on
the assignment status or the Assignment × Choice interaction. This should not be the case in
high-AOF subjects or in subjects with low negative affect.
In a mixed logit model, the subject’s response (yes, no) was regressed on choice
(chosen, not chosen), assignment (assigned, not assigned), item attractiveness, negative affect,
mean-centred AOF, and all interactions up to the fifth order.
Overall, items that had been chosen were more likely to be classified as chosen than
non-chosen items, b = d′ = 1.74, SE = 0.107, t(3544) = 16.28, p < .001. Also, items that
had been previously assigned tended to be classified as chosen more often than unassigned
items, b = 0.20, SE = 0.104, t(3544) = 1.89, p = .059. Furthermore, attractive items were
more often classified as having been chosen than unattractive items, b = 0.52, SE = 0.075,
t(3544) = 6.93, p < .001. No other main effects approached significance (p > .4).
The Choice × Assignment interaction was not significant, b =−.24, SE = 0.150,
t(3544) =−1.62, p = .106, indicating that the discrimination of chosen versus not chosen
activities did not reliably depend on prior assignment.5 Thus, self-other distinction was not
generally affected by assignment. Furthermore, no higher-order interaction involving both
choice and assignment was significant, indicating that an interference of assignment status
with memory performance did not depend on any of the variables included.
The significant interaction between choice and negative affect, b = 0.29, SE = 0.107,
t(3544) = 2.73, p = .006, reveals better choice recognition under conditions of high,
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OR = odds(hit)/odds( f alse alarm) = 6.77, as opposed to low, OR = 3.79, negative affect.
The following two interactions do not concern an influence on memory performance, as
they do not include choice item status as a predictor. The AOF × Assignment interaction,
b = 0.07, SE = 0.037, t(3544) = 1.98, p = .048, signifies that high-AOF subjects,
OR = odds(chosenassigned)/odds(chosennot assigned) = 1.38, were more likely to classify
assigned, rather than unassigned, items as having been chosen, while the opposite was the case
for low-AOF subjects, OR = 0.84.
Finally, classifying an activity as having been chosen was predicted by an Attractiveness
× Negative Affect × AOF interaction, b = 0.07, SE = 0.027, t(3544) = 2.74, p = .006. For
attractive items, high-AOF subjects displaying low negative affect made fewer self
classifications than low-AOF subjects,
OR = odds(chosenhigh AOF)/odds(chosenlow AOF),= 0.71, while for unattractive items or
subjects with a high negative affect this difference disappeared or was reversed,
1.02 < OR < 1.15.
Self-compatibility checking. The effect of item attractiveness and AOF on reaction
time was analysed as a process measure of self-access. High-AOF subjects were expected to
show prolonged reaction times when classifying attractive, rather than unattractive, items as
not having been chosen and also when classifying unattractive, rather than attractive, items as
having been chosen. Low-AOF subjects, by contrast, were not expected to show these effects.
The choice memory task reaction time, the criterion variable, included 3648 data points,
48 per subject. Incorrect responses were excluded from the analyses (1177 data points; 32%).
In addition, reaction times below 250 ms (1 data point) and above 10 s (4 data points) were
excluded from the analyses. In sum, 2466 data points (68%) from all 76 subjects were
included in the analyses. The reaction times used ranged from 266 to 9494 ms (M = 1565,
SD = 959) and were strongly skewed (g1 = 3.05). Thus they were log-transformed, which
resulted in a more moderate skew (g1 = 0.77). Item attractiveness was treated as a continuous
variable. It ranged from 1 to 19 (M = 10.5, SD = 4.8) and was only slightly skewed
(g1 =−0.35). Rating and AOF were centred on their mean for all analyses. The data included
similar numbers of yes (1274) and no (1192) responses. The response type variable (yes, no)
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was coded as −1,1, with the positive value indicating the yes response.
To test the effect of control variables on reaction time, a first mixed linear model was
computed. The reaction time was regressed on choice item set number (1–8), item position in
the choice task (1–6), choice recognition task item number (1–48), assignment of buttons in
the choice recognition task (yes left, yes right), and order of assignment and choice tasks
(assignment first, choice first). The reaction times for items appearing earlier in the lists of 6
items of the choice task were shorter, compared with the times for items appearing further
down the lists, b = 0.0095, SE = 0.0048, t(2387) = 1.98, p = .048. The reaction times were
longer for items appearing earlier in the memory task, i.e. with lower choice recognition task
item numbers, b =−0.0022, SE = 0.0006, t(2387) =−3.60, p < .001. No other effects were
significant, p > .17. The two significant item position variables were included in the main
analysis.
The main hypothesis was tested using a second mixed linear model. Log-transformed
reaction times were regressed on response type (yes, no), AOF, rating, and all interactions.
The reaction times for no responses were longer than the reaction times for yes responses,
b =−0.03, SE = 0.0093, t(2389) =−3.60, p < .001. Responses to attractive items took
longer than to unattractive items, b = 0.006, SE = 0.0021, t(2389) = 2.68, p = .007.
Response type interacted with AOF, b =−0.008, SE = 0.0034, t(2389) =−2.40, p = .016.
The Response Type × AOF interaction signifies that action-oriented subjects took longer to
give no answers compared with yes answers, while the opposite was true for state-oriented
subjects. Response type also interacted with rating, b =−0.01, SE = 0.0019,
t(2389) =−6.78, p < .001, in the prediction of the reaction time. Subjects took longer to
identify unattractive (predicted logarithmic reaction time log[RT ] = 7.30), as opposed to
attractive (log[RT ] = 7.17), activities as having been chosen; on the other hand they took
longer to identify attractive (log[RT ] = 7.39), as opposed to unattractive (log[RT ] = 7.20),
activities as not having been chosen. No other main effects or interactions were significant
(p > .19).
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Predicting Self-Access from Additional Trait Variables
The effect of variables from the PASK5, the REI and the TMMS on self-access was
tested using mixed logit models with a penalized quasi likelihood estimator. Rating item
number—the variable that has been shown to predict self-infiltration in the above
analyses—was included in the following analyses as a control variable. Moreover, item
attractiveness was included as a potential moderator, since self-infiltration is hypothesised to
be restricted to unattractive items.
Big Five personality factors. Self-infiltration was expected to depend on neuroticism
but not on other personality factors. The PASK5 anxiety dimension was used as a measure of
neuroticism. Neuroticism ranged from 25.6 to 78.9 (M = 50.6, SD = 14.4) and was centred on
its mean for the following analysis. In a mixed logit model, false self-ascription was regressed
on rating item number, item attractiveness, source, mean-centred neuroticism, and all second-
and third-order interactions involving attractiveness, item type, and neuroticism. Attractive
items, b = 0.57, SE = 0.054, t(1741) = 10.57, p < .001, and assigned items, b = 0.10,
SE = 0.053, t(1741) = 1.98, p = .048, were more likely to be falsely self-ascribed than
unattractive and remaining items, respectively. The effect of source was qualified by a
significant Source × Neuroticism interaction, b =−0.01, SE = 0.004, t(1741) =−2.00,
p = .046, indicating that low-neuroticism subjects,
OR = odds(FSAassigned)/odds(FSAremaining) = 1.52, showed higher levels of self-infiltration
than high-neuroticism subjects, whose self-infiltration was close to zero, OR = 0.998.
Furthermore, the Source × Neuroticism × Item Attractiveness interaction was marginally
significant, b = 0.01, SE = 0.004, t(1741) = 1.74, p = .081. For attractive items, moderate
self-infiltration was equally present for low-neuroticism (OR = 1.30) and high-neuroticism
(OR = 1.23) subjects. For unattractive items, however, low-neuroticism subjects (OR = 1.78)
tended to make more self-infiltration errors than high-neuroticism subjects (OR = 0.81; Figure
2). No other main effects or interactions approached significance (p > .29).
Insert Figure 2 about here
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Parallel analyses were conducted including the remaining personality factors as
predictors. No main effects or interactions resulted that included one of the PASK5
dimensions self-control, independence, or intransigence. Extraversion, however, interacted
with attractiveness in the prediction of false self-ascription, b = 0.01, SE = 0.004,
t(1741) = 2.38, p = .017. While for attractive items, extraverted subjects made more false
self-ascription errors than introverted subjects,
OR = odds(FSAextraverted)/odds(FSAintroverted) = 1.24, the opposite was the case for
unattractive items, OR = 0.75.
Faith in intuition and need for cognition. Faith in intuition (FI) ranged from 20 to
99 (M = 68.3, SD = 12.4). A mixed logit analysis was conducted to test the effect of FI on
self-infiltration. False self-ascription (FSA) was regressed on rating item number, item
attractiveness, source, FI, and all second- and third-order interactions involving attractiveness,
source, and FI. As above, the odds of FSA were higher for attractive compared with
unattractive items, b = 0.57, SE = 0.054, t(1741) = 10.54, p < .001, and for assigned
compared with non-assigned items, b = 0.11, SE = 0.053, t(1741) = 2.14, p = .033.
Moreover, high-FI subjects were less prone to FSA than low-FI subjects, b =−0.02,
SE = 0.008, t(74) =−2.34, p = .022. Furthermore, the Attractiveness × FI interaction was
marginally significant, b = 0.007, SE = 0.004, t(1741) = 1.79, p = .073. For attractive items,
high-FI subjects made fewer FSA errors than low-FSA subjects,
OR = odds(high FI)/odds(low FI) = 0.75. This effect tended to be more pronounced for
unattractive items, OR = 0.52. The FI × Source interaction did not reach significance,
b = 0.002, SE = 0.004, t(1741) = 0.67, p = .502. Thus the lower FSA rate of high-FI
subjects was independent of the source. In other words, FI did not affect self-infiltration
defined as odds(FSAassigned)/odds(FSAremaining).
In an equivalent analysis, need for cognition (NFC), as measured using the REI scale by
the same name, was predicted. NFC ranged from 43 to 97 (M = 73.1,SD = 12.2). In a mixed
logit model, FSA was regressed on rating item number, item attractiveness, source, NFC, and
all second- and third-order interactions involving attractiveness, source, and NFC. As above,
significant main effects of attractiveness, b = 0.56, p < .001, and source, b = 0.11, p = .035,
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emerged. However, neither the main effect of NFC, b =−.004, SE = 0.009, t(74) =−0.49,
p = .625, nor the Source × NFC interaction, b =−0.001, SE = 0.004, t(1741) =−0.19,
p = .846, reached significance. Thus NFC predicted neither FSA nor self-infiltration
(modelled in terms of the Source × NFC interaction). No other main effects or interactions
approached significance (p > .27).
Attention to and clarity of feelings. Attention to feelings ranged from 32 to 63
(M = 52.2, SD = 6.2). In a mixed logit model, FSA was regressed on rating item number,
item attractiveness, source, attention to feelings and all second- and third-order interactions
involving attractiveness, source, and attention to feelings. No main effects or interactions
involving attention to feelings resulted, p > .18.
Clarity of feelings ranged from 16 to 30 (M = 40.2, SD = 7.4). An equivalent analysis
to that described above was conducted, with clarity instead of attention to feelings. The only
effect including clarity of feelings that approached significance was the Attractiveness ×
Source × Clarity interaction, b =−.01, SE = 0.007, t(1741) =−1.80, p = .073. This
interaction signifies that, for unattractive items, low-clarity subjects,
OR = odds(FSAassigned)/odds(FSAremaining) = 1.17, were marginally less prone to
self-infiltration than high-clarity subjects, OR = 1.30. For attractive items, by contrast,
high-clarity subjects, OR = 0.91, did not display self-infiltration, whereas low-clarity subjects,
OR = 1.74, displayed large amounts of self-infiltration (Figure 3).
Insert Figure 3 about here
Discussion
Previous research has shown that self-access, as measured by self-infiltration, is reduced
in state-oriented (i.e. low-AOF) subjects with negative affect (Baumann & Kuhl, 2003; Kazén
et al., 2003). The current study aimed to closely replicate this effect using an independent
implementation of the self-infiltration paradigm. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that
high-AOF, as opposed to low-AOF, subjects take longer to make self-/non-self decisions that
conflict with attractiveness, because of better self-compatibility checking. Finally, the
SELF-INFILTRATION AND SELF-ACCESS 116
construct validity of the self-infiltration measure was tested by examining its correlations with
trait variables assumed to be related to self-access abilities.
A number of office activities were presented to the subjects, of which they chose some
and were, in addition, assigned others by the boss. In an unexpected memory task, subjects
were required to indicate which activities they had previously chosen. Each activity
erroneously classified as having been chosen even though it had been assigned indicated an
instance of false self-ascription (FSA). Self-infiltration was taken to occur if FSA for assigned
activities was higher than FSA for neutral activities (i.e. activities that had neither been
assigned nor chosen). The combined effect of AOF and negative affect on self-infiltration was
expected only for unattractive activities, as the theory does not apply to the identification
processes that take place when attractive activities are assigned.
The results indicate that self-infiltration for unattractive activities was not higher for
low-AOF subjects with negative affect. On the contrary, high-AOF subjects had a higher
probability of self-infiltration, irrespective of attractiveness. Thus, the classical self-infiltration
effect was not replicated and in fact significantly reversed. This result directly contradicts the
results of Baumann and Kuhl (2003, Study 1) and Kazén et al. (2003, Study 3). It may be
concluded that the combined effect of negative affect and AOF is reversed under certain, as yet
unspecified, conditions.
The unexpected result may be explained in two ways: either using PSI-theoretical
reasoning, or by taking memory processes into account. According to PSI theory (Kuhl,
2001), self-access should be reduced under conditions of high negative affect. The naturally
occurring negative affect in the current study was, however, conspicuously low. The mean
negative affect score was 12.8, on a scale ranging from 10 to 50. Consequently,—although in
contrast to Baumann and Kuhl (2003, Study 1) and Kazén et al. (2003, Study 3)—no main
effect of negative affect on self-infiltration was observed.
Studies from PSI theory research have shown self-regulation deficits in action-oriented,
as opposed to state-oriented, subjects under relaxed conditions e.g., Jostmann and Koole
(2006, 2007). Jostmann and Koole (2006, Study 1), for instance, report a lower operation span
in action- as opposed to state-oriented subjects in an accepting state, while the opposite was
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true when they were in a demanding state. In addition, in self-infiltration research, self-access
deficits have been reported in action-oriented subjects under relaxed conditions. Baumann and
Kuhl (2003, Study 1), for example, report self-infiltration for unattractive items in the
low-sadness group for action-oriented, but not for state-oriented subjects. As the subjects in
the current study were generally relaxed, the result of higher self-infiltration in action-oriented
(i.e. high-AOF) subjects is in line with action-orientation research. To explain such results,
Jostmann and Koole (2006) argued that the self-regulatory functioning of action-oriented
subjects is optimal under demanding conditions, while state-oriented subjects function better
under accepting or relaxing conditions.
As the PANTER paradigm makes use of a memory measure to measure self-infiltration,
cognitive processes need to be taken into account in addition to explanations from PSI theory.
The memory task included in PANTER features two incidental learning tasks—i.e. learning
tasks without explicit learning instructions: choice and assignment—and a subsequent
(unexpected) memory task concerning the prior choices. Performance in this memory task
may depend on the cognitive effort spent in encoding the items in connection with their
context (i.e. their source), and therefore, more generally speaking, on the depth of processing
during the learning tasks. Depth of processing has been shown to depend on current mood, in
that a negative mood supports analytic, bottom-up processing, whereas depth of processing is
likely to be less effortful and more top-down when the subject is in a positive mood (Schwarz,
1990). This may explain why subjects with a low AOF and a high level of neuroticism—i.e.
subjects who are more prone to a negative mood—outperformed high-AOF and
low-neuroticism subjects, respectively, in the self-infiltration memory task.
One might argue that self-infiltration does not reflect general memory performance,
since it is defined as a specific difference between two types of false alarm, FSAassigned and
FSAremaining. However, negative affectivity was found to have effects on other memory
measures. Subjects with a high negative affect tended to make more false other-ascriptions
(FOA) and made significantly more FOA of chosen compared with remaining items.
Furthermore, memory performance—analysed using signal detection methodology—was
better under conditions of high, compared with low, negative affect. These results show that
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not only self-infiltration but memory performance in general depended on variables indicating
negative affectivity. Like self-infiltration, general memory performance in the choice memory
task may serve as a measure of self-access, as it indicates the ability to report whether or not a
goal originated within the person.
Another possible self-access measure, which more closely corresponds to the classic
self-infiltration measure, is the confusion of an activity’s assignment status with its choice
status. Evidence for such a confusion has been found in that high-AOF subjects relied on an
activity’s assignment status when deciding whether they had previously chosen it, while
low-AOF subjects did not. This unidirectional crosstalk phenomenon is a sign of a specific
type of self-other confusion in high-AOF subjects, which may account for the effect of AOF in
the classic self-infiltration measure.
From a methodological point of view, a mixed logit model with item status as a
predictor is to be preferred for the analysis of self-infiltration data, as it takes overall memory
performance into account, includes all data points, and enhances control of response
tendencies. The current study features—for the first time in self-infiltration research—such an
analysis, which is fully compliant with signal detection theory.
In addition to self-infiltration and memory measures, reaction times of the choice
memory task were analysed as a measure of self-access processing (see Kazén et al., 2003).
Results showed that item attractiveness influenced processing in self/not-self decisions.
Subjects took longer to classify unattractive, as opposed to attractive, items as having been
chosen, or to classify attractive, as opposed to unattractive, items as not having been chosen.
However, contrary to expectations, this effect was no stronger in high-AOF subjects than in
low-AOF subjects. Thus, no evidence was found for more pronounced self-compatibility
checking in high-AOF subjects. In other words, results from the analysis of reaction times are
neither compatible with previous research (Kazén et al., 2003), nor with better self-access in
low-AOF subjects, as suggested by the self-infiltration data of the current study.
While the hypothesis that high-AOF subjects experience more conflict between choice
and attractiveness, and therefore display longer decision times, is plausible, other hypotheses
are possible regarding the influence of AOF on decision times. For instance, the conflict
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experienced may have a smaller impact on high-AOF subjects, because—by definition—they
are better able to regulate unpleasant states (Koole & Kuhl, 2008). This may result in an
opposite effect to the hypothesized self-access effect superimposing the latter.
Before we discuss the relationships between traits and self-infiltration in more detail,
some intercorrelations between traits are worth noting. In theory, neuroticism and AOF are
related but functionally different variables. While neuroticism indicates high sensitivity to
punishment cues, AOF indicates the ability to cope with negative affect once it is aroused (see
Baumann & Kuhl, 2002). In the current study, neuroticism and AOF were moderately and
significantly negatively correlated, as expected. More importantly, they were significant
predictors of faith in intuition and clarity of feelings. Low-AOF, as well as highly neurotic,
subjects reported lower faith in intuition and clarity of feelings. If the latter two variables are
indeed proxies of self-access, then these relationships may hint at the hypothesized
relationship between negative affect and self-access.
However, the relationships between other assumed trait proxies of self-access only
partially corroborated this hypothesis. Self-infiltration was not related to faith in intuition or
attention to feelings. It was, however, related to clarity of feelings, interacting with item
attractiveness. For attractive items, high-clarity subjects did not display any self-infiltration,
whereas low-clarity subjects showed large amounts of self-infiltration. For unattractive items,
a much smaller difference emerged in the opposite direction.
Two conclusions can be drawn from this result. Firstly, with respect to remaining items,
low-clarity subjects were affected less by item attractiveness than high-clarity subjects,
indicating that being unclear about one’s feelings may be associated with a lower sensitivity to
attractiveness information. Secondly, in line with predictions, low-clarity subjects displayed
more self-infiltration, although—contrary to predictions—only for attractive items. This result
shows that self-infiltration may not only be present for unattractive, but also for attractive
activities. It must be noted that the stability and reliability of self-infiltration as a trait measure
has so far not been established. Thus, a low correlation between self-infiltration and traits may
be due to fluctuations in self-infiltration over time.
In sum, the effect of AOF on self-infiltration in the unexpected direction, as found in the
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current data, can be explained either as a self-regulation deficit or as a general memory deficit
in AOF subjects. The current results do not allow a decision as to which of the two theoretical
approaches is to be preferred. Assumed trait proxies of self-access were, again contrary to
expectations, mostly uncorrelated with self-infiltration, or else correlated in an unexpected
direction, as in the case of neuroticism. Thus neither a replication of the classic self-infiltration
effect, nor a validation of the self-infiltration measure using trait measures was successful.
Outlook and Conclusions
In the current study, self-infiltration and self-other distinction in memory could be
predicted using several different variables, though the processes that mediate these effects
remain unclear. More research is therefore needed into the antecedents of and processes
involved in self-infiltration. Firstly, memory processes need to be scrutinized. The current
research has shown that the dissociation of general memory effects from specific
self-infiltration effects is by no means trivial. To facilitate the analysis of memory processes,
simplifications of the paradigm—which currently includes two, possibly interacting, encoding
phases (i.e. choice and assignment)—should be considered. Moreover, analyses should be
conducted from a strict signal detection perspective, as this ensures that all available
information is taken into account and general memory effects are controlled for. Accordingly,
the self-infiltration construct may have to be redefined as crosstalk from the assignment to the
choice-encoding task. Secondly, the influence of affect and AOF on self-infiltration has not
been replicated using experimental methods, Baumann and Kuhl (2003, Study 2) being the
only such study. A replication of this effect is a crucial test of the PSI-theoretical hypothesis
of reduced self-access under persisting negative affect. Thirdly, as the relationship between
emotional clarity and self-infiltration has shown, self-infiltration should be considered not
only for unattractive but also for attractive tasks. Research on identification processes, which
are supposed to be the result of the assignment of attractive items, could be conducted within
the self-infiltration paradigm with only minor modifications.
The results of the current study imply that the combined effect of negative affect and
AOF on self-infiltration is not as robust as previously thought. Although it remains unclear
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which theories best explain individual differences in self-infiltration, the construct as such is
not called into question by the current findings. However, the current research shows that
analysing self-infiltration data from a memory-psychological perspective may lead to deeper
insights into the processes that constitute self-infiltration effects.
Notes
1 The acronym “PANTER” stands for “Process Analytic Neuroticism Test for Adults” (in German: Prozess-
Analytischer Neurotizismus-Test für Erwachsene).
2 In the following, the terms unattractive and attractive refer to the items whose attractiveness is below and
above the median attractiveness, respectively.
3 None of the predictors in this study was experimentally manipulated.
4All materials and instructions used were in the German language. Instructions in this report are our literal
translations, unless otherwise specified.
5The slight tendency towards an interaction is due to a marginally better memory performance for assigned,
OR = odds(hit)/odds( f alse alarm) = 5.72, compared with unassigned, OR = 4.49, items.
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Figure 1. Prediction of false self-ascription from item source, item attractiveness, and AOF.
Higher logodds(FSA) of assigned, compared with remaining items signify self-infiltration.
High-AOF subjects showed higher degrees of self-infiltration than low-AOF subjects for both
unattractive and attractive items.
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Figure 2. Prediction of false self-ascription from item source, item attractiveness, and
neuroticism. Higher logodds(FSA) of assigned, compared with remaining items signify
self-infiltration. The third-order interaction depicted is only marginally significant.
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Figure 3. Prediction of false self-ascription from item source, item attractiveness, and clarity
of feelings. Higher logodds(FSA) of assigned, compared with remaining items indicate
self-infiltration. The third-order interaction depicted is only marginally significant.
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In Study 1 of the present paper, data from the second paper of the present thesis, entitled
“Self-infiltration as a measure of self-access: A replication study” are reanalyzed with respect
to a different hypothesis. Because the data stem from the same data collection, the
descriptions of some measurement instruments (ACS-90, PANAS), and the first three
paragraphs of the procedure are identical in the two studies.
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Abstract
According to PSI theory (Kuhl, 2000), self-access may be measured by individual differences
in self-infiltration, i.e. in the false self-ascription of assigned activities. The theory suggests
that subjects experiencing high negative affect and having low self-regulatory skills (i.e.
subjects with a low action orientation) suffer from self-access deficiencies. The current
research explored whether preference consistency depends on the same antecedents as
self-infiltration and may therefore serve as an alternative indicator of self-access. In three
studies, preference consistency regarding different objects (activities, animals, and job-related
activities), and action orientation were measured. Negative affect was measured (Studies 1
and 2), or manipulated (Study 3). In Study 2, as expected, the choices of subjects with higher
negative affect were less consistent with attractiveness ratings. However, data from Studies 1
and 3 did not converge with this result. Moreover, action orientation did not emerge as a
moderator of the effect of affect on self-access. The results indicate that the preference
consistency measure cannot serve as a replacement for the self-infiltration measure used in
previous research. Preference consistency and self-infiltration may measure complementary
facets of the self-access construct.
Keywords: PSI theory, consistency, preference, self-access, affect, action orientation
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The Consistency of Preferences as a Measure of Self-Access
Compared with all other species, human beings have the unique ability to reflect on their
own opinions and to ask the question: How well do the opinions I hold agree with reality?
How true are they? Moreover, humans may even ask themselves whether the actions and
objects they prefer, or the goals they strive for, are in concord with their own true minds. This
is a question of knowing one’s preferences (cf. Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994), in other words, a
question of self-access in judgement and choice. A number of theories have addressed the
question of whether the goals that people select fit them. The most prominent of these theories
are the self-concordance model (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999), motive disposition theory
(McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989), and personality systems interaction theory (PSI
theory; Kuhl, 2000).
Self-Access in Goal Selection
Sheldon (2008) defined self-concordance as the “extent to which a person’s goals
correctly represent their deeper personality dispositions, needs, and motives” (Sheldon, 2008,
p. 468). Subjects who managed to select their goals in accordance with their “trait levels of
personality” (Sheldon, 2008, p. 468) reported better subjective well-being (Sheldon & Elliot,
1999; Sheldon & Kasser, 1995), put more effort in their projects, and were more likely to
attain their goals (Sheldon & Elliot, 1998). In these studies, self-concordance was measured
as the perceived locus of control (PLOC) known from self-determination research (Deci &
Ryan, 2000). Subjects rated to what extent their goal-striving was based on external or internal
reasons.
Sheldon (2008) admitted that, when measuring self-concordance through self-reports,
one cannot be sure whether self-concordance is anything but illusory. In other words, the
possibility that an internally regulated goal is in fact self-discordant cannot be ruled out.
Therefore, an objective—as opposed to self-reported—measure of a person’s “trait levels of
personality” (Sheldon, 2008) is an advantage when measuring a goal’s self-concordance.
Such an objective measure of motivational traits is widely used in motive disposition
research (McClelland, 1985; Schultheiss & Brunstein, 2010): the Picture Story Exercise (PSE;
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McClelland et al., 1989) measure of implicit motives. The PSE assesses individual differences
in the needs for achievement, power, and affiliation. One major strand of motive disposition
research concerns motive-goal congruence (for a summary, see Brunstein, 2010), the
congruence between motives measured using the PSE and self-reported goals. Motive-goal
congruence—like self-concordance—has been attributed to the ability to derive concrete goals
from more abstract motives (Brunstein, 2010; Schultheiss, Patalakh, Rawolle, Liening, &
MacInnes, 2011). Results of motive-goal congruence research also parallel results from
self-concordance research in that motive congruence predicts subjective well-being and life
satisfaction (e.g. Hofer, Busch, Bond, Li, & Law, 2010).
The notions of self-concordance (Sheldon, 2002) and motive-goal congruence
(Brunstein, 2010) both conceptualize a person’s access to trait levels of personality underlying
his or her goals, i.e. self-access as defined above. PSI theory (Kuhl, 2000) focuses—more than
the theories just described—on the analysis of processes involved in self-access.
Self-Access as Access to Intuitive Self-Representations
PSI theory (Kuhl, 2000, 2001) explains the control of volitional action through the
interaction of four memory systems. The theory mainly makes predictions for two classes of
outcome variables: the regulation of action initiation on the one hand and self-access on the
other hand. Action initiation is explained through the interplay of two memory systems:
intention memory (IM) and intuitive behaviour control (IBC). According to the theory, goals
or intentions are stored in IM, waiting to be translated into action by being transferred to IBC,
the system that mediates action execution. Self-access, on the other hand, is explained through
the interplay of extension memory (EM) and the object recognition (OR) system. According to
the theory, a person’s access to his or her implicit self-representations, including preferences
or motives, depends on the relative activation of EM and OR. Kuhl (2000, 2001) argued that
the “self” is so complex a structure that its contents can only be perceived when a person is
cognitively tuned to holistic, intuitive information processing. EM activation corresponds to a
holistic, intuitive cognitive mode, while OR activation corresponds to an analytic, isolated
representation of objects and experiences. When EM cannot be activated—in other words,
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when holistic, intuitive processing is not possible—self-access is hindered.
Whether an intention is transferred from IM to IBC and whether EM or OR is activated
more depends, according to the theory, on changes in a person’s affective state. Kuhl (2000,
2001) argued that to execute an intention—at least a difficult one—an increase in positive
affect is necessary. The activity of EM, and thus self-access, on the other hand, relies on
negative affect in that a persistent high negative affect blocks EM activity and thus the
perception of one’s own needs and preferences. Thus, when negative affect is high, its
down-regulation is a necessary condition for self-access.
Kuhl and Kazén (1994) developed a paradigm to test the latter hypothesis in a
laboratory setting. In the self-infiltration paradigm, subjects form intentions about simple
office activities (e.g. sharpening a pencil, watering a plant). The source of intentions varies in
that they may be chosen by the subjects themselves (self-chosen intentions) or assigned to
them by the “boss” (other-assigned intentions). In a subsequent unexpected memory task,
subjects are asked to indicate which activities they chose themselves. Hampered self-access is
indicated by a tendency to mistakenly self-ascribe activities assigned by the boss (so-called
self-infiltration). As predicted by PSI theory, subjects who were high in negative affect and, at
the same time, had poor affect-regulation skills (i.e. state-oriented subjects), made more
self-infiltration errors than subjects with a low negative affect, or subjects with good affect
regulation skills (i.e. action-oriented subjects, Kuhl & Kazén, 1994). This result was
replicated in similar studies using computer-based data collection (Baumann & Kuhl, 2003;
Kazén, Baumann, & Kuhl, 2003).
A New Way of Measuring Self-Access
In all approaches outlined above, self-access may be conceptualized as a person’s ability
to perceive or act according to his or her trait levels of personality. Thus, what goals people
select is thought to depend, in part, on a trait-like foundation. According to all three theories
people differ in their ability to use that foundation for selecting their goals.
Self-access, as conceptualized in PSI theory, differs in some important respects from
self-access as described by the self-concordance model or motive disposition theory. Unlike
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the other two theories, PSI theory offers a causal explanation for self-access and its failure.
Moreover, in PSI theory self-access is not confined to three classes of motives, as is motive
disposition theory. For these reasons PSI theory can be considered, in some respects, a more
general and more comprehensive approach to the investigation of self-access.
Regarding the measurement method, the self-infiltration paradigm does not rely on
personal goals that are generated ad hoc, but uses standardized materials, which ensures better
control of possible confounding variables. It is questionable, though, whether the measure of
self-other distinction used in the self-infiltration paradigm does fit the definition of self-access
given above. In the self-infiltration paradigm (e.g. Baumann & Kuhl, 2003), subjects are asked
to discriminate between self-chosen and other-assigned activities. The accuracy with which
one’s preferences are perceived is neither measured nor is it an advantage in the discrimination
task.1
Given the advantages of the conception of self-access based on PSI theory, we propose
an alternative measure of self-access that is both more economical than the self-infiltration
paradigm and is hypothesized to measure self-access as defined above in a more
straightforward fashion. In this research, we develop and test preference consistency as a
measure of self-access in the context of PSI theory.
Why Preference Consistency Might Indicate Self-Access
In economic theory, preference consistency has been conceptualized as a transitivity of
choices. Transitivity is a fundamental axiom of most prescriptive choice theories
(Regenwetter, Dana, & Davis-Stober, 2011). If a person prefers object A to object B and, at
the same time, object B to object C, then—according to the axiom of transitivity—the person
is expected to prefer object A to object C. Researchers in economics and economic
psychology have asked the question whether humans violate transitivity when making choices
and consequently lack rationality. Early research (e.g. Davis, 1958; Tversky, 1969) found that
people violated transitivity when making complete pairwise comparisons of a range of objects
(e.g. gambles). More recent studies, however, support the conclusion that data are consistent
with transitive preferences, provided appropriate statistical models (e.g. mixture models) are
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applied (Birnbaum & Schmidt, 2008, 2010; Regenwetter et al., 2011).
Most of the existing preference consistency research has dealt with the suspected
violation of transitivity in humans in general, neglecting individual differences. Only in a
small number of studies preference consistency has been defined as a variable that differs
between individuals and depends on the subjects’ traits or states (Lee, Amir, & Ariely, 2009;
Nordgren & Dijksterhuis, 2009). In the current research, we have used preference consistency
as an individual difference variable. Therefore, discussions on whether humans are generally
transitive or intransitive are of minor relevance here.
Lee et al. (2009) tested the hypothesis that emotional processing enhances self-access,
as indicated by preference consistency. In a series of experiments, Lee et al. asked subjects to
make pairwise preference comparisons regarding a number of consumer products. The
amount of emotional processing was manipulated using various methods. In one experiment,
items were presented either as pictures or words, with pictures being more likely, according to
Lee et al., to be emotionally processed than words. In another experiment, cognitive capacity
was limited by a secondary task, which was thought to lead to more emotion-based processing
compared with a control group. Subjects who processed stimuli in a more emotional manner
made fewer transitivity errors than subjects who processed stimuli more cognitively.
In a similar paradigm, Nordgren and Dijksterhuis (2009) showed that the type of
processing used in a preference task may influence preference consistency. Subjects had to
rate a number of Chinese ideograms, both at the beginning and end of a 50-minute interval.
Subjects who were told to make their judgements deliberately were less consistent over time
than subjects who were told to “make quick decisions based on a gut feeling” (p. 40).
Both Lee et al. (2009) and Nordgren and Dijksterhuis (2009) employed a dual-process
model. They held that a more emotional or intuitive kind of processing enhances preference
consistency, compared with more cognitive or reflective processing. Furthermore, Lee et al.
held that emotional processing “provide[s] individuals with a reading of their preferences”, in
other words that emotional processing enhances self-access.
The self-access hypothesis in PSI theory (Kuhl, 2000, 2001) is formulated in
dual-process terms, too. According to Kuhl, access to implicit self-representations—i.e.
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self-access—depends on the ability of intuitive, holistic processing. As preference consistency
is predicted—in theory—by variables similar to those that predict self-access, the hypothesis
that preference consistency might be an indicator of self-access seems warranted.
In classical test theory, the internal consistency of a number of items indicating the same
construct, often formalized as Cronbach’s α , signifies reliability, i.e. accuracy of
measurement. In a similar vein, intact self-access, fostered by intuitive processing, may lead
to more reliable preference decisions and therefore to a higher internal consistency of
preferences. Relying on implicit self-representations may provide a solid basis for
decision-making, thus reducing the need to take guesses or decide at random, and enabling
more reliable decisions to be made. We therefore hypothesize that preference consistency may
be a measure of self-access as defined in PSI theory.
The Present Studies
State-oriented subjects experiencing negative affect are known to have a self-access
deficit, as indicated by increased self-infiltration (Baumann & Kuhl, 2003; Kazén et al., 2003).
The aim of the present research was to conceptually replicate these findings while substituting
measures of preference consistency for the self-infiltration measure. The above-mentioned
self-access effect has been well-replicated and there is—as we have shown—a good case for
using preference consistency as a measure of self-access. Therefore, in the present studies, we
attempt to show that preference consistency is lower in state-oriented subjects experiencing
high negative affect than in action-oriented subjects or subjects experiencing low negative
affect.
Self-access measures. In the present studies, two kinds of preference consistency
measures were used as indicators of self-access: the inconsistency between attractiveness
ratings and subsequent choices (rating-choice inconsistency) on the one hand, and the number
of transitivity violations on the other hand (see Lee et al., 2009). To calculate rating-choice
inconsistency, the expected choice for each trial is determined based on item attractivenesses.
More attractive items are expected to be preferred to less attractive items. Rating-choice
inconsistency is calculated as the number of choices contradicting the expectation. Therefore,
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rating-choice inconsistency is based on a comparison of two separate preference measures, i.e.
of attractiveness ratings and choices.
The number of transitivity violations, by contrast, is a measure of inconsistency within a
number of binary preference decisions. For a small number of items, e.g. 10, subjects are
requested to make complete pairwise preference decisions. The measure is calculated as
follows: All possible permutations of the items (e.g. A, B, and C) of length three are
generated. For each permutation, it is determined whether the first pair (i.e. A versus B), the
second pair (i.e. B versus C), and the pair consisting of the leftmost and rightmost items (i.e. A
versus C) were preferred in the same direction (e.g. A B, BC, and AC). Each
combination that does not satisfy this condition (e.g. A≺C) is considered a violation of
transitivity. The number of transitivity violations is counted for each subject.
In the present studies, rating-choice inconsistency and number of transitivity violations
were used as complementary measures of inconsistency, each indicating the amount of
discrepancy between or within preference measures of the same objects.
Choice of materials. The self-infiltration paradigm (Kuhl & Kazén, 1994) differs
from other self-access measures in that it replaces personal goals—as used in
self-concordance (Sheldon, 2002) and motive-disposition (Brunstein, 2010) paradigms—with
standardized items that remain constant for all participants. A similar approach was taken in
the current research. Materials were chosen to meet three requirements: They needed, firstly,
to be viewed as self-relevant, subjectively important choice options; secondly, to lack strong
previous preferences; and, thirdly, to be sufficiently complex to support ecological validity.
Materials were varied between the three studies to test hypotheses across different contexts.
Overview of studies. In Study 1, the prediction of rating-choice inconsistency by
self-reported current affect and action orientation was tested using office activities. Study 2
tested the same hypothesis using animal photographs and, in addition, included a transitivity
measure. Study 3 tested the same hypothesis using an experimental approach. Affect was
manipulated and preference consistency was measured in the context of vocational choice.
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Study 1
This study was correlational in nature and tested the hypothesis that state-oriented
subjects with a high level of negative affect exhibit less consistency between their
attractiveness ratings and their choice of office activities than action-oriented subjects or
subjects in a state of low negative affect.
Method
Participants. Data were collected from N = 76 subjects (61 women, 15 men)
recruited at the University of Zurich through an internet-based participant recruitment system.
Subjects were M = 23.5 (SD = 6.8) years of age. Seventy subjects (92%) were students.
Subjects chose between monetary (CHF 15.–, approximately e 12.50; 24 subjects) and course
credit compensation (52 subjects). Three subjects were excluded from the analyses because
their attractiveness ratings lacked variance (see below).
Materials2
Instructions and office activities. Instruction texts were based on the instructions used
in Baumann and Kuhl (2003). Forty-eight office activities were taken from a recent item set
used in PANTER research (C. Lüdecke, personal communication, June 28, 2010) and adapted
slightly to Swiss language usage. Sample items are “stamping a letter”, “hanging up a
calendar” (all two-word expressions in German).
Affective state. Affect was measured using the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
(PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; German translation by Krohne, Egloff, Kohlmann,
& Tausch, 1996). Subjects are shown 10 negatively and 10 positively valenced adjectives (e.g.
“interested”, “distressed”, “excited”) and are asked to choose one of the five verbal anchors
for each item, ranging from very slightly or not at all to extremely. In the present study,
subjects were asked to indicate how they “feel right now”. Internal consistency for positive
affect (Cronbach’s α = .87) and negative affect (Cronbach’s α = .86) was good.
Action orientation. A 24-item Action Control Scale (ACS-90; Kuhl, 1994) was used
to measure demand-related (AOD) and failure-related (AOF) action orientation. For each
item, subjects are required to choose either alternative A or alternative B. An example of an
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item for AOD is “When I know I must finish something soon: A. I have to push myself to get
started. B. I find it easy to get it done and over [sic; authors’ note] with.” An example of an
item for AOF is “When I have lost something that is very valuable to me and I can’t find it
anywhere: A. I have a hard time concentrating on something else. B. I put it out of my mind
after a little while.” (translations from Kuhl, 1994). In both examples, alternative B indicates
action orientation. Internal consistency was adequate for both AOD (Cronbach’s α = .73) and
AOF (Cronbach’s α = .72).
Procedure. Data collection took place as part of an attempt to replicate a study on
self-infiltration by Baumann and Kuhl (2003, Study 1). Subjects were tested individually in a
room without daylight. The experimenter was present throughout data collection, separated
from the subject by a divider. Data were collected using an IBM-compatible personal
computer running a Psychtoolbox (Version 3; Brainard, 1997) script. All instructions were
presented on the computer screen. Subjects responded using the computer mouse.
The purpose of the study—as presented to subjects—was “to find out how office clerks
organize their work, plan actions and how they feel while doing so”. Subjects were told to
imagine they were an office clerk about to perform a variety of activities. Their affective state
was measured using the PANAS. Next, the 48 office activities were presented sequentially in a
predefined random order. Subjects indicated how attractive they judged each activity to be on
a 19-point scale ranging from −9 (extremely unattractive) to +9 (extremely attractive).
In the two following tasks, subjects were assigned half of the activities and, in addition,
chose half of the activities. The order of assignment and choice tasks was balanced between
participants. In the choice task, subjects were presented with lists of six activities of which
they had to choose three. In each trial, subjects could select and deselect each activity
presented ad libitum, and then confirm their choice, given that exactly three activities were
selected.
The attractiveness of items in each list of six was controlled by drawing the items for
each list—without replacement—from the same quartile of attractiveness, based on the
subject’s earlier ratings. Thus, four attractiveness levels were created. Item lists were
presented in a predefined random order. A detailed account of the assignment task is not
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given, as it is not relevant to the hypotheses tested here.
Following the choice and assignment tasks, subjects answered the ACS-90. The
remaining tasks are not relevant to the hypotheses tested here and are therefore not reported.
Finally, subjects were thanked, debriefed and received compensation.
Results
Self-access measure. For each list of six items, the median rating was calculated for
each subject. Items scoring below the median were expected not to be chosen by the subject
while items scoring above the median were expected to be chosen. For items equalling the
median, no prediction was made. The number of inconsistent choices was calculated as the
number of choices contradicting the expectation. A low number of inconsistent choices was
assumed to indicate a high level of self-access. As the number of items taken into account
differed between subjects, the number of items equalling the median was included as one of
the control variables.
Prediction of self-access. Three subjects whose mode value of attractiveness ratings
had a frequency higher than 24—i.e. who gave the same rating to more than 50% of
activities—were excluded from the analyses because of a lack of variance. Table 1 shows the
means, standard deviations and zero-order correlations of the main variables measured in
Study 1.
The influence of several control variables on the number of inconsistent choices was
tested using a linear regression model. Control variables included the duration of rating and
choice tasks, type of compensation (monetary, course credit), mean and standard deviation of
ratings, and number of items scoring on the median. Variables not contributing to the model
were excluded using stepwise AIC selection (see Venables & Ripley, 2002). The only
predictor remaining in the model was the number of items on the median. Subjects with more
items on the median made a smaller number of inconsistent choices, b =−0.54, SE = 0.08,
t =−6.74, p < .001. This variable was included in the following analysis.
The main hypothesis was tested in a second linear regression model. The number of
inconsistent choices was regressed on the number of items on the median, negative affect,
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AOF, and the Negative Affect × AOF interaction. For this analysis, negative affect and AOF
were standardized. As above, variables were excluded from the model using stepwise AIC
selection. This was the case for the interaction, F(1,68) = 0.43, p = .515, negative affect,
F(1,69) = 0.39, p = .535, and AOF, F(1,70) = 0.80, p = .375. The only variable remaining
in the model was number of items on the median (statistics see above). Thus, negative affect,
AOF, or their interaction did not predict the number of inconsistent choices.
Insert Table 1 about here
Discussion
Contrary to expectations, neither negative affect, nor action orientation, nor their
interaction predicted self-access as measured by rating-choice consistency. Thus, based on the
current data, it is questionable whether preference consistency does measure self-access as
conceptualized in PSI theory. It should be noted, however, that the data in Study 1 originated
from the self-infiltration paradigm, which is why they may not be perfectly suited for
measuring consistency. Firstly, the attractiveness within each set of items to be chosen was
limited as the items on each list presented to subjects were restricted to one attractiveness
quartile. Secondly, Study 1 only included a measure of rating-choice consistency but no
measure of transitivity. In Study 2, the limitation on the variance in the choice task was
removed, and the number of intransitive choices was included as a second measure of
self-access.
Furthermore, self-reported life stress was included in Study 2 as an alternative measure
of negative affectivity. In Study 1, we hypothesized an interaction between AOF—a trait—and
affective state. As this is a correlational study, we are dealing with long-term rather than
short-term processes, so it is plausible that more long-term sources of negative affect—i.e. life
stress—might hinder self-access to a larger extent than current negative affect does. In a study
by Baumann, Kaschel, and Kuhl (2005), life stress, together with AOF, predicted congruence
of implicit versus explicit achievement motives, with state-oriented subjects under high stress
being more incongruent than action-oriented subjects or subjects under low stress. Motive
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congruence may be regarded as a measure of self-access, like the consistency measure used in
the current research. Therefore, to test the effect of long-term sources of negative affect on
self-access, a measure of life stress was included.
Study 2
In Study 2, as in the previous study, participants were asked to give attractiveness
ratings and make preference decisions to measure preference consistency. Photographs of
little-known animals were used as stimuli. These stimuli were expected to evoke affective
reactions while at the same time being relatively novel to subjects. In addition to rating-choice
inconsistency, the number of transitivity violations was calculated as an additional measure of
inconsistency (Lee et al., 2009). Inconsistency was expected to depend on both the AOF ×
Negative Affect and the AOF × Life Stress interaction.
Method
Participants. Data were collected from N = 137 German-speaking subjects at two
points in time. Subjects were recruited by email. Thirty subjects did not take part at Time 2,
which is why no trait measures were available from them. These subjects were excluded from
all analyses. In addition, two subjects were excluded because they gave identical answers to
all questions in the attractiveness ratings. The resulting sample consisted of n = 105 subjects
(71 women, 34 men) aged M = 36.3 years (SD = 16.7). Thirty subjects held a Bachelor’s or
Master’s degree, 75 subjects did not have a university degree. Fourteen (13%) of the subjects
were psychology undergraduates or graduates.
Materials
Animal Photographs. Nine high-resolution colour images of animals were found
using internet search engines. One or two examples were chosen from each of the six animal
classes included (Aves, Mammalia, Reptilia, Amphibia, Actinopterygii, Chondrichthyes).3
Images were cropped to a square shape while centring the animal and removing irrelevant
background details.
Affective state. Affective state was measured using the Positive and Negative Affect
Schedule (Watson et al., 1988, see Study 1). Reliability was good (Cronbach’s α = .84 for
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both scales).
Action orientation. The 24-item Action Control Scale (ACS-90; Kuhl, 1994, see
Study 1) was administered to measure demand-related (AOD) and failure-related (AOF)
action orientation. Reliability was sufficient for AOD (α = .70) and AOF (α = .75).
Life stress. The two life stress subscales of the Volitional Components Inventory
(VCI; Kuhl & Fuhrmann, 1998) were used to measure demand-related and failure-related life
stress. Each subscale consists of four items. On a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very
much), subjects rate to what extent the statements reflect their current situation. Examples for
the demand-related and threat-related life stress scales are: “My current life circumstances are
very tough.” and “I have many painful experiences to cope with.” Reliability was good for
demand-related (Cronbach’s α = .81) and failure-related (Cronbach’s α = .82) life stress.
Procedure. Data collection was internet-based and controlled by an Inquisit (Version
3) script. Preference data and other state variables were measured at Time 1, followed by
collection of trait data approximately 7 days later.
At Time 1, subjects were told the purpose of the study was to research the influence of
personality factors on mundane decisions. These decisions and judgements, subjects were
told, would concern animals living in the wild, because individuals differed considerably in
their evaluation of such animals. Subsequently, the PANAS was administered to measure
current affect. Next, subjects were asked to indicate how much they liked a number of animals
on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Photographs of animals were displayed
sequentially in a random order that was unique to each subject. Each colour photograph was
shown together with the animal’s name, which was shortened, where necessary, to one word.
Subjects responded by clicking on one of the rating scale points.
Following the rating, all 36 possible pairs of animals were displayed, one pair at a time,
in a random order that was unique to each subject. For each pair, subjects were asked to
indicate which of the two animals they “liked better” by clicking on the respective picture.
Subjects were instructed to “take their time” and indicate their personal preference. Finally,
they were thanked and asked to maintain silence about the details of the study. All tasks were
self-paced.
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Subjects were invited by email to take part in the second measurement session. The
session consisted of the ACS-90 and the two VCI subscales. After subjects had finished, they
were thanked and fully debriefed.
Results
Self-access measures. Two measures of preference consistency were calculated to
serve as indicators of self-access: rating-choice consistency and number of transitivity
violations. To calculate rating-choice consistency, the decision for each pair of options was
predicted based on the difference in their attractiveness. The item rated as being more
attractive was expected to be preferred. If both items were rated as equally attractive, no
prediction was made. Inconsistency between rating and choice was calculated as the number
of decisions that contradicted the expectation.
To calculate the number of transitivity violations, all possible item permutations of
length three were generated, and the number of permutations not satisfying the transitivity
condition (A B, BC, and AC) was determined. The two self-access measures were
significantly correlated, r = .26, t(103) = 2.68, p = .004 (one-sided). Table 2 shows the
means, standard deviations and zero-order correlations of the main variables measured in
Study 2.
Rating-choice inconsistency. The number of inconsistent choices ranged from 0 to 12
(M = 2.89, SD = 2.58, Mdn = 2) and was positively skewed (g1 = 1.21). To control for the
number of item pairs about which no prediction could be made regarding choice, the number
of pairs with equal attractiveness was used as one of the control variables. Data were analysed
using negative binomial regression. AOF, negative affect, and life stress were standardized for
these analyses.
In a first analysis, the effect of control variables on the number of inconsistent choices
was tested. The number of inconsistent choices was regressed on the number of pairs with
equal attractiveness, as well as the mean and standard deviation of the subject’s rating.
Variables not contributing to the model were excluded using stepwise AIC selection. This was
the case for mean rating, χ2(1) = 0.79, p = .376. Subjects with a lower number of pairs of
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equal attractiveness—i.e. for whom fewer pairs were taken into account—, b =−.10,
SE = 0.024, z =−4.25, p < .001, and with a smaller standard deviation of ratings,
b =−0.41, SE = 0.187, z =−2.20, p = .029, made more inconsistent choices. Therefore, the
number of pairs with equal attractiveness and the standard deviation of ratings were included
as control variables in the following analysis.
To test the main hypothesis, the number of inconsistent choices was regressed on the
number of pairs with equal attractiveness, standard deviation of ratings, negative affect,
failure-related action orientation (AOF), and the Negative Affect × AOF interaction. Using
stepwise AIC selection, predictors whose deletion did not cause any deterioration of the model
were removed from it. This was the case for the interaction, χ2(1) = 0.04, p = .845. Number
of pairs with equal attractiveness, b =−0.10, SE = .023, z =−4.41, p < .001, and negative
affect, b = 0.20, SE = 0.080, z = 2.52, p = .012, significantly predicted inconsistency, while
standard deviation of ratings, b =−0.34, SE = 0.190, z =−1.77, p = .077, and AOF,
b = 0.16, SE = 0.090, z = 1.82, p = .070, emerged as only marginally significant predictors.
Subjects with fewer equally attractive pairs and higher negative affect made more inconsistent
choices. Subjects with a high AOF and lower standard deviations of ratings tended to be more
inconsistent. According to a likelihood ratio test, the initial negative binomial model reported
was superior to an otherwise equivalent Poisson model, χ2(1) = 37.83, p < .001.
In a parallel analysis, the effect of life stress and AOF on self-access was tested. Using a
negative binomial model, the number of inconsistent choices was regressed on the number of
pairs with equal attractiveness, the mean as well as the standard deviation of the nine ratings,
threat-related life stress, AOF, and the Life Stress × AOF interaction. Using stepwise AIC
selection, predictors whose deletion did not cause any deterioration of the model were
removed from it. This was the case for the interaction, χ2(1) = 0.00, p = .971, and AOF,
χ2(1)1.73, p = .188. According to the resulting model, subjects with fewer pairs of equally
attractive items—i.e. with more pairs taken into account—, b =−0.10, SE = .023, z =−4.47,
p < .001, and subjects with smaller standard deviations of ratings, b =−0.51, SE = 0.193,
z =−2.63, p = .009 made more inconsistent choices. In addition, subjects with high levels of
threat-related life stress, b = 0.14, SE = 0.083, z = 1.65, p = .099, tended to be more
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inconsistent. The initial negative binomial model was superior to an otherwise equivalent
Poisson model, χ2(1) = 27.09, p < .001.
Transitivity violations. The number of transitivity violations ranged from 0 to 24
(M = 2.91, SD = 4.58, Mdn = 0) and was positively skewed (g1 = 2.11). A large number of
subjects (n = 60; 57%) did not make a single violation of transitivity, which resulted in a
zero-inflated distribution. The data were therefore analysed using zero-inflated negative
binomial (ZINB) regression.
In a first analysis, the number of transitivity violations was regressed on the mean as
well as the standard deviation of ratings for each subject. Using stepwise AIC selection, the
mean rating was excluded from the model, χ2(2) = 0.93, p = .625. Subjects with a lower
standard deviation in their ratings tended to make more transitivity violations, b =−0.37,
SE = 0.20, z =−1.90, p = .058. This variable was included in the following analysis.
For the main hypothesis test, the number of transitivity violations was regressed on the
standard deviation of ratings, negative affect, failure-related action orientation (AOF), and the
Negative Affect × AOF interaction. Variables not contributing to the model, based on
stepwise AIC selection, were removed from the model. This was the case for the interaction,
χ2(2) = 0.44, p = .802, action orientation, χ2(2) = 1.03, p = .598, and negative affect,
χ2(2) = 2.12, p = .346. The only predictor approaching significance was the standard
deviation of ratings within subjects (statistics see above).
Using the same procedure, the number of transitivity violations was regressed on the
standard deviation of ratings for each subject, failure-related life stress, AOF, and the Life
Stress × AOF interaction. Based on stepwise AIC selection, variables not contributing to the
model were removed. This was the case for the interaction, χ2(2) = 2.08, p = .353, and AOF,
χ2(2) = 1.30, p = .522. Thus, neither AOF nor the AOF × Life Stress interaction predicted
transitivity significantly. Subjects with higher standard deviations in their ratings tended to
make fewer transitivity violations, b =−0.39, SE = 0.20, z =−1.95, p = .052. More
importantly, subjects experiencing higher threat-related life stress were less likely to be fully
transitive, b =−0.17, SE = 0.077, z =−2.17, p = .030.
The initial ZINB model was tested against a negative binomial model without zero
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inflation using the Vuong test for non-nested models. The zero-inflated model was superior to
the model without zero inflation, Z =−5.33, p < .001. In addition, the ZINB model was
tested against a zero-inflated Poisson model using a likelihood ratio test. The ZINB model
was again superior to the alternative model, χ2(1) = 31.28, p < .001. Therefore, the ZINB
model is considered the most appropriate of the candidate models.
Insert Table 2 about here
Discussion
Study 2 served the purpose of testing the self-access hypothesis in several ways. Two
measures of consistency, rating-choice consistency and number of transitivity violations, were
used as measures of self-access. The prediction of self-access from current negative affect on
the one hand and from threat-related life stress on the other hand was tested. In addition, these
effects were expected to be moderated by AOF.
Results were partially consistent with predictions. As expected, subjects in a state of
high negative affect were more prone to make choices that were inconsistent with prior ratings.
In addition, subjects experiencing a high level of threat-related life stress were less likely to be
fully consistent. However, neither in the case of rating-choice consistency nor of transitivity
was the influence of affect or life stress moderated by AOF. Action-oriented subjects tended to
make decisions that were more consistent with ratings, compared with state-oriented subjects.
The first two studies were correlative in nature. As subjects’ negative affect was
generally low—e.g., in Study 2, M = 15.7 on a scale ranging from 10 to 50—it seemed
advisable to test the hypotheses in an experimental design in which a more pronounced
negative affect was induced. Study 3 featured an experimental design and tested the
hypothesis in the highly self-relevant context of vocational choice.
Study 3
Stable vocational interests develop from adolescence to early adulthood (Low, Yoon,
Roberts, & Rounds, 2005). In Study 3, adolescent participants, who were in the process of
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choosing their careers, made liking judgements and decisions concerning job-related
activities. The judgements and decisions made in this study may therefore be assumed to have
been particularly self-relevant to participants and thus well-suited to examining self-related
processes such as self-access. In the study, negative versus neutral affect was manipulated
using a story reading and writing task. The effect of experimentally induced negative affect on
consistency was tested, as well as a moderating effect of action orientation.
In addition, we investigated the question whether stimulus modality affected self-access.
Research has shown that self-access profits from a pictorial, as opposed to a verbal,
presentation of stimuli (Lee et al., 2009), as well as from vividly imagining goal-striving,
compared with the mere verbal representation of a goal (Job & Brandstätter, 2009; Schultheiss
& Brunstein, 1999). These results are in line with Kuhl’s (2001) assumption that intuitive
processing, which is typical of extension memory, is characterized by “pictoriality, and other
aspects of a close connection to concrete sensorimotor experiences” (p. 626, own translation).
Therefore, in the current study, stimuli were presented either as pictures or as words.
Self-access—and thus consistency—was expected to be facilitated by a pictorial presentation.
Method
Participants. The sample consisted of N = 106 students (17 men, 88 women)4 at a
high school in southern Germany, who were between 15 and 21 years (M = 17.7, SD = 1.2) of
age. Subjects were recruited in the classroom by their teachers.
Materials
Vocation-related stimuli. Vocation-related line drawings were chosen from the
non-verbal test of vocational interests developed by Proyer (2007). The original test comprises
60 stimuli, 10 for each of the six dimensions of the RIASEC model (Holland, 1997). For the
present study, two sets of 12 stimuli each were chosen. To ensure sufficient variability in
stimuli content, each set included two stimuli per RIASEC dimension. All drawings depicted a
person at work. For each of the chosen stimuli, an action description was generated as a verbal
counterpart to the pictures (e.g. “baking bread”, “entering data”; all two-word expressions).
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Affect manipulation stimuli. According to a meta-analysis by Westermann, Spies,
Stahl, and Hesse (1996), the presentation of films or stories with emotional contents,
accompanied by an instruction to imagine the situation and get emotionally involved, is
among the most effective procedures for experimental mood induction. Therefore, a story with
negative emotional content and a control story with neutral to positive content were developed.
In the negative story, a severe nuclear power plant failure in the region of southern
Germany was reported, which presumably included a nuclear meltdown. The people affected
were advised to prepare themselves for evacuation. The story was furnished with one colour
photograph showing a nuclear power plant and two further photographs showing anti-nuclear
activists with posters carrying radiation warning signs. One poster read “I AM SCARED”.
The neutral story reported that a solar power plant in southern Spain had entered into
service. As a result, the story said, a Spanish nuclear power plant had been shut down for
good. Energy production was described as emission-free and low-risk, with positive effects on
“humans, animals, and nature”. The story was furnished with three colour photographs
showing a solar power plant, the sun shining onto a solar panel, and a young, smiling girl
surrounded by sunflowers.
Affective state. The Short Scales for the Measurement of Positive Activation, Negative
Activation, and Valence (PANAVA-KS; Schallberger, 2005) were used as a measure of state
affect. The scales consist of 10 bipolar adjective scales (e.g. unhappy, happy). For each item,
subjects indicate on a 7-point scale whether the left-hand or the right-hand item better
describes their current state. As our hypothesis specifically refers to negative affect, only the
negative activation subscale was used for the manipulation check. Reliability of the negative
activation scale was acceptable (Cronbach’s α = .74 at baseline and α = .71 post
manipulation).
Action orientation. Action orientation was measured using the Action Control Scale
(ACS-90; Kuhl, 1994, see Study 1 for details). Reliability was adequate (Cronbach’s α = .78
for both AOF and AOD).
Procedure. The experiment took place in the classroom. Five groups, consisting of
13, 18, 23, 24, and 27 students, were tested. Subjects were told that the study was examining
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individual differences in the preference for activities. They were asked to read the instructions
carefully and respond spontaneously. Participants were then given all the materials and
worked independently. Oral instructions were standardized and given by the same
experimenter in all groups.
After the collection of general demographic data, baseline affective state and action
orientation were measured by means of the PANAVA-KS and ACS-90, respectively. Next,
affect was manipulated, using a story with either negative or neutral content. Subjects were
told the task was about their ability to empathize with other people. They were instructed to
“imagine the following situation” and to put themselves in the position of a person living with
his or her family in the affected area. The subjects then read either the negative or the neutral
story, depending on the experimental condition. After reading the story, subjects were asked to
“write down from a first-person perspective what is on your mind and how you feel after
hearing this news”. This was followed by some empty lines.
Following affect induction, subjects responded to the PANAVA-KS once again, to
measure change in affect. Next, subjects worked on two preference tasks: They rated the
attractiveness of 12 vocation-related stimuli on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (not attractive at
all) to 7 (very attractive). After that, they made complete pairwise preference comparisons of
the same 12 stimuli, 66 in number. All preference items were presented in a predefined
random order. Apart from affect induction, modality (pictures, words) of all stimuli and
material (A, B) were manipulated between subjects. The two between-subjects factors were
crossed, resulting in four versions of the questionnaire. In each group of subjects tested
together, the four questionnaire versions were administered to a similar number of subjects.
After the preference measurement block, subjects were asked to write down the
assumed purpose of the study and to indicate on scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very
much) to what extent a) they had tried to answer preference questions truthfully (truthfulness),
b) they had answered preference questions at random (randomness), and c) the preference
tasks were meaningful to them (meaningfulness).
Each data collection session lasted no more than 45 minutes. About ten minutes of each
session were used for pre-instructions and debriefing. Subjects who had finished the
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questionnaire before the end of the data collection period were told to raise their hand. They
were given a filler text to read until the data collection period had elapsed. This was done to
ensure that subjects who worked more slowly were not disturbed by other subjects leaving the
room.
At the end of the data collection period, the experimenter thanked the subjects and
informed them about the true purpose of the study and the main hypothesis. Subjects had the
opportunity to ask questions and were asked to maintain silence about the details of the study.
Results
Manipulation check. Negative affect in the two experimental conditions did not
differ at baseline, t(100) =−0.41, p = .681 (two-sided). However, following manipulation,
negative affect was stronger in the negative affect condition (M = 3.54, SD = 1.13) than in the
neutral affect condition (M = 3.21, SD = 1.11), t(104) = 1.97, p = .026 (one-sided). This
difference remained after controlling for negative affect at baseline, b = 0.19, SE = .081,
t(100) = 2.34, p = .022.
Self-access measures. Rating-choice consistency and the number of transitivity
violations were calculated using the same procedure as in Study 2. Note that, while a set of
nine items was used in Study 2, sets of 12 items were used in Study 3, possibly leading to
larger ranges in outcome variables. Table 3 shows the means, standard deviations, and
zero-order correlations of the main variables measured in Study 3.
Rating-choice consistency. One subject, whose rating-choice consistency was more
than 7 standard deviations above the mean (i.e. who made 41 inconsistent decisions), was
removed from the following analyses. The data of n = 105 subjects were included. In the
resulting dataset, the number of inconsistent choices ranged from 0 to 14 (M = 6.4, SD = 3.4,
Mdn = 6) and was only slightly skewed (g1 = 0.28). Data were analysed using negative
binomial regression.
In a first analysis, only control variables were entered. The number of inconsistent
choices was regressed on the number of pairs with equal attractiveness, the mean as well as
the standard deviation of the subject’s ratings, material (A, B), truthfulness and randomness of
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answers in the preference tasks, and meaningfulness of preference tasks. Using stepwise AIC
selection, variables not contributing to the model were identified and excluded. The only
variable tending to contribute to the model was truthfulness. Subjects who indicated that they
had answered more truthfully tended to make fewer inconsistent decisions, b =−.10,
SE = 0.06, z =−1.66, p = .098. Therefore, truthfulness was included in the following
analysis.
A second negative binomial model was run to test the main hypotheses. AOF was
standardized for the following analyses. The number of inconsistent choices was regressed on
truthfulness, modality (pictures, words), the affect manipulation (negative, neutral), AOF, and
the Affect Manipulation × AOF interaction. Stepwise AIC selection revealed that modality,
χ2(1) = 0.35, p = .553, the interaction, χ2(1) = .1.55, p = .213, affect manipulation,
χ2(1) = 0.14, p = .711, and AOF, χ2(1) = 0.57, p = .452, did not contribute to the model.
The final model was identical to the final model of the first analysis, with only truthfulness
remaining in the model (statistics see above).
The initial negative binomial model was superior to an otherwise equivalent Poisson
model, according to a likelihood ratio test, χ2(1) = 102.6, p < .001.
Transitivity violations. The number of transitivity violations ranged from 0 to 30
(M = 3.69, SD = 5.17, Mdn = 3) and was positively skewed (g1 = 2.12). For this outcome
variable, 48.9% of data points were zeros. Of the 106 subjects, 14 (13.2%) were excluded
because of missing data in the pairwise preference decisions. The data of 92 subjects were
included. Data were analysed using zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) models.
In a first analysis, the effect of control variables was tested. The number of transitivity
violations was regressed on the standard deviation as well as the mean of ratings, material (A,
B), randomness, truthfulness, and meaningfulness. According to stepwise AIC selection, none
of these variables contributed to the model, χ2(2)< 3, p > .25.
In a second ZINB model, the number of transitivity violations was regressed on
modality, affect manipulation, AOF, and the Affect Manipulation × AOF interaction. Based
on stepwise AIC selection, the interaction, χ2(2) = 0.90, p = .637, modality, χ2(2) = 1.49,
p = .475, and AOF, χ2(2) = 2.43, p = .297, were removed from the model. Affect
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manipulation emerged as the only significant predictor of the number of transitivity violations.
Subjects in the neutral-affect group made more transitivity violations than subjects in the
negative-affect group, b = 0.39, SE = 0.19, z = 2.06, p = .039.
The initial ZINB model was tested against a negative binomial model without zero
inflation as well as against a zero-inflated Poisson model. The zero-inflated model was
superior to a non-zero-inflated model according to the Vuong test for non-nested models,
Z =−4.49, p < .001. The ZINB model was superior to the zero-inflated Poisson model,
based on a likelihood ratio test, χ2(1) = 35.71, p < .001. Therefore, the ZINB model is
considered the most appropriate of the candidate models.
Insert Table 3 about here
Discussion
In Study 3, the hypothesis that preference consistency may serve as a measure of
self-access was tested in an experimental design. Again, rating-choice consistency and
transitivity were used as alternative measures of consistency. Negative affect was successfully
induced using a story reading and writing task.
Contrary to expectations, neither affect manipulation, nor AOF, nor their interaction
predicted rating-choice consistency. The number of transitivity violations depended
exclusively on affect manipulation, though in the opposite direction to that expected.
Induction of negative affect appeared to reduce the number of transitivity violations. While
the results of Study 2 partially supported the theory, these results were not replicated in Study
3 using an experimental design.
General Discussion
According to PSI theory, self-access is impaired in a state of negative affect, especially
in low-AOF subjects who are less able to cope with negative affect than high-AOF subjects. In
the three current studies, this hypothesis was tested using preference consistency as a
self-access measure. Different measures of preference consistency—rating-choice consistency
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and intransitivity—were used in correlational as well as experimental designs and with
different types of materials (office- and work-related activities, animal photographs).
While most previous research has viewed preference consistency as a universal—or
universally absent—feature of human decision-making (see Regenwetter et al., 2011), the
current paper treats consistency as a variable that is influenced by situational and personality
factors. So far, the idea that preference consistency varies within or between subjects has
received little attention. Research by Lee et al. (2009) and Nordgren and Dijksterhuis (2009)
has shown that a more spontaneous, compared with a more deliberative, response increases
preference consistency. The current research goes beyond these studies in that it tests the
combined effects of trait (i.e. AOF) and state (i.e. affect) variables on consistency measures.
In Study 2, subjects in a state of high negative affect or threat-related life stress made
more inconsistent choices. This result is in line with the hypothesis that negative affect or
stress interferes with self-access (Baumann & Kuhl, 2003; Kazén et al., 2003; Kuhl & Kazén,
1994). According to PSI theory (Kuhl, 2000), this interference is due to a predominant
analytic cognitive mode when experiencing high negative affect, which hinders the retrieval of
extension memory contents. Consequently, access to one’s values, wishes, and goals is
blocked.
The results of Study 2 suggest that preference consistency may indicate self-access and
thus serve as a replacement for the self-infiltration (Kuhl & Kazén, 1994) and
self-compatibility checking (Kazén et al., 2003) measures. These two measures, which are
based on self-other distinction and self-access processing time, respectively, are far more
time-consuming than the measurement of preference consistency. Replacing them by
consistency measures may allow data to be obtained more economically in self-access
research.
However, in none of the studies did negative affect interact with AOF in predicting
self-access. Thus, AOF did not, as expected, buffer the debilitating effect of negative affect on
self-access. This result has two possible implications. It may be thought to call into question
the self-access hypothesis of PSI theory (Kuhl, 2000). However, as the self-infiltration effect
has been replicated in several studies (Baumann & Kuhl, 2003; Kazén et al., 2003), this
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possibility seems unlikely. Alternatively, it may call into question the use of consistency as a
self-access measure. In other words, self-access processes may not be a major prerequisite for
making consistent preference-based judgements and decisions. However, if consistency is not
based on self-access, what else might it be based on?
There are at least two possible accounts of preference consistency without recourse to
self-access: (1) preference consistency may be predominantly based on cognitive
performance, not on self-access capabilities; or (2) the notion of dispositional preferences on
which preference decisions are based may be called into question. Firstly, the preference tasks
may be conceptualized as memory tasks, with consistency depending in part on memory
performance. Given that people are motivated to appear consistent (Heider, 1946), subjects in
the current studies may have been motivated to make binary decisions in accordance with
previous attractiveness ratings. Subjects with a strong preference for consistency (Cialdini,
Trost, & Newsom, 1995), who are furthermore capable of basing preference decisions on their
memory of earlier preference decisions, may respond consistently, even if they lack any
self-access capabilities.
Secondly, using preference consistency as a measure of self-access is based on the
assumption that a subject is endowed with stable preferences that he or she may perceive or
access more or less accurately. However, the perception of stable preferences is not the only
process on which a subject’s preference judgement or decision may be based. According to an
alternative view, preferences are—at least in some cases—constructed just before they are
reported (for a summary, see Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006; Slovic, 1995). This view is based
on findings that show that the preferences indicated by subjects vary depending on contextual
factors such as the separate versus comparative presentation of options, or a forced-choice
versus willingness-to-pay response format (cf. Shafir & LeBoeuf, 2004).
While the notion of preference construction predominates in decision theory, some
researchers have argued that stable preferences nevertheless exist. Simonson (2008) took the
position that preference construction processes as well as dispositional preferences—which he
called inherent preferences—play a role in subjects’ reported preferences and are by no means
mutually exclusive. According to Simonson, peoples’ inherent object preferences emerge
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through experience with the object. When making decisions, however, people prefer to make
relative, or comparative, judgements, in which context-dependent preference construction
processes predominate.
With respect to the current studies, Simonson’s (2008) account leads to two conclusions.
In the first place, the assumption of a dispositional basis of preference decisions need not be
wrong, as is suggested by a large body of BDT-related literature (see Lichtenstein & Slovic,
2006). In the second place, the lack of significant findings regarding the consistency measures
used in the current studies may have been due to characteristics of the task which led to a
relatively larger impact of preference construction processes, compared with processes related
to accessing stable preferences. According to Simonson (2008), preference construction
processes are favoured if easily comparable objects are used as stimuli, and if these stimuli are
presented in a comparative manner, e.g. side by side. Therefore, the binary decisions used in
the studies (or the one-out-of-six decisions in Study 1) should greatly foster comparative
judgements and therefore preference construction processes. This may explain the lack of
significant results regarding the transitivity measure.
Attractiveness ratings, in which items had to be evaluated one by one, should elicit
absolute object evaluations and therefore be better suited to tapping into perceived stable
preferences. This may be one reason why, in Study 2, rating-choice consistency, which
involves attractiveness ratings, depended on negative affect, while this was not the case for
consistency as measured by the transitivity measure, which is based entirely on object
comparisons.
In Study 3, in which affect was manipulated, a significant influence of affect on
transitivity was found, although this was not in the expected direction: Subjects experiencing
negative affect made more transitive decisions than subjects in a state of neutral affect. If
transitivity is interpreted as a measure of self-access, this result leads to the conclusion that
negative affect may foster as well as hinder self-access, depending on circumstances.
The animal photographs used in Study 2 were presumably less self-relevant than the
job-related activities used in Study 3. Moreover, the two studies featured different types and
intensities of affect. While, in Study 2, mildly negative mood was measured, in Study 3, more
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intense fear reactions were induced. Thus, based on the current results, self-access may be
hindered particularly by mild negative affect in situations with low self-relevance.
While Kuhl (2001) does not consider intensity of affect to be relevant for the prediction
of self-access, the motivational dimensional model of affect (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010)
might explain why self-access depends on the intensity of negative affect. According to that
model, affective states with a low motivational intensity (e.g. sadness, amusement) broaden
attention, whereas affective states with a high motivational intensity (e.g. fear, desire) narrow
attention. With respect to the two classes of processes in preference formation—preference
construction versus access to inherent preferences (Simonson, 2008, see above)—, one might
suspect that broad attention would facilitate context-dependent, comparative preference
formation, while narrow attention would facilitate a more isolated, absolute evaluation of
objects. Thus, the mild negative affect in Study 2 may have led to more comparative
judgements and therefore fostered inconsistency, while the more intense negative affect in
Study 3 may have led to more absolute evaluations of objects and therefore fostered the
consistency of preferences.5
From the above considerations, it follows that the consistency measures used in the
current studies differ fundamentally from the self-infiltration measures used in most studies on
self-access in the context of PSI theory (e.g. Baumann & Kuhl, 2003). Consistency measures
are indicators of contradictions within a number of measurements regarding the same objects.
Thus, they are related to measures of congruence between implicit and explicit motives
(Baumann, Kaschel, & Kuhl, 2005), or between implicit and explicit social cognitions (Nosek,
Hawkins, & Frazier, 2011). These congruence measures concern the fit between different
measurements of the same individual differences variables and are, thus, also measures of
contradiction within the mental system. More generally, congruence measures may be
identified with theories of personality integration.
In empirical existential psychology6, personality integration is a process thought to
foster well-being, health, and other positively assessed outcomes (Sheldon & Kasser, 1995;
Weinstein, Przybylski, & Ryan, 2013; for reviews, see Weinstein, Deci, & Ryan, 2011; Ryan,
1995). Weinstein, Przybylski, and Ryan (2013) defined integration as the “relative coherence
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and unity of experience underlying motivated action”, which “varies both between and within
individuals” (p. 69).7 The preference consistency measures used in the current research
indicate coherence within the mental system and therefore tap into an aspect of personality
integration.
Self-infiltration, in contrast, is not concerned with internal contradiction but with the
confusion between others and oneself. This notion is related to the construct of ego boundary,
the feeling of “how far the ego extends, or more correctly, the point beyond which the ego
does not extend” (Federn, 1952, as cited in Horner, 1973, p. 83). A number of psychological
theories are concerned with the question of how well people are able to distinguish self from
other. In developmental psychology, the ability of children, as well as monkeys, to recognize
themselves has been studied by observing their reaction to their own mirror image (Dixon,
1957; Gallup, 1970). Adult human subjects have also been shown to confuse self with other in
memory (Johnson & Raye, 1981), e.g. when generating ideas (inadvertent plagiarism; Brown
& Murphy, 1989). Finally, research on close relationships has shown that people tend to
include the close other in the self, i.e. to treat the “resources, perspectives, and identities of
close others as their own” (Aron et al., 2004, p. 101). Thus, various psychological theories are
concerned with the question of how well people distinguish between themselves and others, or
how well they know the boundary of their ego. The self-infiltration measure is closely related
to this class of theories, but largely unrelated to the personality integration theories discussed
above.
Differences in results between preference consistency and self-infiltration measures may
therefore be due to fact that the two measures belong to conceptually distinct classes of
self-access measures. The results of the current studies suggest, as a whole, that self-other
confusion measures are more suitable for tapping self-access than are preference consistency
measures.
Implications for Future Research
Despite the lack of reliable convergence between self-infiltration and consistency
measures of self-access, the latter may be an intriguing alternative to known self-access
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measures. Further research should examine why the measures diverge, even though, in theory,
they can be conclusively connected to self-access processes.
The current research was based on the assumption that, if preference consistency and
self-infiltration converge, they should be predicted by the same variables, i.e. by action
orientation and negative affect. This assumption is rather restrictive: Preference consistency
was not assumed to be a measure of any kind of self-access, but of the kind of self-access
defined in PSI theory research. Thus, preference consistency might be a self-access measure,
but not be based on the same processes. If that were the case, preference consistency and
self-infiltration—both being self-access measures in a broader sense—might still be directly
related. Therefore, the direct relationship between consistency and self-infiltration measures
should be determined in future studies.
This comparison should not only take place empirically, however, but also theoretically.
In other words, the question should be addressed, how the concepts of self-access in terms of
personality integration, on the one hand, and self-access in terms of ego boundary, on the
other hand, are related. There are a number of plausible answers. Firstly, the two strands of
self-access concepts may be distinct and uncorrelated, which could mean that a person with a
more integrated personality is neither more nor less likely to confuse self with other. Secondly,
they may be negatively correlated, which could mean, for example, that a person with a wider
ego boundary is better able to integrate external demands into their self than a person with a
more narrow ego boundary. Thirdly, they may depend on a common factor, which could mean
that personality integration and the establishment of a clear-cut ego boundary go hand in hand.
In short, the way in which the two concepts, and theories, are related is as yet unknown.
From a methodological point of view, the self-infiltration measure is relatively
unaffected by interfering variables like task motivation and ability. This is achieved by
advancing very specific hypotheses—i.e. by only taking false-self ascriptions of assigned
activities into account—and by controlling for baseline memory performance (see Baumann
& Kuhl, 2003). Preference consistency measures, in contrast, feature a number of effects that
interfere with a potential self-access effect. Preference consistency may depend—apart from
self-access—on memory-related cognitive abilities, preference for consistency,
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context-invariance of judgements, and the care taken while working on the tasks. Future
research should make an effort to separate self-access effects from cognitive and motivational
effects in consistency measurements. The latter effects could be controlled for by measuring
the respective variables, including the measurement of (e.g., memory) abilities in a context
unrelated to preference decisions.
Conclusions
Previous research has suggested a number of self-access measures, including
motive-goal congruence (Brunstein, 2010), self-concordance (Sheldon, 2002), and
self-infiltration (Kuhl & Kazén, 1994). The prominent question in the current research was,
whether measures of preference consistency might serve as an alternative measure of
self-access. Only a small portion of the current data supports this view. Moreover, a number
of processes have been identified that might superimpose self-access-related variance on
preference consistency. The most prominent of these processes are comparative
decision-making—which may be decoupled from inherent dispositions that might otherwise
guide decision-making—and episodic memory processes.
On a conceptual level, it has become clear that different measures of self-access are
based on distinct classes of theories—i.e. personality integration versus ego
boundary—theories that are difficult to reconcile. While it has been shown that the—otherwise
strictly cognitive—phenomenon of preference inconsistency is susceptible to the subject’s
affective state, the data cannot be comprehensively explained by current self-access theories.
Notes
1In the paradigm (Baumann & Kuhl, 2003), by design, the attractiveness of self-chosen and non-self-chosen
items does not differ. Therefore attractiveness information is of little value for discriminating between self-chosen
and non-self-chosen goals.
2All materials and instructions were in the German language. Instructions in this report are our literal transla-
tions, unless otherwise specified.
3The animals chosen were chameleon, common kingfisher, impala, frill-necked lizard, opossum, Atlantic puf-
fin, batoidea, pterois, and one exemplar from the salamander group of animals.
4The sex and age of one subject are unknown, because he or she did not answer the respective questions.
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5This interpretation stands in direct opposition to the predictions of PSI theory, according to which broad
attention—in other words, holistic or intuitive processing—should lead to better self-access. However, the fact
that preference consistency, used as an indicator of self-access, responds in an unexpected way to variations
in intensity of affect may be entirely due to methodological factors, i.e. to the choice of consistency as the
measurement method.
6For an overview of this field of research, see Greenberg, Koole, and Pyszczynski (2004).
7Weinstein, Przybylski, and Ryan (2013) define integration as unity of experience, i.e. of conscious processes.
This restriction is arbitrary, however. Integration may also be defined to include unity of any processes underlying
motivated action, be they conscious or unconscious.
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Discussion
In the present thesis, self-access in goal selection was defined as processes through which
knowledge about the self becomes available for the selection of goals. In three papers, this
construct was researched from a theoretical, a methodological, as well as an empirical
perspective.
The theoretical perspective concerns questions regarding the definition of self-access as
well as the similarities and differences between models of self-access. In Paper 1, a
meta-theoretical framework was postulated that encompasses the least common denominator of
theories of self-access in goal selection. According to the framework, self-access in goal
selection may be conceptualized as communication between two systems, of which the first
contains non-conscious self-representations and the second is responsible for the conscious
processing of information. Communication—and thus self-access—is possible if the cognitive
processes are available that are necessary for retrieving self-representations from memory. Such
cognitive processes have been described as intuitive, experiential, or non-verbal.
Apart from similarities between models, differences were identified, which resulted in a
classification of self-access models and measures. While some models explain self-access
through intrapersonal processes, such as memory retrieval or self-perception, others focus on
interpersonal processes, such as the resistance to external influences on one’s own opinions and
preferences. Therefore, self-access may not be a unitary construct but consist of at least two
facets. The intrapersonal facet has traditionally been discussed in the psychology of motivation
(e.g. McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989), while the interpersonal facet has been
discussed in empirical humanistic psychology (e.g. Kuhl, 2001; Sheldon, 2004).
The distinction between intra- and interpersonal aspects concerns self-access theory as
well as methodology. From a methodological perspective, the self-access construct must be
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further differentiated. This perspective concerns the question of how self-access in goal
selection has been measured in previous research and how it should be measured to assure that
the self-access construct is appropriately represented. In Paper 1, three classes of self-access
measures were distinguished: subjective measures, fit measures, and process measures. Process
measures were considered the most appropriate means of assessing self-access in a narrow
sense, i.e. self-access as a process. Fit measures were considered appropriate for the assessment
of self-knowledge in terms of a fit between the person’s perceived and actual states and traits.
Subjective measures were considered unsuited for the measurement of both self-access and
self-knowledge. They may be useful to measure perceived self-access, which is, however,
different from actual self-access.
In Papers 2 and 3, an empirical perspective was taken, which means that hypotheses
derived from theory were tested. In Paper 2, a replication of the combined effect of action
orientation and negative affect on the false self-ascription of assigned activities (i.e. on
self-infiltration) was attempted (Baumann & Kuhl, 2003), an effect put forward by PSI theory
(Kuhl, 2000). In Paper 3, the use of the consistency of preferences as a self-access measure was
explored in three studies. In both papers, measures of self-access did not reliably and
consistently depend on the predictors specified by PSI theory. While in the case of
self-infiltration the effect’s robustness must be called into question, in the case of preference
consistency, the appropriateness of the procedure for measuring self-access, as defined in PSI
theory, must be doubted.
Contrary to expectations, action-oriented subjects made more self-infiltration errors than
state-oriented subjects in Paper 2. This result is not consistent with similar studies (Baumann &
Kuhl, 2003; Kazén, Baumann, & Kuhl, 2003). However, previous research has shown that
state-oriented subjects may display better self-regulation than action-oriented subjects when
negative affect is low (e.g. Jostmann & Koole, 2006). Thus, the higher self-infiltration rates of
action-oriented subjects may be due to the fact that negative affect was generally low in the
present study. Still, because action-orientation has primarily been defined as the ability to
regulate affect, it proves difficult to explain its undesirable effects on action regulation.
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In Paper 3, preference consistency was in most cases not predicted by action-orientation
or negative affect. Thus, preference consistency does not seem to depend on the same factors as
self-infiltration. This unexpected result was explained based on the above-mentioned distinction
between intrapersonal and interpersonal self-access processes: While the self-infiltration
measure assumes interpersonal processes—i.e. coping with intentions assigned by
others—merely intrapersonal processes are thought to underlie preference consistency. Thus,
self-infiltration may be related to theories of ego boundary (Horner, 1973), which concern the
ability to distinguish self from other, while preference consistency may be related to theories of
personality integration (Sheldon & Kasser, 1995), which concern the contradictions among
cognitions, emotions, and action tendencies within one mental system.
It does not follow from PSI theory that self-access needs to be restricted to interpersonal
processes, such as coping with external assignments. Rather, according to the theory, self-access
is defined as the successful retrieval of self-relevated information from memory, which refers to
an entirely intrapersonal process. Thus, self-perception processes—which preference
consistency measures aim at—should underlie self-access functionality in terms of PSI theory.
It is, however, possible that consistency measures do not tap into self-perception
processes. Firstly, performance on consistency measures may depend, apart from
self-perception, on the care taken while working on the preference tasks. For instance,
superficial processing of items may result in low consistency scores that are, however, not based
on a reduced ability of self-perception. Secondly, consistency measures that are based on
comparative preferences—i.e. choices between two or more simultaneously presented
objects—might increase the influence of the item context on decisions. Two or more
simultaneously presented items constitute a unique context, which may reduce the influence of
the subject’s inherent preferences on the reported preferences (see Simonson, 2008).
Taken together, considerable convergence between self-access theories was found.
However, contrary to expectations, no measure of self-access in goal selection—not even the
well-established self-infiltration measure—was validated by the present research. The
conceptual distinctions that resulted from the present research may be useful for making more
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specific predictions about the differences between measures of self-access.
Limitations
The present research is limited in several respects. In particular, it did not consider all
possibly relevant self-access phenomena, theories, or paradigms. Firstly, hypotheses in
empirical studies of the present research were mostly based on PSI theory (Kuhl, 2000), not on
other theories of self-access. It may be argued that PSI theory provides one of the most
elaborated accounts of self-access in goal-selection. Unlike other self-access accounts, PSI
theory features a process theory, as well as an objective measure of the phenomenon, which
might justify its choice. Nevertheless, hypotheses and methodology of theories such as the
information processing model of dual motivation (Schultheiss & Strasser, 2012) or the
self-concordance model (Sheldon, 2002) might have been included in the empirical studies of
the present research.
Secondly, areas of personality psychology that are closely related to self-access research
have not been thoroughly discussed. Concepts like identity status (Kroger, Martinussen, &
Marcia, 2010), indecisiveness (Germeijs & De Boeck, 2002), or self-concept clarity (Campbell,
1990) refer to individual difference variables that may be associated with self-access in goal
selection. However, while these concepts may be theoretically relevant, research in these areas
does not usually feature an analysis of antecedents and consequences of self-access.
Thirdly, in the present research, methodology from memory and decision-making
research was adapted to the study of self-access. Thus, methods were used outside of the
theoretical context from which they had originated. This transfer of methods between research
domains resulted—to a certain extent—in a neglect of processes that are commonly identified
with those methods. This issue—which might be called methodological alienation—concerns
self-infiltration as well as preference consistency.
From the perspective of memory psychology, self-infiltration is a measure of source
memory for the distiction between self and other following incidental learning. The present
research, however, has considered the memory-psychological aspect only to a limited extent.
Procedures were not designed for the rigorous testing of memory processes. Therefore,
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conclusions about such processes should be treated with caution.
Similarly, preference consistency was used as a measure of self-access in the current
research without fully considering theories from the decision-making domain that are usually
applied to this type of measurement. Theories of multiattribute decision-making (Yoon &
Hwang, 1995), for instance, are suitable for explaining differences in preference consistency
regarding objects with multiple features. Disregarding decision-making theories may have led
to explanations that are not compatible with previous research. The mixed results regarding the
association between affect and self-access (Paper 3), for instance, may be explicable only when
decision-making processes are taken into account.
Fourthly, in the present research, self-access in goal selection was discussed in terms of
the availability of one’s evaluation of actions or objects, i.e. of the value aspect of goal
selection. However, goal selection is typically thought to depend on both expectancies (e.g.
feasibility) and value (desirability; Gollwitzer & Oettingen, 2012). Therefore, self-access in
goal selection may not be defined only with respect to the value aspect, but also with respect to
the expectancy aspect.
The theory of fantasy realization (Oettingen, Pak, & Schnetter, 2001) may be interpreted
as a theory of self-access in goal selection with respect to expectancies. According to the
theory, expectancy information—i.e. the perceived difficulty of goal achievement—is taken into
consideration only if the desired future and the present reality have been contrasted (see the
introduction chapter of the present thesis). This varying availability of expectancy information
in the goal-selection process may be regarded as an instance of self-access.
One might argue that a full account of self-access in goal selection should include the
value as well as the expectancy aspect of goal selection. The present research, however, is
limited to self-access with respect to goal desirability, i.e. the value aspect. This limitation is, in
part, arbitrary. However, it is plausible that, in the process of goal selection, desirability is
primary to feasibility. For instance, Achtziger and Gollwitzer (2008) held that goals originate
from needs which, in turn, lead to the generation of wishes. Both needs and wishes concern the
desirability component of goal selection. Thus, wishes are the impetus that leads to the
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weighing of pros and cons in terms of both desirability and feasibility. It is unlikely that a
person choses a goal solely on the basis of feasibility considerations, for instance, because the
goal is easy to achieve, without any higher-level need or preference from which the goal is
derived. From this point of view, desirability is primary to feasibility.1
Fifthly and finally, the attempt to corroborate self-access theory was limited by the fact
that an economical and well-established method of measuring self-access is not available today.
The picture story exercise (PSE; McClelland et al., 1989) is well-established in research but not
suitable for diagnosing individuals because of the test’s questionable reliability and because
norms are not available. The self-infiltration paradigm (Kuhl & Kazén, 1994) has generated a
considerable number of studies in the past decade. However, a central self-infiltration effect
could not be replicated in the present research. This may either indicate that the effect waxes
and wanes, depending on unknown circumstances, or that the complexity of the paradigm
makes independent replications difficult. Because measurement of self-access is not a easy task,
the present research was, in part, forced to be focused on methodological problems to the
disadvantage—one might think—of theoretical progress.
Questions Not Answered—or Not Even Asked—by the Present Research
No research project provides answers to all questions related to its topic. In the following,
three questions are asked that have not been answered by the papers of the present thesis but
may stimulate future research. These questions refer to contradicting predictions by different
strands of research, to the unambiguously positive evaluation of self-access by some
researchers, and to the assumption of dual systems.
Can Contradicting Predictions Be Reconciled?
According to PSI theory, self-access is deficient in subjects experiencing negative affect,
especially in state-oriented subjects (Baumann & Kuhl, 2003; Kazén et al., 2003). This
assumption is challenged by contradicting predictions derived from other theories.
I have argued above that the theory of fantasy realization (Oettingen et al., 2001) may be
considered a self-access approach because it explains the variation in the extent to which
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expectancy information is considered during goal selection. In a series of experiments, Kappes,
Oettingen, Mayer, and Maglio (2011) found that subjects in a sad mood, compared to subjects
in a neutral mood, engaged more in mental contrasting and that, subsequently, their goal
commitment was more in line with expectancy information. Thus, subjects in a sad mood
appeared to display better self-access than subjects in a neutral mood.
Similarly, results from memory psychology contradict the assumption that a sad mood
leads to a confusion between self and other. Hege and Dodson (2008) tested whether a specific
kind of self-other confusion, inadvertent plagiarism, depends on affective state. Inadvertent
plagiarism refers to the confusion of one’s own ideas with ideas generated by others. Hege and
Dodson hypothesized that subjects in a sad mood are less likely to display self-other confusions
than subjects in a happy mood because they process items more locally. This hypothesis was
confirmed in a series of studies. Therefore, if self-other distinction is taken to be the construct
of interest, then the results by Hege and Dodson contradict self-infiltration research according
to which negative affect increases self-other confusion.
From the above, two questions result: Is self-access fostered or hindered by negative
affect? Is self-other distinction—a proposed proxy variable of self-access—fostered or hindered
by negative affect? Reconciliation of the contradictive results might be possible in two ways:
Either one of the contradicting theories is not tenable, or the constructs involved in the
contradicting theories are not comparable. Further research should clarify the relationships,
firstly, between the value and the expectation aspect of self-access and, secondly, between
self-infiltration and other instances of self-other confusion.
Is Self-Knowledge Desirable?
While research results do not agree on the predictors of self-access or self-knowledge,
most researchers share the opinion that self-knowledge is a desirable characteristic. Some
psychologists from the humanistic or existential tradition hold strong beliefs about the
characteristics of the ideal, or “fully functional” person (Rogers, 1961; cf. Sheldon, 2004).
Self-knowledge is among those positively valued characteristics (Wicklund & Eckert, 1992).
However, the question of whether self-knowledge is desirable under all circumstances is
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debatable.
As Taylor and Brown (1988) pointed out, views about the benefits or costs of
self-knowledge diverge. In clinical psychology, contact with reality is considered an important
aspect of mental health. Research from social psychology, however, has shown that
unrealistically positive views of the own person, illusions of control, or unrealisitic optimism
have positive consequences for well-being and health (cf. Brown & Dutton, 1995). Thus, an
unrealistic view of one’s abilities and of one’s future has, on the whole, positive consequences.
People who slightly overestimate their abilities may set goals for themselves that are
challenging, which might be beneficial for self-regulation (Locke & Latham, 2002).
Inaccurate self-knowledge in terms of optimism or self-enhancement is related to the
expectancy aspect of goal striving. With respect to the value aspect, by contrast, the view that
self-knowledge is beneficial (e.g. Brunstein, 2010; Sheldon, 2002) has not been challenged.
Hence, one might conclude that accurate knowledge of one’s needs and preferences is
advantageous, while accurate knowledge of one’s abilities and prospects—as opposed to their
overestimation—is related to reduced well-being and health.
On the other hand, people who habitually choose tasks that are much too easy or too
difficult for them—which might well be for lack of self-knowledge—should suffer from this
mismatch. Because they can rarely be successful in a challenging task, their need to feel
competent (Ryan & Deci, 2008) is likely to be thwarted .
How Many Systems?
Self-knowledge and self-access are commonly thought to be based on a distinction
between two mental systems. In the dual-system communication framework (see Paper 1),
self-access was defined as a transfer of information from one memory system holding
unconscious self-representations to a second memory system holding conscious
self-representations (e.g. goals). However, the idea that self-access is based on a duality of
systems is challenged by at least two theoretical claims.
Firstly, Evans and Stanovich (2013), while opting in favour of dual-processing models,
discourage the notion of two underlying systems. They argue that it cannot usually be assumed
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that duality phenomena are based on exactly two systems. In fact, in the human brain, a large
number of systems is involved in any complex mental function, including goal selection and
decision-making. From this point of view, dual-system assumptions in self-access theories do
not appear to be appropriate descriptions of the neurological basis of self-access. Rather, they
must be taken to be metaphorical descriptions of theoretical claims.
Secondly, some researchers in the field of implicit social cognition have abandoned the
notion that implicit and explicit cognition stem from distinct memory systems. Gawronski and
Bodenhausen (2012) held that implicit and explicit measures of attitudes do not differ with
respect to source but tap into different aspects of evaluative judgements. While explicit
measures of attitudes refer to associations between the self and the liking of an object (e.g.
between self and liking swimming), implicit measures of attitudes refer to associations between
an object and its incentives (e.g. between swimming and fun; p. 5).
The same might apply to the distinction between implicit and explicit measures of
motivation. In explicit measures of motivation—e.g. measures of goal commitment—the
subject indicates to what extent his self and a possible action are compatible. In implicit
measures of motivation—e.g. the picture story exercise—, by contrast, the self as a concept is
not involved in the measurement process. Thus, implicit and explicit measures of motivation
might not tap into distinct memory systems but into different aspects of motivation.
The Future of Self-Access Research
Research on self-access in goal selection operates in a niche. Because self-access theories
are rooted in existential and humanistic psychology and not in empirical psychology, constructs
related to such theories are difficult to define, measure, or manipulate. This is particularly true
for variables that include an assumption of unconscious processing, such as self-access and
self-knowledge.
Furthermore, research on self-access in goal selection is mostly unconnected to many
areas of research that might be relevant to the topic, such as theories of self-access in
decision-making (e.g. Lee, Amir, & Ariely, 2009), multiattribute decision-making (Wallenius
et al., 2008), implicit attitudes (see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2012), dual-processing theories
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(Evans & Stanovich, 2013), or models of consciousness (e.g. Baars, 2005).
The future of the psychology of self-access is a tightrope walk. Because empirical
humanistic psychology differs from cognitive psychology with respect to the conception of man
and to other fundamental assumptions, it has good reason to reject cognitive reductionism.
While the relative isolation of this field of research may allow creative ideas to flourish, it may
lead to a decoupling of self-access theory from state-of-the-art psychology. This dilemma has
shaped the present research and, presumably, will shape the future of self-access research.
Notes
1 This statement might be thought to contradict the risk-taking model of Atkinson (1957), according to which
task attractiveness (i.e. desirability) is a positive linear function of task difficulty (i.e. the inversion of feasibility). In
other words, the more difficult a task seems, the more attractive it is. However, the risk-taking model predicts choice
only in terms of setting a level of aspiration, not in terms of deciding between different classes of incentives. For a
choice of the latter kind, the desirability of attaining incentives from different classes matters. Thus, also according
to this theory, the selection of a goal (in terms of what behaviour is chosen), which is based on the person’s needs,
depends primarily on considerations of desirability.
References
Achtziger, A. & Gollwitzer, P. M. (2008). Motivation and volition in the course of action. In J.
Heckhausen & H. Heckhausen (Eds.), Motivation and action (pp. 272–295). New York,
NY: Cambridge University Press.
Atkinson, J. W. (1957). Motivational determinants of risk-taking behavior. Psychological
Review, 64, 359–368. doi:10.1037/h0043445
Baars, B. J. (2005). Global workspace theory of consciousness: Toward a cognitive
neuroscience of human experience. Progress in Brain Research, 150, 45–53.
doi:10.1016/S0079-6123(05)50004-9
Baumann, N. & Kuhl, J. (2003). Self-infiltration: Confusing assigned tasks as self-selected in
memory. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 487–497.
doi:10.1177/0146167202250916
DISCUSSION 187
Brown, J. D. & Dutton, K. A. (1995). Truth and consequences: The costs and benefits of
accurate self-knowledge. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21, 1288–1296.
doi:10.1177/01461672952112006
Brunstein, J. C. (2010). Implicit motives and explicit goals: The role of motivational
congruence in emotional well-being. In O. C. Schultheiss & J. C. Brunstein (Eds.),
Implicit motives (pp. 347–374). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Campbell, J. D. (1990). Self-esteem and clarity of the self-concept. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 59, 538–549. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.59.3.538
Evans, J. St. B. T. & Stanovich, K. E. (2013). Dual-process theories of higher cognition:
Advancing the debate. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8, 223–241.
doi:10.1177/1745691612460685
Gawronski, B. & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2012). Self-insight from a dual-process perspective. In S.
Vazire & T. Wilson (Eds.), Handbook of self-knowledge (pp. 22–38). New York, NY:
Guilford.
Germeijs, V. & De Boeck, P. (2002). A measurement scale for indecisiveness and its
relationship to career indecision and other types of indecision. European Journal of
Psychological Assessment, 18, 113–122. doi:10.1027//1015-5759.18.2.113
Gollwitzer, P. M. & Oettingen, G. (2012). Goal pursuit. In R. M. Ryan (Ed.), The Oxford
handbook of human motivation (pp. 208–231). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Hege, A. C. G. & Dodson, C. S. (2008). Sad moods reduce inadvertent plagiarism: Effects of
affective state on source monitoring. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Butler University,
Indianapolis, IN.
Horner, A. J. (1973). Ego boundaries: The last line of resistance in psychotherapy.
Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice, 10, 83–86. doi:10.1037/h0087551
Jostmann, N. B. & Koole, S. L. (2006). On the waxing and waning of working memory: Action
orientation moderates the impact of demanding relationship primes on working memory
capacity. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32, 1716–1728.
doi:10.1177/0146167206292595
DISCUSSION 188
Kappes, H. B., Oettingen, G., Mayer, D., & Maglio, S. (2011). Sad mood promotes self-initiated
mental contrasting of future and reality. Emotion, 11, 1206–1222. doi:10.1037/a0023983
Kazén, M., Baumann, N., & Kuhl, J. (2003). Self-infiltration vs. self-compatibility checking in
dealing with unattractive tasks: The moderating influence of state vs. action orientation.
Motivation and Emotion, 27, 157–197. doi:10.1023/A:1025043530799
Kroger, J., Martinussen, M., & Marcia, J. E. (2010). Identity status change during adolescence
and young adulthood: A meta-analysis. Journal of Adolescence, 33, 683–698.
doi:10.1016/j.adolescence.2009.11.002
Kuhl, J. (2000). A functional-design approach to motivation and self-regulation: The dynamics
of personality systems interactions. In M. Boekaerts, P. R. Pintrich, & M. Zeidner (Eds.),
Handbook of self-regulation (pp. 111–169). Burlington, MA: Elsevier.
doi:10.1016/B978-012109890-2/50034-2
Kuhl, J. (2001). Motivation und Persönlichkeit: Interaktionen psychischer Systeme [Motivation
and personality: Interaction of mental systems]. Göttingen: Hogrefe.
Kuhl, J. & Kazén, M. (1994). Self-discrimination and memory: State orientation and false
self-ascription of assigned activities. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66,
1103–1103. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.66.6.1103
Lee, L., Amir, O., & Ariely, D. (2009). In search of homo economicus: Cognitive noise and the
role of emotion in preference consistency. Journal of Consumer Research, 36, 173–187.
doi:10.1086/597160
Locke, E. A. & Latham, G. P. (2002). Building a practically useful theory of goal setting and
task motivation. American Psychologist, 57, 705–717. doi:10.1037//0003-066X.57.9.705
McClelland, D. C., Koestner, R., & Weinberger, J. (1989). How do self-attributed and implicit
motives differ? Psychological Review, 96, 690–702.
doi:10.1017/CBO9780511527937.004
Oettingen, G., Pak, H.-j., & Schnetter, K. (2001). Self-regulation of goal setting: Turning free
fantasies about the future into binding goals. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 80, 736–753. doi:10.1037//0022-3514.80.5.736
DISCUSSION 189
Rogers, C. R. (1961). On becoming a person: A therapist’s view of psychotherapy. London:
Constable.
Ryan, R. & Deci, E. (2008). Self-determination theory and the role of basic psychological needs
in personality and the organization of behavior. In O. P. John, R. W. Robins, & L. A.
Pervin (Eds.), Handbook of personality: Theory and research (pp. 654–678). New York,
NY: Guilford.
Schultheiss, O. C. & Strasser, A. (2012). Referential processing and competence as
determinants of congruence between implicit and explicit motives. In S. Vazire & T. D.
Wilson (Eds.), Handbook of self-knowledge (pp. 39–62). New York, NY: Guilford.
Sheldon, K. M. (2002). The self-concordance model of healthy goal striving: When personal
goals correctly represent the person. In E. L. Deci & R. M. Ryan (Eds.), Handbook of
self-determination research (pp. 65–86). New York, NY: University of Rochester Press.
Sheldon, K. M. (2004). Optimal human being: An integrated multi-level perspective. Mahwah,
NJ: Erlbaum.
Sheldon, K. M. & Kasser, T. (1995). Coherence and congruence: Two aspects of personality
integration. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 531–543.
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.68.3.531
Simonson, I. (2008). Will I like a “medium” pillow? Another look at constructed and inherent
preferences. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 18, 155–169.
doi:10.1016/j.jcps.2008.04.002
Taylor, S. E. & Brown, J. D. (1988). Illusion and well-being: A social psychological perspective
on mental health. Psychological Bulletin, 103, 193–210.
doi:10.1037/0033-2909.103.2.193
Wallenius, J., Dyer, J. S., Fishburn, P. C., Steuer, R. E., Zionts, S., & Deb, K. (2008). Multiple
criteria decision making, multiattribute utility theory: Recent accomplishments and what
lies ahead. Management Science, 54, 1336–1349. doi:10.1287/mnsc.1070.0838
Wicklund, R. A. & Eckert, M. (1992). The self-knower: A hero under control. Plenum Series in
Social/Clinical Psychology. New York, NY: Plenum.
DISCUSSION 190
Yoon, K. P. & Hwang, C.-L. (1995). Multiple attribute decision making: An introduction.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Lukas Giesinger
Birchstrasse 410, CH­8052 Zürich
geboren am 7. Juli 1975, von Oberriet (SG)
Berufserfahrung
2009–2013 Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter und Lehrbeauftragter, Universität Zürich, Fachrichtung 
Motivationspsychologie
2004 Praktikant an der Psychiatrischen Universitätsklinik Zürich. Diagnostische Abklärungen 
und Einzelgespräche mit Akutpatienten
1996–1998 Kaufmännische Tätigkeit
Ausbildung
2009–2013 Doktorand im Fach Psychologie, Universität Zürich
2009 Lizentiat im Fach Psychologie (lic. phil. I), Universität Zürich
2000–2009 Studium der Psychologie, Psychopathologie und deutschen Sprachwissenschaft an der 
Universität Zürich
1995 Matura Typus B, Stiftsschule Engelberg (OW)
Auszeichnungen
2007 Posterpreis am 10. Kongress der Schweizerischen Gesellschaft für Psychologie, 
Kategorie Lizentianden, 2. Rang.
Lehre
2013 Volition: Theorien der willentlichen Handlungssteuerung, Seminar
2012 Statistik­ und SPSS­Auffrischungskurs für Lizentiats­ und Master­Studierende 
2010 Theorie der Persönlichkeits­System­Interaktionen (PSI­Theorie), Seminar
2009 Praxisbezogene Grundkompetenzen (PGK; Training sozialer Kompetenzen), Anleitung 
und Supervision der TrainerInnen
2010–2012 Experimentalpsychologisches Praktikum: Betreuung experimenteller Forschungsprojekte
2009–2013 Betreuung von Forschungs­, Bachelor­ und Lizentiatsarbeiten
